2025年4月4日，星期五，第1219期

俄直投基金总裁、总统对外投资和经济合作特别代表德米特里耶夫表示，美国公司希望重返俄罗斯

【媒体报道】

4月4日，俄罗斯直接投资基金总裁、俄总统对外投资和经济合作特别代表德米特里耶夫表示，美国公司希望重返俄罗斯。德米特里耶夫在华盛顿向记者表示：“我们看到美国公司非常希望重返俄罗斯。”

【讨论纪要】

●特朗普政府愿意与俄罗斯做交易的一个险恶意图是，类似当年推动科索沃独立进程与欧盟做交易挑拨中欧俄战略协调那样挑拨中俄战略互信

我们注意到，4月4日，俄罗斯直接投资基金总裁、俄总统对外投资和经济合作特别代表德米特里耶夫表示，美国公司希望重返俄罗斯。德米特里耶夫在华盛顿向记者表示：“我们看到美国公司非常希望重返俄罗斯。”

德米特里耶夫不仅仅是俄罗斯当局的高官，也是一位商业人士。这进一步说明，目前美俄之间的逐渐靠近更多基于非传统安全层面。与之类似，中欧之间也在非传统安全层面，比如，在共同应对特朗普政府肆意挥舞关税大棒的问题上，似乎也有越来越多的共同关心话题。如此一来，围绕以乌克兰问题，中东问题为代表的国际局势的后续演化，似乎正在形成分别以美俄，中欧为对家的“两桌儿麻将”，且随着美国内部恶斗日益激烈与“外溢”效应的不断增强而演化出一些新变化，比如，类似中日关系在日本前首相小泉纯一郎执政时期的那种“政冷经热”。

德米特里耶夫是一名商人，特朗普也是一名商人，而商人最喜欢的就是“做交易”。

2007年爆发次贷危机后，深感实力不济的美国不得不对欧盟有所让步，推动科索沃单方面独立，这是一桩典型的交易。当然，美国人在交易过程中加入了“毒药”，因为塞尔维亚当时有俄罗斯的显性利益，科索沃独立进程开启后，欧俄关系变得比之以往更加复杂。对美国来说，策动科索沃独立的好处之一莫过于在中、欧、俄战略协调中撕开了缺口，如此才有机会推动后来的第一到第三轮排列组合。

今天特朗普政府或准备从这一段过往经历中获取灵感，通过对俄罗斯妥协让步，进一步破坏中俄战略互信。

需要再次强调的是，特朗普政府处理美俄关系，某种意义上说是迫不得已。在特朗普的原计划中，其认为最先应该有效处理的是中美关系，但问题在于中国不是俄罗斯，更不是美国。在中国内政问题上，不会就所谓“交易台湾”等话题与美国做任何形式的交易。在中国外交问题上，更不会以第三方核心利益与美国做任何形式的交易。正是在这一背景下，特朗普政府不得不回头处理俄美关系。结果就是，因中美关系的“不确定”导致俄美之间围绕乌克兰问题，中东问题谈出的阶段性“共识”是一变再变。如今，特朗普政府正式上台已经有两个半月左右，不仅中美关系仍未能有效处理，俄美关系，欧美关系更是一团糟。

值得一提的是，德米特里耶夫作为俄罗斯高级官员访问美国的时候，恰逢特朗普政府向全世界挥舞关税大棒之际。而特朗普这样做的一个核心企图就是，妄图通过威逼利诱的方式在全世界范围内组建“关税反华同盟”，基于“伴随战略攻击的战略测试”层面，以此为筹码，讹诈国际社会配合特朗普访华。就算访华不成，也可以借关税政策将世界经济拉入新一次大萧条时期，为其公开，史无前例地大规模启动印钞机寻找理所当然地由头。

●如果最终内塔尼亚胡得以相对顺利返回以色列，则意味着目前主政欧洲的主要国家当局仍能维持和特朗普政府之间的基本沟通和交流

在继续展开讨论前，我们再来看一则新闻报道：

4月3日，以色列总理内塔尼亚胡无视国际刑事法院的逮捕令，于当天凌晨抵达匈牙利。这是他自2023年以来首次访问欧洲。

让我们将讨论的重点再次聚焦在美国内部恶斗上，至少到目前为止，其仍然是国际局势的主要推动力之一。

在我们看来，内塔尼亚胡不顾国际刑事法院发布的逮捕令，2023年以来首次出访欧洲的背后，是美国内斗恶斗“外溢效应”不断增强的具体表现。具体来说，从代言西方资本利益的美国资本利益内部外溢到整个西方资本利益范畴之内，从美国外溢到了欧洲。不要忘了，代言西方资本利益的美国资本利益中的一部分，已经转移到了欧洲，还有一部分正在计划转移到欧洲。而法国极右翼领导人勒庞挪用公款案一事意味着，至少已经转移到欧洲的那部分代言西方资本利益的美国资本利益已经与部分欧洲利益结合在了一起，并导致欧洲内部矛盾日益激化。从这一点看，内塔尼亚胡不顾国际刑事法院发出的逮捕令访问匈牙利，或有意将整个西方阵营内部恶斗不断的白热化程度以及残酷性展现给世界看。

不难想象的是，如果最终内塔尼亚胡得以相对顺利返回以色列，则意味着目前主政欧洲的主要国家当局（区别于与“拜登之索罗斯们”结合在一起的那部分欧洲利益，比如欧洲极右翼政治势力）仍能维持和特朗普政府之间的基本沟通和交流。对此，俄罗斯决策层尤其值得警惕。

这也是我们说尽管欧美之间再次出现“公开争吵”的迹象，但距离真正意义上的“欧美公开争吵仍有距离”且多次提醒俄罗斯决策层不要在乌克兰问题上将欧美关系绝对对立起来的主要原因所在。当然，内塔尼亚胡冒险出国访问，也有以色列内部矛盾尖锐激烈这方面的不得已而为之。

●针对特朗普政府“4月2日宣布对全球许多国家，尤其是中国加税”一事的“短期评估”

在本次回顾的最后，让我们共同关注特朗普关税政策，以及就特朗普政府“4月2日宣布对全球许多国家，尤其是中国加税”一事的“短期评估”。

我们注意到，在中国宣布对所有美国进口商品加征34%关税后，美股三大期指进一步下挫。截至发稿，纳斯达克100期货跌超3%，道琼斯期货跌超1100点、跌幅3%，标普500期货跌近2%。

所谓“短期评估”，指的是特朗普政府关税政策正式生效后，在头三个月的后续可能发展，对此我们想要着重强调的是：

第一，特朗普政府正式上台后已有70日有余，在我们看来，如果特朗普政府能将当前针对中国的这种“加税幅度”维持6个月以上，且还能维持美国社会运行、特别是美国经济，尤其是美国金融的基本稳定运行，那么表面上特朗普就会有机会“修宪”并谋求连任，从而首先确保他个人不会再次遭到政治清算，其次，确保特朗普家族及以他和“特朗普们”为代表的美国利益团体（美国新军工复合体为标志的部分华尔街资本）的大目标。但需要强调的是，即便是这样，东方时事解读对之前的“从2025年年初开始计算，目前模式的美国的大限，最多为7年（+-半年）”的评估，也不调整！

第二，至于目前模式的美国“最少”还能维持多久时间？只能说是“随时（或半年）”，具体就要看美国政府针对中国的“加税幅度”维持目前这种综合水平能否维持6个月？或6个月之内，何时，何种方式进行调整？

第三，基于“第一”，特朗普政府“4月2日宣布对全球许多国家，尤其是对中国加税”其后续操作手法，首先就是“加，就是为了减”，而对“除中国之外的国家”而言、想减就得去谈。而谈的主要内容就是要加入“关税反华联盟”；

第四，基于“第二”，如果“加税幅度”不能坚持6个月，或“谈”的效果不好，恐怕特朗普会再次使出其第一任期最擅长的一手，那就是“川剧”中“变脸”，且是“不要脸式的随时变脸”。

在过去的70多天时间里，通过至少两拨人马（美国前财长保尔森和特朗普的“闺蜜”戴恩斯）讨要“进京机票”至今未果的情况下，恼、羞、最终于4月2日“成怒”的特朗普尽管表面上表现得凶残无比、肆意妄为，但却已经“露怯”——特朗普一边宣布对主要贸易伙伴加征“全球对等关税”，但另一边的墨西哥却未被列入新关税名单，为什么？因为墨西哥事实上已经成为中国制造“转口进入”美国经济的最大渠道！

最后需要强调的是，上述内容仅是我们就特朗普政府“4月2日宣布对全球许多国家，尤其是中国加税”一事的“短期评估”，也就是“中美双方彼此加税正式生效后的前三个月”的后续可能发展所给出的初步评估。至于三个月后的可能发展，我们将与大家一起密切观察，具体结合相关新闻报道再做进一步展开解读。

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Tuesday, April 4, 2025, Issue No. 1219

Dmitryev, President of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and Special Representative of the President for Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation, stated that American companies wish to return to Russia.

[Media Coverage]

On April 4th, Dmitryev, President of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and Special Representative of the President for Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation, said that American companies wish to return to Russia. Dmitryev told reporters in Washington: "We see that American companies are very eager to return to Russia."

【Discussion Summary】

● One sinister intention of the Trump administration's willingness to make deals with Russia is to, similar to how they pushed for Kosovo's independence and made deals with the EU to undermine the strategic coordination among China, Europe, and Russia back then, undermine the strategic mutual trust between China and Russia.

We have noticed that on April 4th, Dmitryev, President of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and Special Representative of the President for Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation, said that American companies wish to return to Russia. Dmitryev told reporters in Washington: "We see that American companies are very eager to return to Russia."

Dmitryev is not only a high-ranking official of the Russian authorities but also a businessman. This further indicates that the current gradual rapprochement between the US and Russia is more based on non-traditional security aspects. Similarly, China and Europe also seem to have more and more common topics of concern on non-traditional security aspects, such as jointly responding to the Trump administration's wanton brandishing of the tariff bat. As such, the subsequent evolution of the international situation represented by issues like Ukraine and the Middle East seems to be forming a kind of "two mahjong tables" with the US-Russia and China-Europe as the opposing sides, and with the intensifying internal strife in the US and the growing "spillover" effect, some new changes are emerging, such as the "cold politics and hot economy" in Sino-Japanese relations during the tenure of former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

Dmitryev is a businessman, and Trump is also a businessman, and what businessmen like most is to "make deals."

After the subprime mortgage crisis broke out in 2007, the US, feeling its strength insufficient, had to make concessions to the EU and promoted Kosovo's unilateral independence, which was a typical deal. Of course, the Americans added "poison" during the deal-making process because Serbia had explicit Russian interests at that time, and after the Kosovo independence process began, the relationship between Europe and Russia became more complicated than before. For the US, one of the benefits of instigating Kosovo's independence was to tear open a gap in the strategic coordination among China, Europe, and Russia, so as to have the opportunity to promote the subsequent first to third rounds of permutations and combinations.

Today, the Trump administration may be ready to draw inspiration from this past experience and further undermine the strategic mutual trust between China and Russia by making compromises and concessions to Russia.

It needs to be emphasized once again that in handling US-Russia relations, the Trump administration is, in a sense, forced to do so. In Trump's original plan, he thought that the China-US relationship should be effectively addressed first, but the problem is that China is neither Russia nor the United States. On China's domestic issues, it will not make any form of deal with the US on topics such as "trading Taiwan." On China's foreign policy issues, it will not make any form of deal with the US on third-party core interests. Against this backdrop, the Trump administration had no choice but to turn back to handling US-Russia relations. As a result, due to the "uncertainty" in China-US relations, the phased "consensus" reached between Russia and the US on issues such as Ukraine and the Middle East has changed repeatedly. Now, more than two and a half months have officially passed since the Trump administration took office, and not only has the China-US relationship not been effectively handled, but the Russia-US and Europe-US relationships are also in a mess.

It is worth mentioning that Dmitryev's visit to the US as a senior Russian official coincided with the Trump administration's brandishing of the tariff bat at the whole world. One of Trump's core attempts in doing so is to try to form a "tariff anti-China alliance" worldwide through coercion and inducement, based on the level of "strategic testing accompanied by strategic attacks," using this as a bargaining chip to extort the international community to cooperate with Trump's visit to China. Even if the visit to China fails, it can also use tariff policies to drag the world economy into a new Great Depression, finding a seemingly justified excuse for its unprecedented large-scale launching of the printing press.

● If Netanyahu can return to Israel relatively smoothly in the end, it means that the authorities of the major countries currently governing Europe can still maintain basic communication and exchanges with the Trump administration.

Before continuing the discussion, let's take a look at another news report:

On April 3rd, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, ignoring the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court, arrived in Hungary in the early hours of the same day. This was his first visit to Europe since 2023.

Let's focus our discussion again on the internal strife in the United States, which, at least so far, remains one of the main driving forces of the international situation.

In our view, the fact that Netanyahu visited Europe for the first time since 2023, disregarding the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court, is a concrete manifestation of the continuously intensifying "spillover effect" of the internal strife in the United States. Specifically, it has spilled over from the interests of US capital that represent Western capital interests within the United States to the entire scope of Western capital interests, and from the United States to Europe. Don't forget that part of the US capital interests representing Western capital interests has already been transferred to Europe, and some are planning to be transferred there. The case of French far-right leader Le Pen's embezzlement of public funds means that at least the part of the US capital interests representing Western capital interests that has been transferred to Europe has combined with some European interests, leading to increasingly intensified internal contradictions in Europe. From this perspective, Netanyahu's visit to Hungary, disregarding the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court, may be intended to show the world the continuously intensifying and brutal nature of the internal strife within the entire Western camp.

It is not difficult to imagine that if Netanyahu can return to Israel relatively smoothly in the end, it means that the authorities of the major countries currently governing Europe (different from the part of European interests combined with "Biden's Soros," such as the far-right political forces in Europe) can still maintain basic communication and exchanges with the Trump administration. In this regard, the Russian decision-making level especially needs to be vigilant.

This is also the main reason why we said that although there are signs of "open quarrels" between Europe and the United States again, there is still a distance from a real "open quarrel between Europe and the United States," and we have repeatedly reminded the Russian decision-making level not to absolutely oppose the European and American relations on the Ukraine issue. Of course, Netanyahu's risky overseas visit is also a last resort due to the sharp and intense internal contradictions in Israel.

● "Short-term assessment" of the Trump administration's "announcement on April 2 to increase taxes on many countries around the world, especially China"

At the end of this review, let's pay attention to Trump's tariff policy and the "short-term assessment" of the Trump administration's "announcement on April 2 to increase taxes on many countries around the world, especially China."

We have noticed that after China announced a 34% tariff on all US imports, the three major US stock index futures further declined. As of the time of publication, Nasdaq 100 futures fell more than 3%, Dow Jones futures fell more than 1,100 points, or 3%, and S&P 500 futures fell nearly 2%.

The so-called "short-term assessment" refers to the possible development in the first three months after Trump's tariff policy officially takes effect. What we want to emphasize is:

First, more than 70 days have passed since the Trump administration officially took office. In our view, if the Trump administration can maintain the current "tax increase rate" against China for more than six months and still maintain the basic stable operation of US society, especially the US economy, especially the US financial system, then on the surface, Trump will have the opportunity to "amend the constitution" and seek re-election, thereby first ensuring that he himself will not be politically purged again, and second, ensuring the major goals of the Trump family and the US interest groups represented by him and "the Trumps" (part of Wall Street capital represented by the new US military-industrial complex). However, it should be emphasized that even so, the Oriental Times' previous assessment that "from the beginning of 2025, the maximum limit for the current model of the United States is seven years (plus or minus half a year)" will not be adjusted!

Second, as for how long the current model of the United States can "at least" last? It can only be said to be "at any time (or six months)," depending on whether the US government can maintain the current comprehensive level of "tax increase rate" against China for six months? Or within six months, when and in what way will it be adjusted?

Third, based on the "first point," the follow-up operation method of the Trump administration's "announcement on April 2 to increase taxes on many countries around the world, especially China" is first "to increase in order to decrease," and for "countries other than China," if they want to decrease, they have to negotiate. The main content of the negotiation is to join the "tariff anti-China alliance."

Fourth, based on the "second point," if the "tax increase rate" cannot be maintained for six months, or the "negotiation" effect is not good, Trump may once again resort to his most skilled move during his first term, which is the "face-changing" in Sichuan opera, and it is the "shameless face-changing at any time."

In the past 70-plus days, Trump, despite appearing extremely ferocious and reckless on the surface, has already "shown weakness" after at least two groups of people (former US Treasury Secretary Paulson and Trump's "close friend" Dann) have been asking for "tickets to Beijing" without success. Trump announced a "global equivalent tariff" on major trading partners, but Mexico was not included in the new tariff list. Why? Because Mexico has in fact become the largest channel for Chinese manufacturing to "transit into" the US economy!

Finally, it should be emphasized that the above content is only our "short-term assessment" of the Trump administration's "announcement on April 2 to increase taxes on many countries around the world, especially China," which is the preliminary assessment of the possible development in the first three months after the tariffs between China and the United States officially take effect. As for the possible development after three months, we will closely observe it together with everyone and further interpret it in combination with relevant news reports.

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

原文作者公众号：

广州市贯日翻译服务有限公司为东方时评-衍射传媒/衍射咨询提供翻译支持

翻译请联系http://www.en-ch.com/chcontact.htm

手机微信13924166640

广州市越秀区环市东路世界贸易中心大厦南塔24楼 020-86266990