2025年3月13日，星期四，第1202期

普京视察库尔斯克地区并誓言“彻底夺回”，向美西方发出何种信号？

【媒体报道】

3月12日，俄罗斯总统兼武装力量最高统帅普京视察了位于俄罗斯西部边境的库尔斯克地区，并在库尔斯克集团军指挥点举行会议。这是自去年8月乌克兰军队发动进攻并占领库尔斯克部分领土以来，普京首次访问该地区。

【讨论纪要】

●对特朗普来说，在与中国“搭话”的问题上，是能早就别晚

在今天讨论正式开始之前，我们先来关注菲律宾前总统杜特尔特被捕一事的后续发展。我们注意到，在杜特尔特被送往海牙后，有媒体称，其将于当地时间14日下午2时在法院第一预审庭首次出庭接受聆讯。

从杜特尔特刚到海牙就立刻启动审判进程来观察，推动此事的特朗普政府，或特朗普本人以及“特朗普们”的时间很有限，在与中国“搭话”的问题上，是能早就别晚。国际刑事法院由欧盟主导，虽有“国际”两个字，但性质上却是欧盟私设的“衙门”。也就是说，国际刑事法院（ICC）‌不是联合国下属机构‌，而是一个独立的国际司法组织。

值得一提的是，在审判菲律宾前总统杜特尔特的问题上，不管欧美各自揣着什么心思，至少表面上是在配合。这也是我们提醒大家在观察当前阶段美欧关系的时候，不要将其“绝对对立”的主要原因之一。

●普京以行动向特朗普政府表明态度，不接受美欧搞的所谓“临时停火协议”

在继续展开讨论前，再来看一则新闻报道。

3月12日，俄罗斯总统兼武装力量最高统帅普京视察了位于俄罗斯西部边境的库尔斯克地区，并在库尔斯克集团军指挥点举行会议。据俄媒消息，这是自去年8月乌克兰军队发动进攻并占领库尔斯克部分领土以来，普京首次访问该地区。

俄罗斯总统普京自去年8月以来首次访问库尔斯克地区，或意味着俄罗斯要彻底解决库尔斯克问题，在我们看来，仅从纯军事角度观察是有可能的。显然，俄方对美乌在沙特吉达进行会晤的结果非常不满，甚至感到愤怒。普京以行动向特朗普政府表明态度，不接受美欧搞的所谓“临时停火协议”。此外，与中、伊搞“和平纽带-2025”联合海上军事演习也是俄罗斯表达强烈不满的具体动作之一。

当然，不排除一种可能性，那就是急于借缓和美俄关系，哪怕是阶段性缓和美俄关系尽早开启（特朗普）访华行程的特朗普政府，一边用美欧“临时停火协议”对俄罗斯施压，另一边用对俄罗斯收回库尔斯克一事“睁一眼闭一眼”对俄罗斯进行安抚。

●特朗普政府为弱化伊朗当局的“抵抗之心”想出的“临时办法”

除了在乌克兰方向竭尽全力达成阶段性的局势缓和外，特朗普政府也在努力试图在中东问题上促成一个阶段性的局势相对缓和的局面。

我们注意到3月12日，阿拉伯国家外长在卡塔尔同美国中东问题特使史蒂文·威特科夫讨论了加沙地带重建问题的新闻报道。

以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家，包括一些重要的中东国家，如，埃及，在叙利亚局势后续发展中越来越积极。值得注意的是，叙利亚问题的解决，包括叙利亚战后重建，现在已经提升到阿盟层面。如果美国反对，那就等于把整个阿盟推到了自己的对立面上。

问题在于，有以色列内塔尼亚胡政府“拦路”，特朗普政府能处理得好吗？

这里不得不提一句，从特朗普政府即便在以色列巴勒斯坦政策、叙利亚政策已经公开明显和以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家，一些中东重要国家，如，埃及对立的情况下，仍无法轻易下决心在沙特和伊朗之间做选择的情况看出，此前伊朗当局的“投降主义”决策非常不明智。这恐怕也是伊朗当局进退维谷之间，不得不将自己的对外政策从“投降主义”摇摆回“强硬路线”的原因之一。

伊朗的小心思是，在中国和沙特（逊尼派）之间“双向奔赴”的背景下，自己有机会投靠西方。帝国主义者从来在中东制造对立，从来都是拉一波打一波，这至少从20世纪70年代就开始，涉及“布雷顿森林体系”的截图和“石油美元制”的建立。其中当然也有以色列这个“军事钢钉”和沙特“经济钢钉”的作用。最终，伊朗总统公开向美国发出缓和信号。在我们看来，这本身就是哈梅内伊的意思。结果伊朗投降无门。想要取代沙特的这个小心思未能得逞。值得一提的是，如果特朗普政府地位稳定，接纳伊朗投降是可以的。现在恰恰因为内斗，特朗普政府被以色列“绑架”而无法简单在沙特和伊朗之间做出选择。

投降无门，声誉受损，空间压缩，于是伊朗当局不得不将对外政策从“投降”转向“对抗”。讽刺的是，这恰恰也是以色列内塔尼亚胡的“私利”客观上促成的。当然更是美国的内斗不断激烈，特朗普政府地位无法稳固导致的。

对特朗普来说，既然因以色列因素暂时无法在沙特和伊朗之间做选择，也就是在以前美帝惯用的“拉一波，打一波”策略不能进行下去的情况下，为了整体上尽量稳定中东局势，特朗普政府还真想出了一个“临时办法”，那就是“写信”，以弱化伊朗当局的“抵抗之心”。有趣的是，据公开媒体消息，特朗普似乎给伊朗方面写去了两封信，一封信写给伊朗最高精神领袖哈梅内伊，另一封则写给了伊朗总统佩泽希齐杨。

特朗普政府弱化伊朗当局“抵抗之心”的具体手法可谓“司马昭之心，路人皆知”，这非常类似中国古代经典故事“曹操抹书间韩遂”。当然，文章不在如何“抹书”上，而在于离间伊朗最高精神领袖和伊朗最高行政领导人，他们之间本来就已经矛盾公开化，以至于公开“甩锅”。

显然，这是针对本就已经暗痕累累的伊朗内部，尤其是伊朗决策层内部矛盾进行挑拨离间，制造猜忌，让伊朗当局陷入决策瘫痪状态，进而弱化伊朗当局的“抵抗之心”。当然，在伊朗之外，这一幕也在进一步损害伊朗当局在中东地区，伊斯兰世界以及全球范围内的形象和信用，比如，对于这样一个“有信就接”而且一接就是两封的伊朗，刚刚与其举行“和平纽带-2025”的中国和俄罗斯怎么想呢？

说到以色列，不妨和大家一起看看内塔尼亚胡政府近期都在“忙些什么”。

3月13日，有报道称，以方已划定一条距以叙边界围栏约65公里的“非军事化走廊”，仅允许叙利亚警察部队在此区域内活动，以此阻止叙利亚新政权在毗邻以色列的边境地区强化军事存在。以色列将严禁叙利亚在该区域部署任何远程打击武器，包括导弹发射平台及尖端武器系统。

显然，以色列内塔尼亚胡政府，没有一刻停止“绑架”特朗普政府，服务于实现所谓“大以色列梦”。对此意图，特朗普政府自然十分满意，但当然阶段，其一，基于美国内部恶斗，不能说什么；其二，基于阶段性缓和中东紧张氛围，也可稍加利用一二。对于前者来说，已陷入“苦斗”中的特朗普和“特朗普们”此时此刻自然不能得罪美国内部的“关键少数”，也就是掌握大量媒体资源并与传统美国军工复合体利益关联极其密切且在意识形态上支持“极端犹太复国主义”的部分美国资本利益（美国对以色列出口的F-35i是“开源”的，尤其可见关联度之强，而对其它国家是“不开源”的）；对于后者来说，尽管美国因内塔尼亚胡小集团的搅局，暂时无法轻易在沙特和伊朗之间做选择，但以色列的强硬态度有利于特朗普政府稳住伊朗，比如，推送所谓“新型伊以关系”，并在这个过程中威逼利诱伊朗彻底断绝获取核武器的途径，这种稳住伊朗的方式，既可以对内塔尼亚胡小集团有一个交代，也对敦促其帮助重返叙利亚的俄罗斯产生某种呼应，同时让中东局势整体上相对稳定。

●基于重新定义“恐怖主义，恐怖组织，恐怖分子”的“尊王攘夷”

3月13日，土耳其媒体援引消息人士的话称，将在中东、土耳其或约旦建立打击“伊斯兰国”恐怖组织（在俄罗斯被禁的恐怖组织）的行动中心，相关的技术性工作已展开。

“恐怖组织，恐怖主义，恐怖分子”到底应该如何定义，由谁来决定，向来是方方面面高度关注且较为敏感的话题。对国际社会来说，虽然到目前为止人不谋求主动介入叙利亚局势后续发展，但“暗桩”早已埋下，那就是世界范围内，包括中东地区，在“到底如何定义恐怖主义、恐怖组织、恐怖分子”的问题上如何界定的话题，核心就是，决不能美国一家说了算。

在中东，恐怖组织不只有ISIS，还有国际社会关心的“东突”，土耳其关心的“库尔德武装”，叙利亚临时政府支持的“沙姆组织”，以及俄罗斯暗中支持的“阿拉维派武装”是否要被定义为新的恐怖组织。

对此，我们的建议是，首先把ISIS、“东突”和“沙姆组织”这三者摆出来，因为其是联合国明确定性为极端恐怖组织的武装派别。不难想象的是，通过一系列努力，如果美帝，甚至西方世界霸权最终丧失了这个定义的话语权，并将其还给中东人民，当然是一种基于反恐层面的“尊王攘夷”，国际社会大可支持。

●台湾就是中国的一个省，台湾问题是纯粹的中国内政问题，这没什么好谈的

近日，美国“政府效率部”部长马斯克在接受媒体采访的时候公开表示“处境很难”。在我们看来，让“马部长”有如此压力的主要原因之一就是特斯拉的股票大跌，这让马斯克的“商业帝国”内部产生了对其巨大的压力。投资人们加入马斯克是为了盈利，而不是为了赔钱。这意味无论从特朗普阵营外部观察，还是从特朗普阵营内部观察，美国内部恶斗在“时间因素”的“催化”下比之前更加激烈。这恐怕也是特朗普政府如此急切地一边推动审判菲律宾前总统杜特尔特，另一边尽可能按住乌克兰和中东这两口“锅”的主要原因之一。

而更要命的是，“拜登们之索罗斯们”已经转入暗处，弱点已不再明显（“拜登们”目前是“光脚者”，之前执政的时候不能说的现在可以随便说，现在，“特朗普们”成为“穿鞋者”，在野的时候随便说的现在不能说了）。正所谓，明枪易躲，暗箭难防，这恐怕是让“特朗普们之马斯克们”公开表示“处境艰难”的主要原因所在。比如，以比尔·盖茨和索罗斯为例，宁可亏钱也要把股市往下砸，让特朗普难堪，这是特朗普此前始料未及的。而在美国之外，在“不服就干，学习中国‘好榜样’”的作用下，大大小小，方方面面对美帝纷纷出手，进行反击。以至于特朗普政府上任两个月，对外政策混乱一片，基本上“交了白卷”。

于是乎，痛定思痛，特朗普政府不得不极其痛苦地重新审视对华关系。

3月10日，据日本媒体报道，特朗普团队关键人物、美国防部负责政策事务的副部长提名人埃尔布里奇·科尔比近日在听证会上表示，台湾并非美国“生死攸关”的利益，美国明确承诺保卫台湾不仅成本大于收益，并可能激化与中国大陆的矛盾，引发多方面风险。报道认为，科尔比的表态与拜登政府的立场形成鲜明对比。

实际上，这并不是特朗普政府首次提及美国应该如何处理“台湾问题”之相关话题，早在特朗普走马上任之初东方时事解读就曾提醒大家注意美方是否有意将“台湾问题”作为“交易”的筹码和中国讨价还价（美国人想要用本就是我们自己的“交易”重大问题，比如，中俄关系，中沙关系，中国中东政策，中美经济关系）的意图。事实上，在我们的观察与评估中，美方的确有此心思并多次对中国进行试探。于是也就有了3月12日，我们就为什么中国对美国（特朗普政府）将“谈台湾问题”封得死死的这一话题展开的详细讨论。总体上，对于美国吹风所谓“放弃台湾”，中国是理都不理！至于“作价将台湾贱卖给中国”这种炒作，中国更是提都不要提！在中国看来，台湾就是中国的一个省，台湾问题是纯粹的中国内政问题，这没什么好谈的。

需要补充的是，这一次，在“台湾问题上”，特朗普政府除了再次试探中国的态度外，也有一边威胁欧、俄，一边离间中俄，中欧关系之意。言外之意就是，将“中美可能就‘台湾问题’达成交易”这种氛围抄送欧盟和俄罗斯。由于后两者和美国一样都信奉帝国主义和大国沙文主义，尤其是坚信“图强必霸”，所以，某种程度上，特朗普政府的这一限额意图还是能够有所收效的。

不排除特朗普政府在近几天会在三大关系中的一个或两个中有大动作（涉及中美关系的可能性较大）。另一个就是美国内部恶斗或会有大新闻传出的可能性。大家不妨密切观察。

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Thursday, March 13, 2025, Issue No. 1202

What Signal Is Putin Sending to the West by Inspecting the Kursk Region and Vowing to "Completely Retake It"?

[Media Coverage]

On March 12, Russian President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Vladimir Putin inspected the Kursk region, located on Russia's western border, and held a meeting at the command post of the Kursk Army Group. This marks Putin's first visit to the region since Ukrainian forces launched an offensive and occupied parts of Kursk in August of last year.

【Discussion Summary】

● For Trump, in the matter of "engaging with China," the sooner, the better.

Before we begin today's discussion, let us first follow up on the arrest of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. We have noted that after Duterte was taken to The Hague, media reports indicate that he will make his first court appearance at the First Pre-Trial Chamber on the afternoon of March 14, local time.

Judging from the immediate initiation of the trial process upon Duterte's arrival in The Hague, the Trump administration—or Trump himself and the "Trump faction"—has limited time. In the matter of "engaging with China," the sooner, the better. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is dominated by the European Union, and despite the word "international" in its name, it is essentially a "private court" set up by the EU. In other words, the ICC is not a subsidiary body of the United Nations but an independent international judicial organization.

It is worth noting that in the trial of former Philippine President Duterte, regardless of the individual motives of Europe and the U.S., they are at least cooperating on the surface. This is one of the main reasons we remind everyone not to view U.S.-EU relations as "absolutely opposed" when observing the current stage.

● Putin, through his actions, signals to the Trump administration that Russia will not accept the so-called "temporary ceasefire agreement" concocted by the U.S. and Europe.

Before continuing the discussion, let us look at another news report.

On March 12, Russian President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Vladimir Putin inspected the Kursk region, located on Russia's western border, and held a meeting at the command post of the Kursk Army Group. According to Russian media, this is Putin's first visit to the region since Ukrainian forces launched an offensive and occupied parts of Kursk in August of last year.

Putin's first visit to the Kursk region since August of last year may signal Russia's intention to completely resolve the Kursk issue. From a purely military perspective, this is certainly possible. Clearly, Russia is extremely dissatisfied, even angry, about the outcome of the U.S.-Ukraine meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Through his actions, Putin is signaling to the Trump administration that Russia will not accept the so-called "temporary ceasefire agreement" concocted by the U.S. and Europe. Additionally, Russia's joint naval exercise with China and Iran, "Peace Bond-2025," is another concrete expression of its strong dissatisfaction.

Of course, there is also the possibility that the Trump administration, eager to ease U.S.-Russia relations—even if only temporarily—to facilitate Trump's visit to China, is using the U.S.-EU "temporary ceasefire agreement" to pressure Russia while turning a blind eye to Russia's efforts to retake Kursk as a form of appeasement.

● The Trump administration's "temporary solution" to weaken Iran's "resistance mentality."

In addition to striving for a temporary easing of tensions in Ukraine, the Trump administration is also working to promote a relatively stable situation in the Middle East.

We have noted the news report on March 12 that Arab foreign ministers discussed the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip with U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace Steven Wittkopf in Qatar.

Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia, along with other important Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, are becoming increasingly active in the subsequent development of the Syrian situation. It is worth noting that the resolution of the Syrian issue, including post-war reconstruction, has now been elevated to the level of the Arab League. If the U.S. opposes this, it would effectively push the entire Arab League into opposition.

The question is, with the Israeli Netanyahu government "blocking the way," can the Trump administration handle this well?

It must be mentioned that even though the Trump administration's policies on Israel-Palestine and Syria have openly and clearly put it at odds with Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia and other important Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, it still cannot easily decide between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This shows that the Iranian authorities' earlier "capitulationist" decision was very unwise. This is likely one of the reasons why the Iranian authorities, caught in a dilemma, have had to shift their foreign policy back from "capitulation" to a "tough line."

Iran's small hope was that, in the context of China and Saudi Arabia (Sunni) "moving towards each other," it could find an opportunity to align with the West. Imperialists have always created divisions in the Middle East, pulling one side while attacking the other, a strategy that dates back to the 1970s, involving the "Bretton Woods system" and the establishment of the "petrodollar system." This, of course, also involves the role of Israel as a "military nail" and Saudi Arabia as an "economic nail." Ultimately, the Iranian president publicly signaled a willingness to ease relations with the U.S. In our view, this was Ayatollah Khamenei's intention. However, Iran found no door to surrender. Its small hope of replacing Saudi Arabia was thwarted. It is worth noting that if the Trump administration were stable, accepting Iran's surrender would be possible. But now, precisely because of internal strife, the Trump administration is "held hostage" by Israel and cannot easily choose between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

With no door to surrender, its reputation damaged, and its space compressed, the Iranian authorities have had to shift their foreign policy from "capitulation" to "confrontation." Ironically, this was objectively facilitated by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's "self-interest." Of course, it is also a result of the intensifying internal strife in the U.S. and the Trump administration's inability to stabilize its position.

For Trump, since he cannot easily choose between Saudi Arabia and Iran due to Israeli factors—meaning the U.S.'s usual strategy of "pulling one side while attacking the other" cannot proceed—the Trump administration has come up with a "temporary solution" to stabilize the Middle East situation as much as possible: "writing letters" to weaken the Iranian authorities' "resistance mentality." Interestingly, according to public media reports, Trump seems to have sent two letters to Iran, one to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the other to President Pezeshkian.

The Trump administration's specific approach to weakening the Iranian authorities' "resistance mentality" is as clear as day, reminiscent of the ancient Chinese story "Cao Cao Writes a Letter to Divide Han Sui." Of course, the key is not how the "letter is written" but in sowing discord between the Supreme Leader and the President of Iran, whose relationship is already publicly strained to the point of openly "shifting blame."

Clearly, this is an attempt to exploit the already existing cracks within Iran, especially within its decision-making circles, to create mistrust, paralyze decision-making, and weaken the Iranian authorities' "resistance mentality." Outside of Iran, this further damages the Iranian authorities' image and credibility in the Middle East, the Islamic world, and globally. For example, how would China and Russia, who just conducted the "Peace Bond-2025" exercise with Iran, view an Iran that "accepts letters" and even two at once?

Speaking of Israel, let us take a look at what the Netanyahu government has been "busy with" recently.

On March 13, reports indicated that Israel has demarcated a "demilitarized corridor" approximately 65 kilometers from the Israeli-Syrian border fence, allowing only Syrian police forces to operate within this area to prevent the new Syrian regime from strengthening its military presence near the Israeli border. Israel will strictly prohibit Syria from deploying any long-range strike weapons, including missile platforms and advanced weapon systems, in this region.

Clearly, the Israeli Netanyahu government has not stopped "holding hostage" the Trump administration to serve the realization of the so-called "Greater Israel Dream." The Trump administration is naturally satisfied with this intention, but at this stage, first, due to internal U.S. strife, it cannot say much; second, it can use this to temporarily ease tensions in the Middle East. For the former, Trump and the "Trump faction," already embroiled in a "bitter struggle," naturally cannot afford to offend the "critical minority" within the U.S.—those who control significant media resources and are closely linked to the traditional U.S. military-industrial complex, ideologically supporting "extreme Zionism." For the latter, although the U.S. cannot easily choose between Saudi Arabia and Iran due to the Netanyahu clique's meddling, Israel's tough stance helps the Trump administration stabilize Iran, such as by promoting the so-called "new Iran-Israel relationship" and using this process to pressure Iran into completely abandoning its nuclear weapons ambitions. This approach to stabilizing Iran allows the Trump administration to appease the Netanyahu clique, respond to Russia's calls for a return to Syria, and maintain relative stability in the Middle East.

● "Revering the King and Expelling the Barbarians" Based on Redefining "Terrorism, Terrorist Organizations, and Terrorists."

On March 13, Turkish media cited sources as saying that an operations center to combat the "Islamic State" (a terrorist organization banned in Russia) will be established in the Middle East, Turkey, or Jordan, and that related technical work has already begun.

The definition of "terrorist organizations, terrorism, and terrorists," and who gets to decide, has always been a highly sensitive and closely watched topic. For the international community, although it has not yet actively intervened in the subsequent development of the Syrian situation, "hidden stakes" have already been laid, namely the global discussion on "how to define terrorism, terrorist organizations, and terrorists," including in the Middle East. The core issue is that the U.S. cannot have the final say.

In the Middle East, terrorist organizations are not limited to ISIS. There are also the "East Turkestan" groups of concern to the international community, the "Kurdish armed forces" of concern to Turkey, the "Sham Organization" supported by the Syrian interim government, and the "Alawite armed forces" covertly supported by Russia, which may or may not be defined as new terrorist organizations.

In this regard, our suggestion is to first put forward ISIS, "East Turkestan," and the "Sham Organization," as these are armed groups explicitly classified as extremist terrorist organizations by the United Nations. It is not hard to imagine that, through a series of efforts, if the U.S. empire—or even the Western world—ultimately loses its discursive power over this definition and returns it to the people of the Middle East, this would be a form of "revering the king and expelling the barbarians" based on counter-terrorism, which the international community could support.

● Taiwan is a Province of China, and the Taiwan Issue Is Purely China's Internal Affair—There Is Nothing to Discuss.

Recently, U.S. "Secretary of Government Efficiency" Elon Musk publicly stated in a media interview that "the situation is very difficult." In our view, one of the main reasons for Musk's pressure is the sharp decline in Tesla's stock price, which has created significant internal pressure within his "commercial empire." Investors joined Musk to make profits, not to lose money. This means that, whether viewed from outside or inside the Trump camp, the internal strife in the U.S. has become more intense under the "catalyst" of the "time factor." This is likely one of the main reasons why the Trump administration is so eager to push for the trial of former Philippine President Duterte while trying to keep the "pots" of Ukraine and the Middle East from boiling over.

What is even more critical is that the "Biden faction's Soros faction" has gone underground, and their weaknesses are no longer obvious (the "Biden faction" is now "barefoot," able to say things they couldn't while in power, while the "Trump faction" has become "shod," unable to say things they could while out of power). As the saying goes, "an open enemy is easier to deal with than a hidden one," which is likely the main reason why the "Trump faction's Musk faction" has publicly stated that "the situation is very difficult." For example, figures like Bill Gates and Soros are willing to lose money to drive down the stock market and embarrass Trump, something Trump did not anticipate. Outside the U.S., under the influence of "if you don't submit, fight—learn from China's 'good example,'" various forces, large and small, have launched counterattacks against the U.S. empire. As a result, two months into the Trump administration, its foreign policy is in complete disarray, essentially "handing in a blank paper."

Thus, after much reflection, the Trump administration has had to painfully re-examine its relationship with China.

On March 10, Japanese media reported that a key figure in the Trump team, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy nominee Elbridge Colby, stated during a hearing that Taiwan is not a "vital interest" for the U.S., and that a clear U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan would cost more than it gains and could exacerbate tensions with mainland China, triggering multiple risks. The report believes that Colby's statement sharply contrasts with the Biden administration's position.

In fact, this is not the first time the Trump administration has raised the topic of how the U.S. should handle the "Taiwan issue." As early as the beginning of Trump's term, we reminded everyone to pay attention to whether the U.S. intended to use the "Taiwan issue" as a bargaining chip to negotiate with China (the Americans want to use issues that are fundamentally our own, such as China-Russia relations, China-Saudi relations, China's Middle East policy, and China-U.S. economic relations). In fact, in our observations and assessments, the U.S. has indeed had this intention and has repeatedly tested China. This led to our detailed discussion on March 12 about why China has firmly sealed off any discussion of the "Taiwan issue" with the U.S. (the Trump administration). Overall, China has ignored U.S. hints about "abandoning Taiwan," and does not even mention the idea of "selling Taiwan cheaply to China"—Taiwan is a province of China, and the Taiwan issue is purely China's internal affair, with nothing to discuss.

It should be added that this time, on the "Taiwan issue," in addition to testing China's attitude again, the Trump administration also intends to threaten Europe and Russia while driving a wedge between China-Russia and China-EU relations. The implication is to create an atmosphere of "the U.S. and China may reach a deal on the 'Taiwan issue'" and share it with the EU and Russia. Since the latter two, like the U.S., believe in imperialism and great-power chauvinism—especially the conviction that "a strong nation must dominate"—the Trump administration's limited intent may still achieve some effect.

It is not impossible that the Trump administration will make a major move in one or two of the three major relationships in the coming days (with a higher likelihood of involving China-U.S. relations). Another possibility is that major news about the internal strife in the U.S. may emerge. Everyone should pay close attention.

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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