2025年3月18日，星期二，第1205期

为什么说美国内部恶斗已经到了完全无视法律、毫无底线约束的地步？

【媒体报道】

3月17日，据美国媒体报道，特朗普当天在社交媒体上发文称，他认为拜登的赦免令是无效的，因为拜登用自动签名笔签署了这些文件。

【讨论纪要】

●再次强调，美国前财长保尔森访华不是一件简单的事情

近日，据英国媒体报道，美国总统特朗普3月17日在华盛顿约翰·肯尼迪表演艺术中心表示，*********将于不久的将来访问美国。

特朗普恐怕很清楚，中国国家最高领导人不会访问美国，但他需要这样一种“表达方式”。虽然特朗普是一个毫无诚信的“商人总统”，但却是一个很要脸的人，这样做，无非是基于“既然你不来，那我就过去”之“求其上，得其中”给自己急需访华找脸面、下台阶罢了。

再次强调，美国前财长保尔森访华不是一件简单的事情。特朗普3月17日的最新表态很好地验证了东方时事解读此前的相关评估，其中就包括本次保尔森访华的主要意图之一，为美国总统特朗普尽早访华求得一张“进京的机票”。实际上，有关中美领导人会晤的相关话题在特朗普走马上任之前就有炒作，当时就有美国媒体报道称，美国候任总统特朗普称希望在上任后100天内访华。

此外，我们注意到美国总统特朗普有关拜登赦免令无效，因为他是用自动签名笔签的新闻报道。

客观地说，特朗普的借口显得非常荒唐，曾经担任过美国总统的特朗普难道从来没有用过自动签名笔吗？以这样一个荒唐的借口否认美国前任总统的特赦令是违背美国法律的。赦免制度是美国宪法赋予总统的一项权力，美国宪法第二条第二款规定美国总统拥有赦免权。

特朗普此举传递出的信号很明白——他就是美国的法律。或者说，美国的法律，包括宪法，他可以随意修改。由此不难看出，美国内部恶斗已经到了完全无视法律、毫无底线约束的地步。当然，特朗普也不是一个人在战斗，特朗普和“特朗普们”为确保自身在美国内部恶斗中的切实利益，甚至人身安全，只能如此。从层面也能观察到，特朗普访华之急切已经到了什么程度。

●所谓“.....怎么看……都像是……达成协议”的可能内容和本质是……

3月18日，有美国媒体援引两名消息人士的话，以“特朗普考虑承认克里米亚为俄罗斯领土以结束冲突”为标题发文称，美国特朗普政府正在考虑承认克里米亚地区为俄罗斯领土，以此作为未来结束俄乌冲突协议的一部分。

在我们的观察与评估中，恐怕这种消息就是特朗普政府故意放出去的。值得一提的是，东方时事解读早在2014年就克里米亚问题的本质就已给出相关评估。

在我们继续展开讨论前，来看一段《东方时事解读·时事简版》2014年3月21日的内容，原文如下：

……

●就“本质”而言，“事情”将随着“克里米亚重入俄罗斯才会刚刚开始”

第三点，在“克里米亚公投、独立、并入俄罗斯”的整个过程中，就“本质”而言，由于，“事情”将随着“克里米亚重入俄罗斯才会刚刚开始”，因此，直到今天之前，欧美（北约）只是“叫嚷着要对俄罗斯怎么怎么样、却始终没有对俄罗斯怎么怎么样”！

至于如何看“此前欧美各自宣布的那几项制裁（制裁几个人）”？欧、美的媒体自己都说了：出了这么档子事（克里米亚从乌克兰独立、再加入俄罗斯），那算得上制裁吗？不仅如此，从欧美、俄罗斯、特别是乌克兰临时政府的反应来看，欧、美的媒体普遍认为：怎么“看”都像是达成了“某种协议”！

而在“.....怎么看……都像是……达成协议”的层面上，最具代表性的“疑问”就是一个乌克兰人对一家西方媒体所抱怨的：“俄国人侵占了我们的国家，（西方）制裁却只针对这么点人，西方就这样帮我们对抗俄罗斯吗？”

……

受篇幅限制，我们只引用了这一期内容中很小的一部分，有兴趣的网友可前往东方网站搜索并阅读全文。从这篇简版给出的时间至今，已经过去了整整11年。这期间，围绕克里米亚问题，围绕乌克兰问题发生了太多的事情。尤其是爆发自2022年2月24日且持续至今的俄乌战争（俄方称“对乌特别军事行动”）。在过去的11年间，本质上，西方从乌克兰问题上什么也没有得到，而俄罗斯更是损失惨重。乌克兰曾经是苏联时期的重工业基地和科技研发中心，被称为“苏联的心脏”。而恰恰是苏联的直接继承者——俄罗斯，亲手将其彻底砸烂。

回顾11年前东方时事解读就克里米亚问题在第一时间的评估，再来看特朗普政府就克里米亚问题的放风，也许大家不难发现，所谓“.....怎么看……都像是……达成协议”的可能内容和本质是什么。特朗普政府的意思很清楚：美国已经让步如此，如果俄罗斯仍不打算签署停火协议，那我就把这个放风收回去，届时，普京可别后悔！

对于俄罗斯来说，这既是威逼，也是利诱。当然，反过来，对欧盟也是一种威胁。同时，特朗普政府也在用“临时停火协议”利诱欧盟，并同时威胁俄罗斯。类似西方资本利益对欧美平台施加的那种“双向挤压”（西方资本利益在“复杂转进”的过程中，要尽量消除“国家制约因子”的影响）。

●如果有一天马斯克“被出局”，就一定是华尔街对特朗普发出的强烈警告

在特朗普政府看来，尽快拿到有效缓和俄美关系非常重要，只有这样，拿着这一“外交成果”的特朗普才好和中国去谈中美关系。拿到中美关系有效缓和，就可以放心地大规模开启“印钞机”（奥巴马时期处理过次贷危机，大骂华尔街贪婪，甚至痛哭流涕，但实际上美国已经开始大规模印钱，也就是量宽。而今天，美国仍在“缩表”，但却从未停止印钱。所以，现在印钱是非正式的。特朗普访华寻求有效缓和中美关系，就是满足公开、正式、大规模开启“印钞机”的前提条件——中国决不能捣乱）；拿到中美关系有效缓和就有办法有效缓和美国内部的恶斗。将“蛋糕”做大，既可以“化敌为友”，也可以防止“化友为敌”。

特朗普焦急访华的背后，自然也是华尔街的影子。当然，华尔街关心的核心问题是“金融永动机”到底能不能继续玩下去。这显然与特朗普关心的核心问题有些不同。如果说，华尔街最关心的是“蛋糕”如何做大，那么，特朗普最关心的除了“蛋糕”如何做大外，还有如何保全自己的身家性命。

鉴于特朗普政府正式运作两个月以来迟迟无法有效处理中美关系这一现实，方方面面，尤其是特朗普本人已经感受到了压力的传导。显然，特朗普未能完成华尔街交给他的任务，这意味着华尔街已经对特朗普感到强烈不满。而这种压力作用在“特朗普阵营”上，其内部矛盾开始不断显性化。

有美国媒体爆料称，特朗普一边猛夸马斯克工作效率高，另一边却指使其核心执政团队“政治行动委员会”拒绝接受马斯克对“政府效率部”的注资。

在华尔街眼中，尽管马斯克是个商人，也是华尔街的一员，但目前阶段他看上去更像是特朗普政府的官员，或者说“特朗普们”的一分子。华尔街的大部分对特朗普政府的不满，导致特朗普不得不从其阵营内部想办法“消化压力”，对马斯克进行警告，这必然会激化“特朗普阵营”的内部矛盾（在“特朗普阵营”之外，将压力转向“拜登们”，比如，进一步公开肯尼迪遇刺案以及宣告拜登特赦令无效）。如果有一天马斯克“被出局”（表面是特朗普解雇马斯克，但实际上是华尔街在处理特朗普），就一定是华尔街对特朗普发出的强烈警告。

所以，在我们看来，结合特朗普政府进一步向俄罗斯就克里米亚问题做出让步一并观察，保尔森本次访华似乎谈得并不顺利。

●菲律宾前总统杜特尔特被捕一事后续已经出现了不利于小马克斯政府的发展苗头

在继续展开讨论前，我们再来看一则新闻报道。

3月17日，菲律宾参议院外交关系委员会主席伊梅·马科斯发表声明说，参议院20日将对前总统杜特尔特被拘留一事进行紧急调查。她强调，菲律宾的主权和法律程序必须始终处于首要地位。

伊梅·马科斯是菲律宾现任总统的亲姐姐，显然，这位姐姐要“大义灭亲”。由此可见，菲律宾前总统杜特尔特被捕一事后续已经出现了不利于小马克斯政府的发展的苗头——一旦特朗普政府先于欧盟在诸如南海问题上出现准备对中国让步的迹象，比如，以“国际刑事法院无权审判杜特尔特”为由干预对其的继续审判，那么不仅欧盟被美国出卖，小马克斯政府也将岌岌可危。

在我们一贯的评估中，中国不会和美国就所谓“交易台湾”（台湾就是中国的一个省，是中国的内政问题，用本就是中国的台湾做筹码和中国做交易，门都没有，更何况中国随时可以收台）的话题谈什么，要谈就谈南海问题。问题在于，特朗普政府敢张着个嘴吗？恐怕嘴巴一张，欧、日、韩等原本美帝手下的“马仔”会一个比一个跑得快。当然，如果特朗普非要访华，也可以，不妨这次将其到中国人民革命军事博物馆参观好了！需要补充的是，目前中国的“爆兵”，某种意义上说，已经开始从常规层面向战略方向发展，核心体现的一条就是，就算美国打核战争也毫无胜算。

●美国的这一意图被胡塞武装的“拖鞋”无情打破

在本次回顾的最后，我们再来看一则新闻报道。

3月18日，也门胡塞武装发言人叶海亚·萨雷亚称，为报复美军针对也门胡塞武装的空袭，胡塞武装通过两枚导弹和两架无人机袭击了位于红海北部的美国“杜鲁门”号航空母舰，通过一枚导弹和四架无人机袭击了美军另外一艘驱逐舰。

3月17日，美国白宫发言人突然表态称，只要胡塞武装“停止袭击美国船只和伤害美国人”，美军将停止对也门的打击。此言一出，舆论哗然。堂堂美帝的所谓军事霸权已经不堪到连胡塞武装也无法搞定的地步了吗？

显然，胡塞武装拒绝了美国人的“好意”，继续对美国船只，尤其是“杜鲁门”号航空母舰进行打击。一时间，特朗普政府被胡塞武装置于骑虎难下的尴尬境地。值得一提的是，军事打击胡塞武装美国不是没做过，之前在美国前总统拜登执政时期就曾经做过，结果却是：不来不会，胡塞武装还在那里，而且是越战越勇，甚至传出美国航母被“拖鞋”打得东躲西藏的各类传闻。

客观上讲，相比于伊朗，有浓重类似原教旨主义宗教信仰的胡塞武装更不容易被西方渗透。美国对付胡塞武装的难度更是高于伊朗。

值得一提的是，特朗普政府再度军事打击胡塞武装，除了基于内斗因素对以色列内塔尼亚胡政府“示好”外，更想要向方方面面展示其有能力控制世界范围内主要运河、海峡和航道（在“DeepSeek+华为”的强烈冲击下，“星际之门”项目已经不行了，AI神话被彻底打破，“技术反华联盟”未能实现，这才凸显这一点）。这也是美国搞所谓“战略扩张”的核心目的之一。然而，美国的这个意图被胡塞武装的“拖鞋”无情打破。

客观上是以色列给了胡塞武装借口，特朗普政府就这被架在火上烤，一个胡塞武装都无法搞定，还说什么大话？别的不说，中国新型战机航程3000-4000公里，这期间多少航线掌握在PLA的手中？对波斯湾来说，先不谈意志力，至少其武力比胡塞武装强得多。美国有可能得手的是巴拿马运河。值得一提的是，这次中国处理巴拿马运河是党务代表团，做最坏打算。而决定胜负的不在巴拿马，而在西太，在南海。如果特朗普想要彻底得罪天下人，那就去弄吧。巴拿马本就得罪了一批人，如果搞到钱凯港，那就得罪了整个南美洲。

何况，美国可以卡我们，我们就不能卡美国吗？时间长了，美国就是断人财路。更何况中国还有汇率手段，利率手段，对美国在各类关键战略物资上做限制（美国在全球层面实际上已经陷入“阿富汗式战略陷阱”），以及不断的“爆兵”“爆矿”，而“兜底方案”就是收台。

胡塞武装打击美、以的借口选择非常好（中东国家和欧洲国家没有谴责），那就是以色列内塔尼亚胡政府倒行逆施，破坏停火协议，继续在中东杀人越货，为非作歹。对此，特朗普虽然心里气得骂娘，但表面还要佯装支持（当然，特朗普也不敢公开谈论“重占加沙”）。

值得一提的是，胡塞武装似乎很清楚自己的定位，只要抵抗下去，未来可期。更何况胡塞武装有成为“也门真正主人”的心思，而只要和美、以色列对抗下去，说不定，入主政府的那一天真会到来。相比之下，假以时日，伊朗在什叶派中的地位或将岌岌可危。国际社会也恰好抓住这个窗口（伊朗“投美无门”），不断鼓励胡塞武装和美帝做坚决作斗争。

●无论如何，谈就需要时间，谈“架构性的约束”更需要时间

美国之所以会成这个样子：第一，经济实力不够了；第二，军事力量不够了；第三，外交和内乱将自己彻底玩成了孤家寡人。特朗普知道中国在以逸待劳，他自己是劳师远征，而且毫无结果。如果继续这样下去，也许用不了几个月，特朗普要么自己下台，要么被子弹“送下台”。而在特朗普出事之前，马斯克很大概率上会成为第一个牺牲者。

最后需要补充的是，除了南海问题外，国际社会关心的一系列问题，比如，南亚问题，巴基斯坦问题，“俾路支解放军”问题，特朗普政府也要给一并给出一个明确的说法。或者也可以聊聊阿富汗的金铜矿，巴拿马运河的港口问题等。总之，需要谈出一个“架构性的约束”，否则谁都不会不信。或者更准确地说，只要美国自己相信就好，中国无所谓。

所谓“架构性的约束”对俄罗斯在乌克兰问题，中东问题上和美国可能达成的“交易”中同样非常重要，如果没有某种框架性的协议做保证，恐怕双方最终只能谈个寂寞。但无论如何，谈就需要时间，谈“架构性的约束”更需要时间。这也凸显特朗普政府，尤其是背后的华尔街在其务必尽快访华问题上，基于“时间因素”的急迫性。

Tuesday, March 18, 2025, Issue No. 1205

Why is it said that the internal strife in the United States has reached a point of completely disregarding the law and lacking any bottom-line constraints?

[Media Coverage]

On March 17, according to U.S. media reports, Trump posted on social media that he believed Biden's pardons were invalid because Biden used an autopen to sign these documents.

【Discussion Summary】

●Reiterating that former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson's visit to China is not a simple matter

Recently, according to British media reports, U.S. President Trump stated at the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington on March 17 that the Chinese leader would visit the United States in the near future.

Trump likely understands that the Chinese leader will not visit the U.S., but he needs such a "gesture." Although Trump is a dishonest "businessman president," he is someone who cares about appearances. By doing this, he is essentially seeking to save face and create an opportunity for his urgent visit to China, following the logic of "if you won't come, then I'll go" to achieve his goal.

Reiterating, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson's visit to China is not a simple matter. Trump's latest statement on March 17 well validates the previous assessments by Eastern Times Analysis, including one of the main intentions of Paulson's visit: to secure a "ticket to Beijing" for President Trump's early visit to China. In fact, discussions about a potential meeting between Chinese and U.S. leaders were already circulating before Trump took office, with U.S. media reporting that then-President-elect Trump hoped to visit China within 100 days of assuming office.

Additionally, we noted Trump's claim that Biden's pardons were invalid because they were signed with an autopen.

Objectively speaking, Trump's excuse is absurd. As a former U.S. president, has Trump never used an autopen? Denying the legitimacy of a former president's pardons based on such a ridiculous excuse violates U.S. law. The pardon system is a power granted to the president by the U.S. Constitution, specifically under Article II, Section 2.

Trump's actions send a clear signal—he sees himself as the law in the United States. In other words, he believes he can arbitrarily alter U.S. laws, including the Constitution. This clearly demonstrates that the internal strife in the U.S. has reached a point of complete disregard for the law and any bottom-line constraints. Of course, Trump is not alone in this fight. To secure their interests and even personal safety in the internal power struggle, Trump and his allies have no choice but to act this way. This also highlights the urgency of Trump's desire to visit China.

●The possible content and essence of "how it looks like an agreement has been reached"

On March 18, U.S. media cited two sources in an article titled "Trump Considers Recognizing Crimea as Russian Territory to End Conflict," stating that the Trump administration is considering recognizing Crimea as Russian territory as part of a future agreement to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

In our observation and assessment, this news was likely deliberately leaked by the Trump administration. It is worth noting that Eastern Times Analysis had already provided relevant assessments on the nature of the Crimea issue back in 2014.

Before we continue the discussion, let's revisit a segment from the "Eastern Times Analysis · Brief Edition" dated March 21, 2014, which reads:

...

●In essence, "the matter will only begin with Crimea's return to Russia"

Third, in the entire process of "Crimea's referendum, independence, and annexation by Russia," in essence, because "the matter will only begin with Crimea's return to Russia," up until today, the West (NATO) has only "threatened to take action against Russia but has never actually done so!"

As for how to view "the few sanctions previously announced by the West (targeting a few individuals)"? Western media themselves have said: With something like this happening (Crimea's independence from Ukraine and annexation by Russia), can those even be called sanctions? Moreover, based on the reactions of the West, Russia, and especially Ukraine's interim government, Western media generally believe that it "looks like some kind of agreement has been reached!"

At the level of "how it looks like an agreement has been reached," the most representative "question" is one posed by a Ukrainian to a Western media outlet: "The Russians have invaded our country, and the West's sanctions only target a few individuals. Is this how the West helps us fight against Russia?"

...

Due to space constraints, we have only quoted a small portion of this edition. Interested readers can visit the Eastern website to search for and read the full text. It has been exactly 11 years since this brief edition was published. During this time, many events have unfolded around the Crimea issue and the Ukraine crisis, especially the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war (referred to by Russia as a "special military operation") that began on February 24, 2022. Over the past 11 years, the West has essentially gained nothing from the Ukraine issue, while Russia has suffered significant losses. Ukraine, once the industrial and technological heart of the Soviet Union, has been completely shattered by Russia, the direct successor to the Soviet Union.

Looking back at Eastern Times Analysis' immediate assessment of the Crimea issue 11 years ago and comparing it with the Trump administration's recent signaling on the issue, it is not difficult to see the possible content and essence of "how it looks like an agreement has been reached." The Trump administration's message is clear: The U.S. has already made significant concessions. If Russia still refuses to sign a ceasefire agreement, then we will retract this offer, and Putin should not regret it later!

For Russia, this is both coercion and temptation. Conversely, it also poses a threat to the EU. At the same time, the Trump administration is using a "temporary ceasefire agreement" to entice the EU while simultaneously pressuring Russia. This is similar to the "two-way squeeze" exerted by Western capital interests on the European and U.S. platforms (in the process of "complex maneuvering," Western capital interests aim to minimize the influence of "national constraints").

●If Musk is ever "forced out," it will undoubtedly be a strong warning from Wall Street to Trump

In the Trump administration's view, quickly achieving effective easing of U.S.-Russia relations is crucial. Only with this "diplomatic achievement" can Trump negotiate U.S.-China relations effectively. Achieving a significant improvement in U.S.-China relations would allow the U.S. to confidently restart the "money printing machine" (during the Obama administration, the subprime crisis was handled, and Wall Street's greed was criticized, but in reality, the U.S. had already begun large-scale money printing, known as quantitative easing. Today, the U.S. is still "tapering" but has never stopped printing money. Thus, current money printing is informal. Trump's visit to China to seek effective easing of U.S.-China relations is a prerequisite for openly, formally, and massively restarting the "money printing machine"—China must not disrupt this); achieving a significant improvement in U.S.-China relations would also help ease internal U.S. strife. Expanding the "pie" can both "turn enemies into friends" and prevent "friends from becoming enemies."

Behind Trump's anxious push to visit China lies the shadow of Wall Street. Of course, Wall Street's core concern is whether the "financial perpetual motion machine" can continue to operate. This is somewhat different from Trump's core concerns. If Wall Street is most focused on how to expand the "pie," Trump is most concerned not only with expanding the "pie" but also with preserving his own life and wealth.

Given that the Trump administration has been unable to effectively handle U.S.-China relations in its first two months of operation, all parties, especially Trump himself, have felt the pressure. Clearly, Trump has failed to complete the tasks assigned to him by Wall Street, which means Wall Street is deeply dissatisfied with him. This pressure, applied to the "Trump camp," has begun to reveal internal contradictions.

U.S. media reported that while Trump praised Musk's efficiency, he also instructed his core governing team, the "Political Action Committee," to reject Musk's funding for the "Government Efficiency Department."

In the eyes of Wall Street, although Musk is a businessman and a member of Wall Street, he currently appears more like an official of the Trump administration or part of the "Trump camp." Wall Street's dissatisfaction with the Trump administration has forced Trump to find ways to "absorb the pressure" within his own camp, warning Musk, which will inevitably exacerbate internal contradictions within the "Trump camp" (outside the "Trump camp," the pressure is being redirected to the "Biden camp," such as further publicizing the Kennedy assassination case and declaring Biden's pardons invalid). If Musk is ever "forced out" (ostensibly fired by Trump but actually dealt with by Wall Street), it will undoubtedly be a strong warning from Wall Street to Trump.

Therefore, in our view, combined with the Trump administration's further concessions to Russia on the Crimea issue, Paulson's visit to China does not seem to have gone smoothly.

●The aftermath of the arrest of former Philippine President Duterte has shown unfavorable signs for the Marcos Jr. administration

Before continuing the discussion, let's look at another news report.

On March 17, Philippine Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairperson Imee Marcos issued a statement saying that the Senate would conduct an emergency investigation on March 20 into the detention of former President Duterte. She emphasized that Philippine sovereignty and legal procedures must always take precedence.

Imee Marcos is the sister of the current Philippine president, and it is clear that this sister is "placing justice above family loyalty." This shows that the aftermath of the arrest of former President Duterte has shown unfavorable signs for the Marcos Jr. administration—if the Trump administration shows signs of preparing to make concessions to China on issues such as the South China Sea before the EU, such as intervening in the continued trial of Duterte on the grounds that the "International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over Duterte," then not only will the EU be betrayed by the U.S., but the Marcos Jr. administration will also be in jeopardy.

In our consistent assessment, China will not engage with the U.S. on the so-called "Taiwan deal" (Taiwan is a province of China and an internal Chinese matter; using Taiwan, which is inherently part of China, as a bargaining chip in negotiations with China is out of the question, especially since China can take Taiwan back at any time). If there is to be a discussion, it should be about the South China Sea issue. The question is, does the Trump administration dare to open its mouth? Once it does, the EU, Japan, South Korea, and other former U.S. "lackeys" will likely flee one after another. Of course, if Trump insists on visiting China, that's fine—perhaps this time he can visit the Chinese People's Revolution Military Museum! It is worth noting that China's military buildup, in a sense, has already begun to shift from conventional to strategic levels, with the core point being that even if the U.S. starts a nuclear war, it stands no chance of winning.

●The U.S. intention was ruthlessly shattered by the Houthis' "slippers"

At the end of this review, let's look at another news report.

On March 18, Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea stated that in retaliation for U.S. airstrikes against the Houthis, the Houthis launched two missiles and two drones at the U.S. aircraft carrier "Truman" in the northern Red Sea, and one missile and four drones at another U.S. destroyer.

On March 17, the White House spokesperson suddenly stated that as long as the Houthis "stop attacking U.S. ships and harming Americans," the U.S. military would cease its strikes on Yemen. This statement caused an uproar. Has the so-called military hegemony of the U.S. become so weak that it cannot even handle the Houthis?

Clearly, the Houthis rejected the U.S. "offer" and continued to attack U.S. ships, especially the "Truman." This left the Trump administration in an awkward position. It is worth noting that the U.S. has previously conducted military strikes against the Houthis during the Biden administration, but the result was that the Houthis not only remained but grew stronger, with rumors even circulating that U.S. aircraft carriers were being chased by "slippers."

Objectively speaking, compared to Iran, the Houthis, with their strong fundamentalist religious beliefs, are less susceptible to Western infiltration. The difficulty for the U.S. in dealing with the Houthis is even greater than with Iran.

It is worth noting that the Trump administration's renewed military strikes against the Houthis, besides being a gesture of goodwill to Israel's Netanyahu government based on internal strife, also aim to demonstrate to all parties its ability to control the world's major canals, straits, and shipping lanes (with the "DeepSeek + Huawei" strong impact, the "Stargate" project has failed, the AI myth has been shattered, and the "technological anti-China alliance" has not materialized, making this point even more prominent). This is also one of the core purposes of the U.S. so-called "strategic expansion." However, this U.S. intention was ruthlessly shattered by the Houthis' "slippers."

Objectively, Israel has given the Houthis an excuse, and the Trump administration is now in a difficult position. If it cannot even handle the Houthis, what more can it boast about? China's new fighter jets have a range of 3,000-4,000 kilometers, and during this range, how many shipping lanes are under the control of the PLA? As for the Persian Gulf, setting aside willpower, at least its military strength is much greater than that of the Houthis. The U.S. might succeed in the Panama Canal. It is worth noting that this time, China's handling of the Panama Canal is through a party delegation, preparing for the worst. The decisive factor is not in Panama but in the Western Pacific and the South China Sea. If Trump wants to completely offend the world, then go ahead. Panama has already offended a group of people, and if it targets the Port of Quetzal, it will offend all of South America.

Moreover, if the U.S. can block us, can't we block the U.S.? Over time, the U.S. is cutting off people's livelihoods. Furthermore, China has exchange rate and interest rate tools to impose restrictions on the U.S. in various key strategic materials (the U.S. is already trapped in an "Afghanistan-style strategic trap" globally), as well as continuous military and resource buildups, with the "bottom-line solution" being the reunification of Taiwan.

The Houthis' choice of excuse for attacking the U.S. and Israel is excellent (Middle Eastern and European countries have not condemned it): the Netanyahu government's reckless actions, violating the ceasefire agreement, and continuing to kill and plunder in the Middle East. Although Trump is furious internally, he must pretend to support this externally (of course, Trump dares not publicly discuss "reoccupying Gaza").

It is worth noting that the Houthis seem to understand their position well—as long as they resist, the future is promising. Moreover, the Houthis aspire to become the "true rulers of Yemen," and as long as they continue to fight against the U.S. and Israel, the day may come when they enter the government. In contrast, over time, Iran's position within the Shia community may become precarious. The international community has seized this window (Iran has "no way to join the U.S.") to continuously encourage the Houthis to resolutely fight against the U.S.

●In any case, negotiations take time, and negotiating "structural constraints" takes even more time

The reasons why the U.S. has reached this point are: first, its economic strength is insufficient; second, its military power is insufficient; third, its diplomacy and internal strife have left it completely isolated. Trump knows that China is waiting at ease while he is on a futile expedition. If this continues, perhaps in a few months, Trump will either step down or be "forced down" by a bullet. Before anything happens to Trump, Musk is highly likely to be the first casualty.

Finally, it should be noted that in addition to the South China Sea issue, the Trump administration must also provide a clear stance on a series of issues of international concern, such as the South Asia issue, the Pakistan issue, and the "Balochistan Liberation Army" issue. Alternatively, it could discuss Afghanistan's gold and copper mines or the Panama Canal's port issues. In short, a "structural constraint" must be negotiated; otherwise, no one will believe it. Or, more accurately, as long as the U.S. believes it, China doesn't care.

The so-called "structural constraint" is also crucial in the potential "deal" between Russia and the U.S. on the Ukraine and Middle East issues. Without some kind of framework agreement, the two sides may end up negotiating in vain. But in any case, negotiations take time, and negotiating "structural constraints" takes even more time. This also highlights the urgency of the Trump administration, especially Wall Street behind it, to visit China as soon as possible, based on the "time factor."

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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