2025年3月22日，星期六，第1209期

结合美俄正商谈分割乌克兰土地的背景观察，俄方重提莫斯科音乐厅恐袭旧案值得国际社会高度警惕

【媒体报道】

3月22日，俄罗斯联邦侦查委员会发言人彼得连科在莫斯科“克罗库斯城”音乐厅恐袭一周年之际发布声明称，俄侦查和安全机关已逮捕并完成对19名在该案中被控犯有恐怖主义犯罪的被告的调查行动，还有一系列涉案人员已被通缉。

【讨论纪要】

●结合美俄正商谈分割乌克兰土地的背景观察，俄方重提莫斯科音乐厅恐袭旧案值得国际社会高度警惕

3月19日，美国总统特朗普接受美国某媒体独家采访时称，他这两天与俄乌总统进行了“两次非常好的谈话”。他坚持应与俄罗斯打交道，赞美俄罗斯“领土比中国大，有非常宝贵的矿产”。他还声称，若美俄关系正常化能让俄罗斯“脱离中国”，那这是“一件好事”。

这一条新闻报道至少传递出两个明确信号：其一，美国和俄罗斯在非传统安全层面的确有可能合作的空间。当然，这里内嵌了一条双方合作的必要前提条件，那就是实质性解除对俄罗斯的经济，尤其是金融制裁；其二，特朗普政府仍在努力试图破坏中俄战略互信。就像特朗普所说的，若美俄关系正常化能让俄罗斯“脱离中国”，那这是“一件好事”。

在继续展开讨论前，我们来看一则新闻报道。

3月21日，美国总统特朗普表示，目前正在商谈“分割”乌克兰土地的“契约”，作为结束战争的最终协议的一部分。乌克兰的主权和领土完整正在被“乌克兰最大的保护者”——美国与“乌克兰最大的敌人”——俄罗斯商谈如何“分割”，这一场景显得似乎过于讽刺。而这就是乌克兰当下的现状。

如果说，这是特朗普政府基于传统安全层面为缓和俄美关系在对俄罗斯进一步妥协让步，那么在非传统安全层面，双方可能的合作，大家就有必要关注俄方重提莫斯科音乐厅恐袭旧案这一最新动作——3月22日，俄罗斯联邦侦查委员会发言人彼得连科在莫斯科“克罗库斯城”音乐厅恐袭一周年之际发布声明称，俄侦查和安全机关已逮捕并完成对19名在该案中被控犯有恐怖主义犯罪的被告的调查行动，还有一系列涉案人员已被通缉。在我们的观察与评估中，所谓美俄基于非传统安全层面可能展开的合作，中亚方向或是“切入点”。

为了更好地展开讨论，我们不妨回顾一下2025年1月11日回顾中的部分内容：

●美国“战略收缩”之强烈信号从“灵魂深处”触动了俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”的小心思

在继续展开讨论前，再来看一则新闻报道。

日前，自然资源部中国地质调查局联合中国石油长庆油田分公司、中国核工业地质局等单位，在鄂尔多斯盆地泾川地区取得铀矿找矿重大突破，资源储量规模达特大型。

众所周知，我国一向在能源获取问题上采取“多条路一起走”的办法，核能就是其中之一。有消息说，中国有望在2025年启动全球首座钍基熔盐堆核电站的建设工作。最近，中国科学院上海应用物理研究所发布了《小型模块化钍基熔盐堆研究设施项目环境影响报告书（选址阶段）》，详细介绍了即将开展的一个10兆瓦电功率的小型模块化钍基熔盐堆项目。该研究堆的设计最大热功率为60兆瓦，预计将成为全球首座此类钍基熔盐反应堆核电站。该项目的建设目标是在2025年内正式动工，并在2029年实现首次临界并满功率运行。此外，该商业堆的热功率将达到60兆瓦，其中10兆瓦将用于发电，而另外50兆瓦则计划用于制氢，这将进一步推动中国能源结构的多元化和清洁化发展。此外，中国钍储量28.6万吨，足够未来两万年需求。在我们看来，钍基熔盐反应堆是可控核聚变反应堆商用前的终极能源方案。

相比于储量丰富的钍，中国的铀储量则要贫瘠得多，至少从以前官方公布的数据来看是这样的。而在此前，基于俄罗斯二号政治人物梅德韦杰夫访华这一问题的基础上，我们曾讨论过俄罗斯将哈萨克斯坦某大型铀矿股份转让给中国的话题。下面不妨让我们共同回顾一下2024年12月26日的部分讨论内容，对大家更好地理解上述新闻报道会有所帮助：

所谓“新想法”，在我们看来：

第一，“中吉乌铁路”项目即将动工开建，尽管哈萨克斯坦对此心中有所不满（目前中欧班列主要经过哈萨克斯坦，所以哈萨克斯坦认为，“中吉乌铁路”项目可能会分流运输，使哈萨克斯坦利益受损），但总体上仍服从于这一局面。由于“中吉乌铁路”开工建设一定经过了俄罗斯的默许，在客观上，俄罗斯与哈萨克斯坦之间的关系或会有所拉近。至于靠多近，另当别论，但有一点可以肯定，俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦现在都离不开中国；

第二，如果说，俄方就“蒙古问题”作为“愿意共同解决历史遗留问题”之切入点，诚意尚可，但仍显务虚的话。那么在相对务实的层面，我们注意到，据英国媒体报道，在中、俄、哈三方协商下，俄罗斯原子能公司旗下的铀一集团已将其在哈萨克斯坦扎列奇诺耶铀矿的49%股份转交给了中国核铀资源开发公司的消息出现。当然，这一消息尚待有关方的官方进一步确认；

第三，如果这一消息被证实无误，在我们看来，基于“在商言商”的层面，也算是俄方诚意相对务实的具体表现。相应地，我们对俄罗斯的战略策应会比之以往更加有力一些（仍达不到实质性战略策应的程度）；

第四，所谓“在商言商”的意思在于，如果俄罗斯希望获得更有力的战略策应，在诸如“中俄实质性联手稳定中亚”“俄罗斯实质性放弃阿富汗政策‘小九九’”等话题得出“最终结论”之时机仍不成熟的背景下，就需要用真金白银的利益进行交换。基于此，我们认为，这一传闻的可行性是较高的；

第五，尽管目前诸如“中俄实质性联手稳定中亚”“俄罗斯实质性放弃阿富汗政策‘小九九’”等话题得出“最终结论”之时机仍不成熟，但中亚稳定问题似乎正在以另外一种形式慢慢形成，那就是中、俄、哈三方基于越来越多的共同利益交集，尤其是，对我们来说是资产，对俄罗斯来说是“后腰”的安全，对哈萨克斯坦来说是得到中俄提供的安全保障（对哈萨克斯坦来说，稳定最重要。而想要实现稳定，唯一途径就是依靠中俄，依靠上合），共同促使中亚地区稳定。所以，这一变化虽然距离质变层面还有距离，但可以看作量变层面的一种进展；

第六，综上五点，或是哈萨克斯坦愿意向塞尔维亚部署部队的主要原因之一。值得注意的是，有媒体报道，本次哈萨克斯坦向塞尔维亚派遣特种部队，是在塞尔维亚向上合请求下，基于“反恐”而进行的。值得一提的是，2001年6月15日成立的上合，哈萨克斯坦是创始成员国之一。如果俄罗斯最终选择与中国实质性联手，那么上合就会被有效“重启”，一旦如此，中俄共同组成“党小组核心”（类似于党组书记），包括哈萨克斯坦在内的创始成员国将成为“党小组核心成员”（类似于党组成员）。

结合上述回顾大家不难看出，围绕哈萨克斯坦扎列奇诺耶铀矿的股份转让问题，表面看是经济问题，实际上是政治问题，且直接涉及俄罗斯是否愿意彻底放弃“阿富汗政策小九九”，是否愿意与中国实质性联手。

在我们看来，在美国“战略收缩”之强烈信号的刺激下，俄罗斯很可能被牵动，从而使得中俄关系发生新变化。显然，在我国公布鄂尔多斯盆地泾川地区取得铀矿找矿重大突破，资源储量规模达特大型的背后，或是哈萨克斯坦铀矿合作项目发生了“新变化”，且变化的方向是消极的。看样子，美国“战略收缩”之强烈信号从“灵魂深处”触动了俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”的小心思。

从上述回顾大家不难看出，从2024年12月10日，梅德韦杰夫因叙利亚局势骤变，阿萨德政权被颠覆而紧急访华，到2025年1月10日，仅一个月的时间中，特朗普政府释放“战略收缩”之强烈信号，是如何从“灵魂深处”触动了俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”的小心思的。

俄方心思再次发生“新变化”的一个主要影响方向就是中亚地区。且以非传统安全层面为切入点，却映射在传统安全层面。用回顾中的一句话形容就是：围绕哈萨克斯坦扎列奇诺耶铀矿的股份转让问题，表面看是经济问题，实际上是政治问题，且直接涉及俄罗斯是否愿意彻底放弃“阿富汗政策小九九”，是否愿意与中国实质性联手。

此外，在美俄有可能基于非传统安全层面合作，中亚方向或是“切入点”的问题上，我们再提供两则旧闻，请大家结合上面的回顾一并观察：

2024年3月23日，对于有消息称“有塔吉克斯坦公民参与俄罗斯莫斯科近郊音乐厅恐怖袭击事件”，塔吉克斯坦外交部称，这是“假消息”。

2024年3月25日，时任美国五角大楼发言人帕特·莱德表示，“伊斯兰国呼罗珊分支”（IS-K）宣称对俄罗斯莫斯科近郊音乐厅恐怖袭击事件负责，表明“伊斯兰国”（IS）极端组织仍然是一个全球威胁，该组织在中亚和非洲地区的分支正不断壮大。

提醒大家注意的是，吉尔吉斯斯坦是“中吉乌铁路”项目中的重要节点，此外，这条铁路项目的建设也涉及哈萨克斯坦这个中亚五国中最大的国家。而发生在2024年3月22日的莫斯科音乐厅的恐袭事件引起了哈萨克斯坦总统托卡耶夫的高度关注，他召集国家安全部门紧急会议，讨论如何保障本国公民的安全问题，并呼吁与中国和俄罗斯加强合作，共同对恐怖主义行动进行打击，以维护地区的和平与稳定。

●特朗普政府在处理美俄关系和美欧关系的过程中，始终无法绕开“按下了葫芦，瓢又起”的尴尬处境

目前，特朗普政府还是选择对俄罗斯进一步让步，尽管有媒体爆料称，在上一次的俄美元首通电话的过程中，普京出席了俄罗斯工业家和企业家联盟代表大会并发表讲话，特朗普为此等了普京足足一个小时。

显然，对于至今仍无法在中美关系有效改善问题上打开任何局面的特朗普，不得不再次转身，以一种更卑微的姿态，尽快处理好美俄关系。话说，美国和欧盟在乌克兰问题上至少合作了三年，但似乎只合作出了一个寂寞。如果欧美在乌克兰问题上的合作是取得实质性进展的，特朗普今天也不至于如此极尽屈辱地去等一个小时与普京通话。要知道，俄美元首本次电话会晤的时间是事先商定的。俄罗斯总统普京相当于放了特朗普的鸽子。这在大国之间，尤其是国家最高领导人之间举行会晤的问题上非常罕见。所以，某种意义上说，由于中美关系是特朗普政府只有有效处理好“三大关系”（对华、对欧、对俄）中的“大多数”才有可能赢得内斗之“必选项”，特朗普政府在欧盟与俄罗斯之间，必选俄罗斯。

接下来大家就不妨继续观察美俄是否会在所谓“非传统安全层面”谋求更深入合作，以期达到一边离间中俄关系，另一边将此作为向中国施压的一个“战略支点”。

值得一提的是，俄罗斯与美国之间的博弈不仅包括乌克兰问题，也包括中东问题，比如，俄罗斯已经向特朗普政府提出协助其有效重返叙利亚的利益诉求。而这对于欧盟而言，绝不是什么好消息。在国际社会看来，尽管目前法国总统马克龙访华仍没有确定的消息，但马克龙已经宣布将前往中东地区进行访问。据法国政府发布的官方消息，马克龙将于4月7日和8日访问埃及，届时他将讨论阿拉伯国家的加沙重建计划。不难想象的是，只要内塔尼亚胡小集团继续在巴以问题上倒行逆施，对特朗普政府而言，美欧关系的处理就只有更复杂，没有最复杂。

在我们的观察与评估中，受到乌克兰方向和中东方向等诸多战略压力的欧盟，尽管内部很难在中欧关系上达成统一意见，但欧盟中的一些主要国家，即便是基于能够更深地介入叙利亚局势的后续发展，推动与以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家和某些中东重要国家，如，埃及之间的关系发展，也会寻找理由和中国靠拢，比如，德国，法国。

●透过“台湾问题”观察欧美关系的微妙性和复杂性

特朗普急于有效缓和俄美关系，目的还在于尽早实现访华。为此，特朗普政府也在“积极努力”，寻求应对中国的筹码。其中之一就是继续在“台湾问题”上做文章。

日本极右政权因福岛核污染水排放问题上耍小聪明，一头撞在“铁板上”，未能从中国这里骗取到中国对日本水产品的全面解禁而心生不满，再加上美国对其施加压力，使得其在“台湾问题”上配合特朗普政府恶心中国。对此，中方予以了严厉驳斥。比如，在所谓“台湾‘行政院’”聘请日本前自卫队统合幕僚长岩崎茂担任顾问一职一事上，中国外交部发言人毛宁表示：台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，台湾问题纯属中国内政，不容任何外来干涉。一个中国原则是中日关系的政治基础。今年是中国人民抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争胜利80周年。日本在台湾问题上对中国人民负有历史罪责，尤应谨言慎行，以实际行动兑现坚持一个中国原则的承诺。中方已向日方提出交涉。民进党当局勾连外部势力谋“独”挑衅不会得逞。

值得一提的是，特朗普政府在“台湾问题”上做文章还有一个险恶意图，那就是“带节奏”希望能够以此引诱欧、俄参与其中。

在我们的观察与评估中，在“台湾问题”上，俄罗斯恐怕是“有这个贼心，没这个贼胆”，但欧盟则有可能响应美国。对特朗普来说，欧盟的参与，有利于阻止中欧关系的进一步靠近。对欧盟来说，也想以此为筹码和中国讨价还价，强调“欧盟是‘有身价’的”。道理很简单，欧盟的一些政要，比如，马克龙此前公布了2025年有访华计划。其原理类似于欧美合作了一把，在菲律宾前总统杜特尔特被捕一事后续发展中的“各取所需”。

●这让我们想起了《水浒传》中林冲被高俅陷害，误入白虎节堂的故事

在本次回顾的最后，我们将讨论的焦点再度汇集在美国内部恶斗的问题上。

3月21日，据白宫发布的一份备忘录，美国总统特朗普取消了对前副总统卡玛拉·哈里斯和前国务卿希拉里·克林顿等人的安全许可。特朗普此前已经撤销了前总统拜登的安全许可。

美国的内部恶斗显然仍然继续中。在我们看来，此前特朗普政府公布美国前总统肯尼迪遇刺未删减的几万份文件，对于特朗普和“特朗普们”的对头冤家们来说，既是“大棒”，也是“胡萝卜”。所谓“大棒”，如果特朗普和“特朗普们”的对头冤家们拒不配合，那么那柄悬在“未删减的几万份文件”之外的，一定“有料”的“达摩克斯之剑”随时可能斩下；所谓“胡萝卜”，特朗普和“特朗普们”的对头冤家们应该感到庆幸，“未删减的几万份文件”之中并没有公布关于肯尼迪遇刺案真相的确凿证据。

在实实在在的利益层面，这种对内“胡萝卜+大棒”的手法也在同步上演。比如，对于美国“旧军工复合体”的典型代表——波音来说，尽管宇航这块的“蛋糕”以后大概率要分给马斯克，但“F-47”项目最终花落波音还是能够让他们感到兴奋。显然，这就是特朗普政府对内，比如，对“美国新老军工复合体”这样的不同利益集团的一种“平衡手段”。

值得一提的是，未来空战在我们的想象中，“六代机”应该涉及空天飞机相关技术（当然，如何定义“六代机”在我们的PLA。我们认为，这次连续推出两款“新型战机”在于应急，也就是内外反华势力在军事技术上压得死死地，让其不敢妄想）。如果真是这样，这就涉及美国的航天技术，也就会涉及马斯克。所以，美国的“F-47”项目到底以后能走到哪一步，不好说。特朗普更不关心。在特朗普看来，4年之后，到底能不能修宪以继续连任美国总统，不知道！这一届总统任期能不能实现独裁统治？也不知道！所以，“F-47”项目更像是某种“期货”，但对波音而言，眼下的股票大涨也就足够了。

需要补充一点的是，我们再次注意到特朗普否认马斯克听取美对华秘密作战计划的新闻报道。

在我们看来，特朗普通过多次迅速“辟谣”，显然是想要规避某种“致命陷阱”。全世界都知道马斯克和中国关系紧密，马斯克在中国更有大量投资，如果马斯克就这样进入五角大楼的最机密决策场所，马斯克以后还能去中国吗？或者说马斯克去了中国能保证不泄密吗？这让我们想起了《水浒传》中林冲被高俅陷害，误入白虎节堂的故事。而在特朗普看来，在其访华行程正变得越来越急迫的背景下，在美国前财长保尔森访华基本以失败告终的背景下，保住马斯克似乎比之以往更加重要。也许马斯克的“一点薄面”还真的成为特朗普尽快实现访华的关键。由此大家也不难看出，特朗普和“特朗普们”的对头冤家们给马斯克设下如此陷阱的核心意图究竟是什么。

●如果没有了规矩，昨天在餐桌边，明天就可能在菜单上

无论是美国人炒作的乌克兰割让领土也好，还是欧洲人炒作的乌克兰总统泽连斯基准备要下台也罢，似乎都是俄罗斯愿意听的，更或是其愿意相信的事情。似乎在乌克兰问题上，欧美已经达成某种共识，尽管表面上欧盟仍在毫不吝啬的宣泄自己的不满情绪。剩下的问题就是俄罗斯如何回报西方（欧美）了。

之前，围绕俄罗斯与美国说“愿意考虑美国提出的‘临时停火’”时我们就曾警示俄方：俄罗斯瞄着特朗普急于“内斗之需、阶段性缓和与俄关系”并抛出“临时停火协议”，俄罗斯之所以“愿意考虑谈”，主要意图在于继续“拖”字诀，但“拖”下去，又会类似之前，不知道会拖出什么“巨大损失”来。俄罗斯的军用机场，基础能源设施遇袭恐怕只是考试。下一步，俄罗斯境内的其他重要基础设施、比如，地铁，核电站、会不会也拖出什么重大损失？天知道！

最后，我们引用王毅外长的一句话提醒俄罗斯决策层的是：如果没有了规矩，昨天在餐桌边，明天就可能在菜单上。如果俄罗斯在中俄关系上不能有效把握尺度，玩出了圈，是完全有可能被送上为西方实质性消化的“快车道”的，而对于西方而言，菜单上的俄罗斯，绝对是一道能够有效调和其内部各种矛盾的“盛宴大餐”。希望俄罗斯好自为之。

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Saturday, March 22, 2025, Issue No. 1209

In light of the background where the US and Russia are discussing the division of Ukrainian territory, Russia's reiteration of the old case of the Moscow concert hall terrorist attack deserves high vigilance from the international community.

[Media Coverage]

On March 22, at the one-year anniversary of the terrorist attack on the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, spokesman for the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Peter Lekhov issued a statement saying that Russian investigative and security agencies have arrested and completed investigations against 19 defendants charged with terrorism in the case, and a number of other suspects have been put on the wanted list.

【Discussion Summary】

● In light of the background where the US and Russia are discussing the division of Ukrainian territory, Russia's reiteration of the old case of the Moscow concert hall terrorist attack deserves high vigilance from the international community

On March 19, US President Donald Trump said in an exclusive interview with a US media outlet that he had "two very good conversations" with the presidents of Russia and Ukraine in the past two days. He insisted on dealing with Russia, praising Russia for having "a larger territory than China and very valuable minerals." He also claimed that if the normalization of US-Russia relations could make Russia "detach from China," then it would be "a good thing."

This news report conveys at least two clear signals: First, there is indeed room for potential cooperation between the United States and Russia in the non-traditional security realm. Of course, this comes with a necessary precondition for cooperation, which is the substantial lifting of economic, especially financial, sanctions on Russia; Second, the Trump administration is still trying hard to undermine the strategic mutual trust between China and Russia. As Trump said, if the normalization of US-Russia relations could make Russia "detach from China," then it would be "a good thing."

Before continuing the discussion, let's take a look at another news report.

On March 21, US President Donald Trump stated that a "contract" for the "division" of Ukrainian territory is currently being negotiated as part of the final agreement to end the war. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine are being "divided" by the United States, which claims to be Ukraine's "biggest protector," and Russia, which is considered Ukraine's "biggest enemy." This scenario seems rather ironic. This is the current reality of Ukraine.

If this represents the Trump administration's further concessions to Russia in the traditional security realm to ease US-Russian relations, then in the non-traditional security realm, the potential cooperation between the two sides warrants attention to Russia's latest move of reiterating the old case of the Moscow concert hall terrorist attack—On March 22, spokesman for the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Peter Lekhov issued a statement on the one-year anniversary of the terrorist attack on the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, saying that Russian investigative and security agencies have arrested and completed investigations against 19 defendants charged with terrorism in the case, and a number of other suspects have been put on the wanted list. In our observation and assessment, the so-called potential cooperation between the US and Russia in the non-traditional security realm may have Central Asia as its "entry point."

To better facilitate the discussion, let's review some content from January 11, 2025:

● The strong signal of US "strategic contraction" has touched the sensitive nerve of Russia's "Afghanistan policy"

Before continuing the discussion, let's take a look at another news report.

Recently, the China Geological Survey of the Ministry of Natural Resources, in conjunction with the Changqing Oilfield Company of PetroChina and the China National Nuclear Corporation's Geology Bureau, among other units, has made a major breakthrough in uranium exploration in the Jingchuan area of the Ordos Basin, with reserves reaching the scale of a super-large deposit.

As is well known, China has always adopted a "multi-pronged approach" in energy acquisition, with nuclear energy being one of them. There are reports that China is expected to start construction of the world's first thorium-based molten salt reactor nuclear power plant in 2025. Recently, the Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences released the "Environmental Impact Report (Site Selection Stage) of the Small Modular Thorium-Based Molten Salt Reactor Research Facility," detailing a small modular thorium-based molten salt reactor project with an electrical power output of 10 megawatts. The research reactor is designed with a maximum thermal power of 60 megawatts and is expected to become the world's first thorium-based molten salt reactor nuclear power plant of its kind. The construction goal is to officially start construction within 2025 and achieve first criticality and full-power operation by 2029. Additionally, the commercial reactor will have a thermal power output of 60 megawatts, of which 10 megawatts will be used for power generation, and the remaining 50 megawatts are planned for hydrogen production, which will further promote the diversification and cleaning of China's energy structure. Moreover, China's thorium reserves amount to 286,000 tons, sufficient for the next 20,000 years. In our view, the thorium-based molten salt reactor is the ultimate energy solution before the commercialization of controlled nuclear fusion reactors.

Compared to the abundant thorium reserves, China's uranium reserves are much scarcer, at least according to previously officially published data. Previously, based on the visit of Russia's second political figure, Medvedev, to China, we discussed the topic of Russia transferring a stake in a large uranium mine in Kazakhstan to China. Let's now review some of the discussions from December 26, 2024, which will help better understand the above news report:

The so-called "new idea," in our view:

First, the "China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway" project is about to commence construction. Although Kazakhstan is somewhat dissatisfied with this (currently, most China-Europe freight trains pass through Kazakhstan, so Kazakhstan believes that the "China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway" project may divert traffic and harm its interests), it generally complies with this situation. Since the commencement of the "China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway" construction must have Russia's tacit approval, objectively, the relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan may draw closer. How close remains to be seen, but one thing is certain: both Russia and Kazakhstan now cannot do without China;

Second, if Russia's approach to the "Mongolia issue" as an entry point for "willingness to jointly resolve historical legacy issues" shows some sincerity, it still seems rather impractical. However, at a more practical level, we note that, according to British media reports, under the trilateral consultation of China, Russia, and Kazakhstan, Rosatom's Uranium One Group has transferred 49% of its stake in the Zarechnoye uranium mine in Kazakhstan to the China National Nuclear Corporation's Uranium Resources Development Company. Of course, this news awaits further official confirmation from the relevant parties;

Third, if this news is confirmed, in our view, from a "business is business" perspective, it represents a relatively practical demonstration of Russia's sincerity. Accordingly, our strategic response to Russia will be more forceful than before (though not yet at the level of substantial strategic support);

Fourth, the meaning of "business is business" is that if Russia hopes to receive more forceful strategic support, in the context where the timing for reaching "final conclusions" on topics such as "substantive China-Russia joint efforts to stabilize Central Asia" and "Russia's substantive abandonment of the 'Afghanistan policy'" is still immature, it needs to exchange tangible benefits. Based on this, we believe the feasibility of this rumor is quite high;

Fifth, although the timing for reaching "final conclusions" on topics such as "substantive China-Russia joint efforts to stabilize Central Asia" and "Russia's substantive abandonment of the 'Afghanistan policy'" is still immature, the stabilization of Central Asia seems to be slowly taking shape in another form—that is, the increasing intersection of common interests among China, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Especially for us, it represents assets; for Russia, it is the "backbone" of security; and for Kazakhstan, it is the security guarantee provided by China and Russia (for Kazakhstan, stability is paramount. And the only way to achieve stability is to rely on China and Russia, relying on the SCO). Together, they are promoting the stability of the Central Asian region. Therefore, although this change is not yet at the qualitative level, it can be seen as progress at the quantitative level;

Sixth, combining the above five points, or one of the main reasons why Kazakhstan is willing to deploy troops to Serbia. It is worth noting that some media reports that Kazakhstan's dispatch of special forces to Serbia this time was based on a "counter-terrorism" request from Serbia under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It is worth mentioning that Kazakhstan, as one of the founding members of the SCO established on June 15, 2001, has a significant role in the organization. If Russia ultimately chooses to substantially join hands with China, then the SCO will be effectively "restarted." Once this happens, China and Russia will jointly form the "core group of the party cell" (similar to the party group secretary), and the founding members, including Kazakhstan, will become "core members of the party cell" (similar to party group members).

Combining the above review, it is not difficult to see that the issue of the transfer of shares in the Zarechnoye uranium mine in Kazakhstan, on the surface, appears to be an economic issue but is actually a political issue, directly involving whether Russia is willing to completely abandon its "Afghanistan policy" and whether it is willing to substantially join hands with China.

In our view, under the strong signal of US "strategic contraction," Russia is likely to be swayed, leading to new changes in Sino-Russian relations. Clearly, behind China's announcement of a major breakthrough in uranium exploration in the Jingchuan area of the Ordos Basin, with reserves reaching the scale of a super-large deposit, there may be "new changes" in the Kazakhstan uranium cooperation project, and the direction of change is negative. It seems that the strong signal of US "strategic contraction" has deeply touched Russia's "Afghanistan policy."

From the above review, it is not difficult to see that from Medvedev's emergency visit to China on December 10, 2024, due to the sudden change in the Syrian situation and the overthrow of the Assad regime, to January 10, 2025, in just one month, the Trump administration's strong signal of "strategic contraction" has deeply touched Russia's "Afghanistan policy."

One of the main directions affected by Russia's renewed "change of heart" is Central Asia. And starting from the non-traditional security realm, it is reflected in the traditional security realm. To describe it with a phrase from the review: The issue of the transfer of shares in the Zarechnoye uranium mine in Kazakhstan, on the surface, appears to be an economic issue but is actually a political issue, directly involving whether Russia is willing to completely abandon its "Afghanistan policy" and whether it is willing to substantially join hands with China.

Additionally, on the issue of potential deeper cooperation between the US and Russia in the non-traditional security realm, with Central Asia as the "entry point," we provide two more old news items for everyone to observe in conjunction with the above review:

On March 23, 2024, in response to reports that "Tajik citizens participated in the terrorist attack on the concert hall near Moscow, Russia," the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that this was "fake news."

On March 25, 2024, then-US Pentagon spokesman Pat Ryder said that the "Islamic State-Khorasan Province" (IS-K) claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack on the concert hall near Moscow, Russia, indicating that the "Islamic State" (IS) extremist organization remains a global threat, and its branches in Central Asia and Africa are growing stronger.

It is worth noting that Kyrgyzstan is an important node in the "China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway" project, and the construction of this railway project also involves Kazakhstan, the largest country among the five Central Asian countries. The terrorist attack on the Moscow concert hall on March 22, 2024, has attracted high attention from Kazakh President Tokayev, who convened an emergency meeting of the national security department to discuss how to ensure the safety of his citizens and called for closer cooperation with China and Russia to jointly combat terrorist actions to maintain regional peace and stability.

● The Trump administration cannot avoid the embarrassing situation of "solving one problem only to create another" in handling US-Russia and US-EU relations

Currently, the Trump administration still chooses to make further concessions to Russia, although some media have reported that during the last phone call between the US and Russian presidents, Putin attended the Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and delivered a speech, for which Trump waited for Putin for a full hour.

Clearly, for Trump, who has not yet been able to make any breakthrough in effectively improving Sino-US relations, he has no choice but to turn around again and deal with US-Russia relations with an even more humble posture. It is said that the US and the EU have cooperated on the Ukraine issue for at least three years, but it seems that they have only achieved a lonely outcome. If the cooperation between the US and the EU on the Ukraine issue had made substantial progress, Trump would not have had to wait so humiliatedly for an hour to talk to Putin. It should be noted that the timing of this phone call between the US and Russian presidents was pre-arranged. Russian President Putin effectively stood up Trump. This is very rare in meetings between major countries, especially between the highest leaders of nations. Therefore, in a sense, since Sino-US relations are the "must-win" option for the Trump administration to effectively handle the "three major relationships" (with China, the EU, and Russia), the Trump administration must choose Russia over the EU.

Going forward, everyone can continue to observe whether the US and Russia will seek deeper cooperation in the so-called "non-traditional security realm," aiming to drive a wedge between China and Russia on one hand and use this as a "strategic fulcrum" to pressure China on the other.

It is worth mentioning that the rivalry between Russia and the US includes not only the Ukraine issue but also the Middle East issue. For example, Russia has already proposed to the Trump administration to assist in its effective return to Syria as a matter of interest. This is certainly not good news for the EU. In the eyes of the international community, although there is still no confirmed news of French President Macron's visit to China, Macron has announced that he will visit the Middle East. According to an official announcement by the French government, Macron will visit Egypt on April 7 and 8, where he will discuss the reconstruction plan for Gaza among Arab countries. It is not difficult to imagine that as long as the Netanyahu group continues to act in the opposite direction on the Palestinian-Israeli issue, handling US-EU relations will only become more complex for the Trump administration, with no end to the complexity.

In our observation and assessment, facing various strategic pressures from the Ukraine and Middle East directions, although it is difficult for the EU to reach a unified opinion on China-EU relations internally, some major EU countries, even based on the potential to be more deeply involved in the subsequent development of the Syrian situation and to promote relations with major Middle Eastern countries led by Saudi Arabia, such as Egypt, will find reasons to move closer to China, such as Germany and France.

● Observing the subtleties and complexities of US-EU relations through the "Taiwan issue"

Trump's eagerness to effectively ease US-Russia relations is also aimed at realizing a visit to China as soon as possible. To this end, the Trump administration is also "actively striving" to seek leverage against China. One of these is to continue to play the "Taiwan issue."

Japan's far-right regime, due to its shenanigans over the Fukushima nuclear wastewater discharge issue, has run into a "brick wall" and failed to obtain a comprehensive lifting of China's ban on Japanese seafood from China, leading to dissatisfaction. Coupled with pressure from the United States, it has cooperated with the Trump administration in an attempt to upset China on the "Taiwan issue." In response, China has strongly refuted this. For example, regarding the appointment of former Japanese Self-Defense Forces Chief of Defense Staff Ishiguro Shigeru as an advisor to the so-called "Taiwan 'Executive Yuan'," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning stated: Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory, and the Taiwan issue is purely China's internal affair, not subject to any external interference. The one-China principle is the political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations. This year marks the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. Japan has a historical debt to the Chinese people on the Taiwan issue and should be especially cautious in its words and actions, fulfilling its commitment to the one-China principle with concrete actions. China has lodged representations with the Japanese side. The attempts by the Taiwan authorities to seek "independence" and provoke through collusion with external forces will not succeed.

It is worth mentioning that the Trump administration's focus on the "Taiwan issue" also has a sinister intention, which is to "set the pace" and hope to lure Europe and Russia into participating.

In our observation and assessment, on the "Taiwan issue," Russia may have the inclination but lacks the courage, while the EU may respond to the United States. For Trump, the EU's participation is conducive to preventing further closeness in China-EU relations. For the EU, it also wants to use this as leverage to bargain with China, emphasizing that "the EU has 'value'." The reason is simple: some EU politicians, such as Macron, have announced plans to visit China in 2025. The principle is similar to the US-EU cooperation in the aftermath of the arrest of former Philippine President Duterte, where both sides "took what they needed."

● This reminds us of the story in *Outlaws of the Marsh* where Lin Chong was framed by Gao Qiu and accidentally entered the White Tiger Hall.

At the end of this review, we will once again focus our discussion on the issue of internal strife within the United States.

On March 21, according to a memorandum released by the White House, US President Donald Trump revoked the security clearances of former Vice President Kamala Harris, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and others. Trump had previously revoked the security clearance of former President Joe Biden.

The internal strife in the United States is clearly ongoing. In our view, the Trump administration's release of tens of thousands of unredacted pages of files on the Kennedy assassination, for the Trump camp and its adversaries, is both a "big stick" and a "carrot." The so-called "big stick" means that if Trump's adversaries refuse to cooperate, the "Damocles sword" hanging outside the "tens of thousands of unredacted pages of files," which is bound to contain "substantial" evidence, could fall at any time; the so-called "carrot" is that Trump's adversaries should feel fortunate that the "tens of thousands of unredacted pages of files" did not reveal conclusive evidence about the truth of the Kennedy assassination.

At the practical level of interests, this "carrot and stick" approach is also being played out internally. For example, for Boeing, a typical representative of the "old US military-industrial complex," although the "cake" in the space field is likely to be shared with Musk in the future, the fact that the "F-47" project ultimately went to Boeing is still exciting for them. Clearly, this is a means of "balancing" for the Trump administration internally, such as among different interest groups like the "new and old US military-industrial complexes."

It is worth mentioning that in our imagination of future air warfare, the "sixth-generation fighter" should involve relevant technologies of spaceplanes (of course, how to define the "sixth-generation fighter" in our PLA). We believe that the continuous introduction of two "new fighter jets" this time is for emergency purposes, that is, being under immense pressure from both domestic and foreign anti-China forces in military technology, leaving no room for recklessness. If this is the case, it involves US space technology and thus Musk. Therefore, how far the US "F-47" project can go is uncertain. Trump doesn't care either. In Trump's view, whether he can amend the constitution to continue his presidency after four years is unknown! Whether he can achieve dictatorial rule during this term is also unknown! So, the "F-47" project is more like a kind of "futures contract," but for Boeing, the current surge in stock prices is sufficient.

It should be added that we have once again noticed Trump's denial of the news report that Musk listened to the US's secret combat plan against China.

In our view, Trump's repeated and rapid "denials" are clearly an attempt to avoid a certain "fatal trap." Everyone knows that Musk has close ties with China and has made substantial investments in China. If Musk were to enter the most confidential decision-making places in the Pentagon like this, could he still go to China afterward? Or if he does go to China, can he guarantee not to disclose secrets? This reminds us of the story in *Outlaws of the Marsh* where Lin Chong was framed by Gao Qiu and accidentally entered the White Tiger Hall. In Trump's view, against the backdrop of his increasingly urgent visit to China and the basic failure of former US Treasury Secretary Paulson's visit to China, preserving Musk seems more important than ever. Perhaps Musk's "slight favor" could indeed be the key to Trump's quick realization of his visit to China. From this, it is not difficult to see the core intention of Trump's adversaries in setting such a trap for Musk.

● Without Rules, One Could Be on the Menu Tomorrow

Whether it's the US hype about Ukraine ceding territory or the European hype about Ukrainian President Zelensky preparing to step down, it seems that these are things Russia is willing to hear or even believes. It seems that on the Ukraine issue, Europe and the US have reached some sort of consensus, although on the surface, the EU is still unreservedly venting its dissatisfaction. The remaining question is how Russia will reward the West (Europe and the US).

Previously, when Russia said it was "willing to consider the 'temporary ceasefire' proposed by the US," we had already warned the Russian side: Russia, aiming at Trump's need for "internal strife and a phased easing of relations with Russia" and presenting the "temporary ceasefire agreement," mainly intends to continue the strategy of "dragging things out." However, dragging things out could lead to unknown "huge losses," just like before. The attacks on Russian military airports and basic energy facilities might just be the beginning. What about other important infrastructure within Russia, such as subways and nuclear power plants? Who knows what significant losses might occur next?

Finally, we would like to remind the Russian decision-making layer with a quote from Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi: "Without rules, one could be on the dining table today and on the menu tomorrow." If Russia cannot effectively gauge the boundaries in its relationship with China and steps out of line, it is entirely possible that it will be put on the "fast track" for substantial digestion by the West. For the West, a Russia on the menu would indeed be a "feast" that could effectively reconcile its internal contradictions. We hope Russia will act wisely.

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

原文作者公众号：

广州市贯日翻译服务有限公司为东方时评-衍射传媒/衍射咨询提供翻译支持

翻译请联系http://www.en-ch.com/chcontact.htm

手机微信13924166640

广州市越秀区环市东路世界贸易中心大厦南塔24楼 020-86266990