2025年3月12日，星期三，第1201期

如何理解在菲律宾前总统杜特尔特被捕事件上，欧美是在各取所需？

【媒体报道】

3月12日，在菲律宾政府的配合下，菲前总统杜特尔特于当地时间3月11日晚被包机带往荷兰海牙，接受国际刑事法院（ICC）对他提出的所谓“反人类罪指控”审判。当天深夜，菲现总统马科斯举行新闻发布会，确认飞机正在飞往海牙。他同时为菲政府在逮捕杜特尔特一事中所扮演的角色做辩护，声称此次逮捕符合菲律宾对“国际刑警组织”的承诺，“我们没有以任何方式帮助ICC”。

【讨论纪要】

●在菲律宾前总统杜特尔特被捕事件上，欧美是在各取所需

我们注意到菲前总统杜特尔特于当地时间3月11日晚被包机带往荷兰海牙，接受国际刑事法院（ICC）对他提出的所谓“反人类罪指控”审判的新闻报道。

杜特尔特并不是一般人，而是菲律宾的前总统，其女儿是菲律宾现任副总统。此外，其家族在菲律宾有较大势力，尤其在棉兰老岛。所以，杜特尔特被捕这件事，究其本质，引用值班员的点评来说就是：这是有人在准备开启所谓的“杀人门”，但这种“准备开启”又是在继续旋转所谓的“旋转门”。意料之中的事！有必要强调的是，“庆父（美帝）不死、门（菲）转不已”！

所谓“庆父（美帝）不死、门（菲）转不已”的意思就是，这件事是美帝（特朗普政府）一手操纵的，是“推动者”。当然，其中也离不开目前总体上仍运行在“欧美合流”状态下的欧盟。国际刑事法院（ICC）就在欧盟的掌控之下，而国际刑事法院（ICC）的总部所在国荷兰（海崖），更是不折不扣的欧盟成员国。用“执行者”来形容欧盟毫不为过。在我们的观察与评估中，在菲律宾前总统杜特尔特被捕事件上，欧美是在各取所需。

在继续展开讨论前，我们再来看一则新闻报道。

●俄方显然早已将“临时停火”贴上了“缓兵之计”的标签

3月11日，在沙特阿拉伯吉达举行会谈的美国和乌克兰代表团宣布，双方在实施临时停火、恢复情报共享和安全援助等议题上达成共识。双方代表团当晚在结束会谈后发表联合声明。对此，关注会谈的欧洲各方纷纷发声表示欢迎。

我们尚不清楚，俄罗斯代表团是否在沙特阿拉伯吉达举行会谈的现场，但公开消息显示，俄方没有参加本次会谈。或者说，俄罗斯目前是不是在“菜单里”我们不确定，但显然不在“餐桌上”。对欧盟而言，从原来的“菜单里”挪到了“餐桌上”，自然是“纷纷发声表示欢迎”。至于所谓的“临时停火”，大家在始于2023年10月1日的本轮巴以冲突中早已看过反复上演多次了。

种种迹象表明，俄罗斯对于这次在沙特阿拉伯吉达举行会谈的结果感到极度不满，甚至愤怒。值得一提的是，在大约10天前，也就是3月2日，英、法两国曾提出过一个为期一个月的“部分停火计划”。该计划范围不包括停止地面战斗，但希望俄乌停止对空中、海上和能源基础设施的袭击。对此，俄方立刻表示拒绝，并称所谓“临时停火”不可接受。俄方认为这将给乌克兰提供喘息之机。用扎哈罗娃的话说就是，我们正在应对（乌克兰军队）不惜一切代价实现喘息以及防止前线溃败的企图。换言之，俄方显然早已将“临时停火”贴上了“缓兵之计”的标签。说到这里不得不提一句，在乌克兰问题上，并不是没有出现过所谓的“临时停火”，最典型的案例就是“明斯克协议”。后来，经德国前总理默克尔和法国前总统奥朗德亲自证实，“明斯克协议”就是诓骗俄罗斯的缓兵之计。

对此，东方时事解读早有点评，尽管这一手非常阴险恶毒——通过将俄罗斯最高领导人或决策层贴上“愚蠢上当者”之标签，进而企图在俄罗斯社会内部制造对普京政权的极度不满情绪，进而严重冲击普京政权的稳定性，甚至伺机将其推翻。

但是，当这一阴险手段最终未能得逞后，西方（欧美）“聪明反被聪明误”的恶果也就随之显现：如今，西方（欧美）说出的任何话，俄罗斯显然都极难相信了。这非常讽刺，企图给别人贴上“愚蠢上当者”之标签的人，反而通过这件事向全世界自证，自己才是那个“蠢货”。

值得一提的是，俄罗斯使用了自己的方式向西方（欧美）表达不满和愤怒，于是也就有了中、俄、伊三国举行的“和平纽带-2025”海上联合军事演习。当然，俄罗斯在表达愤怒和不满之余，参与本次军演也有瞄着中美关系进行调拨的小心思。可以说，中美关系进一步恶化，甚至直接发生军事冲突或爆发局部战争，绝对是俄罗斯最希望看到的国际局势变化之一。

●乌克兰问题上，特朗普政府围绕美俄，美欧关系如何平衡“打转转”的过程中，中美关系始终运行在“中国一天天好起来，美帝一天天烂下去”的层面上

特朗普政府显然对俄罗斯，在乌克兰问题上的耐心所剩无几。在特朗普看来，俄罗斯“漫天要价”是不识时务，于是在和俄罗斯谈所谓“美俄版永久停火协议”的同时，又搞出和欧盟谈所谓“美欧版临时停火协议”这一出，妄图一手“胡萝卜”一手“大棒”压服俄罗斯同意签署特朗普政府提出的“乌克兰和平协议”。

但问题在于，俄罗斯之所以此时此刻“漫天要价”也是瞅准了才来的。所谓“瞅准了”指的就是：其一，特朗普政府至今未能妥善处理中美关系，不仅未能改善，反而出现进一步恶化的迹象；美国内部恶斗激烈，甚至连特朗普阵营内部也出现公开矛盾激化的迹象。对这样一个处境的特朗普政府，俄罗斯认为，不趁机“揩油”实在是对不起自己。要让步，也是特朗普政府继续让步。这也是对此前东方时事解读关于在乌克兰问题上，美俄关系和美欧关系对特朗普政府来说，就是一对儿“按下了葫芦瓢又起”的关系之相关评估的又一证明。

需要提醒大家注意的是，对特朗普政府来说，对俄罗斯让步，对“北约”和“西太”为两大支柱（传统安全层面）的美国既定全球战略不构成颠覆性的负面影响。但对中国就不同了，哪怕美国仅仅表现出愿意和中国谈“太平洋足够大，容得下中美两国”这个话题，其负面影响都可能对“西太安全框架”的稳定造成巨大冲击，甚至因此一发不可收并最终导致“西太安全框架”崩塌的可能性都是存在的。所以，特朗普政府在这个问题上很难做出决定，或者说很难满足中国提出的有关特朗普可以访华的前提条件。

对此，恐怕欧盟和俄罗斯也早已看透。对俄罗斯来说，美国搞不定中国，凭什么让俄罗斯率先妥协让步？对欧盟来说，美国连俄罗斯都搞不定，如何面对比俄罗斯强大得多得多的中国？如果中、俄都搞不定，凭什么欧盟要率先妥协、让步？由此不难看出，只要中国在特朗普访华这一问题上毫不动摇坚持原则和立场，特朗普政府面对美俄关系，美欧关系就始终陷入“按下一方，另一方必然浮起来”的“死局”。

在这个“死局”中，除非特朗普政府满足中国提出的条件，否则，就要面对，事实上的被中、欧、俄轮番“消遣”的局面。尽管中、欧、俄早已不再是当年国际社会“主要核心成员”之中、欧、俄，甚至中俄战略互信也出现褪色的情况，但在“趁此良机，尽可能从特朗普政府手中淘换各自需要的利益”的问题上，三方心照不宣，各取所需。虽非战略协调，但胜似战略协调。但如果特朗普政府满足中国提出的条件，那将意味着美国的世界霸权，尤其是金融霸权被从根本上打倒之进程将被大幅加速。

由此大家也不难看出，中国不和美国谈台湾问题（对于美国吹风“放弃台湾”，中国是理都不理。至于什么“作价将台湾贱卖给中国”这种炒作，中国更是提都不要提！台湾就是中国的一个省，台湾问题是纯粹的中国内政问题，没什么好谈的）的“妙处”就在于，乌克兰问题上，特朗普政府围绕美俄，美欧关系如何平衡“打转转”的过程中，中美关系始终运行在“中国一天天好起来，美帝一天天烂下去”的层面上：其一，从国家层面看，时间对中国有利，对美国不利；其二，跳出国家的概念看，时间对国际社会极其有利，对特朗普和“特朗普们”极其不利。可以说，中国早已锁定胜局，剩余的只有一个问题，那就是美帝选择“怎么死”！也许美国上上下下现在终于真实地感受到什么叫“河渡人”。对此，特朗普政府可以选择沉默，可以选择愤怒，但又能如何？

●在叙利亚局势后续发展这“一锅烂粥”中，美俄关系和美欧关系何尝不是“按下了葫芦，瓢又起”？

对特朗普政府来说，问题在于，以上“死局”仅仅是围绕乌克兰问题展开讨论的，而乌克兰问题显然不是美俄，美欧关系的全部。还有一个重要组成部分就是拜登政府给特朗普政府留下的后阿萨德时代叙利亚局势后续发展这个“坑”。在拜登政府同样出于“党争”之一己私利不惜严重损害美国国家长远利益将叙利亚阿萨德政权推翻后，如今的叙利亚局势早已成为“一锅烂粥”。而在这“一锅烂粥”中，美俄关系和美欧关系何尝不是“按下了葫芦，瓢又起”？

在俄罗斯眼中，乌克兰和平太远，但有效重返叙利亚很近。如果特朗普政府在乌克兰问题上是有诚意的，那么帮助俄罗斯有效重返叙利亚就是特朗普政府必须做的，而这显然需要特朗普政府帮助俄罗斯摆平中东地区，或明，或暗的众多地缘政治对手，比如，欧盟。至少俄罗斯不愿看到一条不受俄罗斯控制的中东输欧能源管线。

在欧盟眼里，以色列内塔尼亚胡政府是美国人支持的，盘踞在叙利亚北方的库尔德人武装是美国人支持的，还有效忠于叙利亚前总统阿萨德的阿拉维派武装是目前美国人正在极力讨好的俄罗斯的，问题在于，为什么这三方现在都在和欧盟支持的叙利亚临时政府过不去？欧盟完全有理由认为，美国人在乌克兰问题上忽悠欧盟，想用一纸“临时停火协议”和随时可能将欧盟赶下“餐桌”的口头承诺覆盖中东问题。显然，这是欧盟不能接受的。

在特朗普政府眼中，叙利亚这个烂摊子着实让人感到头晕目眩，但想要一走了之，第一个不答应的就是内塔尼亚胡小集团。后者完全有理由，以“为了更好支持特朗普政府赢得内斗”为借口要求特朗普政府务必帮助其实现“大以色列梦”。对于以色列在巴勒斯坦加沙地带、约旦河西岸，叙利亚南部以及戈兰高地，黎巴嫩南部的所作所为，特朗普政府不仅不能说个不字，更应该强化对以色列的支持。否则，美国国内掌握媒体资源的所谓“犹太资本”（“关键少数”）会做出什么“出格儿”的事儿，内塔尼亚胡无法保证！

问题是，欧盟，俄罗斯和以色列就是特朗普眼中叙利亚问题的全部吗？当然不是！别忘了还有空前活跃，依托国际社会有力战略策应积极介入叙利亚局势后续发展的，以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家，以及其他中东地区的重要国家，比如，埃及等。说不定还有那个站在“牌桌”边上“扒眼儿”的伊朗。

对国际社会来说，虽然到目前为止人不谋求主动介入叙利亚局势后续发展，但“暗桩”早已埋下，那就是世界范围内，包括中东地区，在“到底如何定义恐怖主义、恐怖组织、恐怖分子”的问题上如何界定的话题，核心就是，决不能美国一家说了算。大家不要忘了，在“东突”极端恐怖组织问题上，叙利亚临时政府到今天依旧是不清不楚。当然，话说回来，对以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家积极介入叙利亚局势后续发展问题上，国际社会不会说什么。国际社会相信沙特等国家有足够的政治智慧处理好类似叙利亚临时政府在“东突”极端恐怖组织问题上“适时澄清”等问题，给国际社会的基本共识一个满意的交代，给联合国宪章一个满意的交代。在此之前，作为对叙利亚临时政府就“东突”极端恐怖分子授予官职一事持高度关切态度的中国，对叙利亚问题，想管就管一管，不想管就不管！且拒绝的理由合情合理，无可指责！

●到底是“引狼（欧）入室（西太）”还是“引狼（“拜登们”之“索罗斯们”）入室（西太）”？

特朗普政府目前处境的现状是，本应以处理好对华、对欧、对俄关系中“大多数”为基础去争取赢得“内斗”，结果却交了“白卷儿”。其中不得不再提一下以色列。虽然以色列只是中东的一个小国，但却有能力直接影响美国的内政，尤其是在美国内部恶斗不断激化的情况下，显然尤为突出。由于以色列的不断搅局，特朗普政府几乎没有可能处理好中东问题，也就很难处理好与中东问题紧密联动的乌克兰问题。说到底，这是美国绝对实力也好，相对实力也罢，以肉眼可见的速度与日俱下的具体表现。以至于特朗普政府没有能力达成其原本计划中的若干战略意图，且还因“计划失败”而不断遭到反噬。

尹锡悦（特朗普也知道，关键时刻，自己能否指挥得动美军，另说），国际社会已经不感兴趣了，美国的讹诈无效！一个朝鲜，特朗普政府就对付不了。在朝鲜半岛，掌握“擦枪走火”主动权的是国际社会而非美帝。别的不说，面对这次中国舰队绕澳巡航，特朗普政府之所以一声不吭，除了“政治因素”外，更有“技术因素”——在中国周边地区，美国（包括整个北约）在“制电磁权”方面完全处于下风（中国在1996年之前，在电子战方面是吃过亏的）。或者干脆说，美国（包括整个北约）的C4系统被中国人民解放军完全压制，没有还手之力，更别提“制空权”了。这恐怕是促使特朗普政府在极端无奈之下搞出“杜特尔特被抓”事件的一大主要原因。

有关杜特尔特的可能结局（小马科斯政府最希望的是杜特尔特不回来，这样就可以给其安上一个“叛国”的罪名，但杜特尔特知道小马科斯的心思。经评估，杜尔特认为自己赢得可能性更大，于是就从香港回来了。如果杜特尔特真“意外死亡”的话，那他女儿完全可以打“悲情牌”，这对小马科斯政府极其不利的），简单说两句。

在我们的观察与评估中，大致有三种可能：第一，杜特尔特“意外死亡”；第二，不宣判，持续关押；第三，释放。表面看，菲律宾当局参与其中，实际上是西方（欧美）在处理此事。且从杜特尔特的可能结局中，大致可以观察欧美关系未来如何发展的脉络。

特朗普政府急于访华但态度恶劣，结果一头撞在钢板上，“脑袋被撞的嗡嗡”的同时，不得不在明显感到力所不逮的情况下请欧盟帮忙。而欧盟恐怕也有意借此机会介入西太问题。至少在杜特尔特最终如何处理的问题上，欧盟现在是有话语权的。

在我们的观察与评估中，欧盟大概率上不会用美国请欧盟（剩余的北约）介入西太问题与其交换中东利益，倒是欧洲政要可以踩着“美国的肩膀”访华，且特朗普政府无话可说。此外，既然美国在西太有求于人，在中东问题上，在乌克兰问题上，美国是不是要对欧盟更客气一些？在我们看来，与其说美国邀请欧盟介入西太问题帮忙，倒不如说“引狼（欧）入室（西太）”。问题在于，现在的欧盟恐怕和以前有所不同，别忘了，目前代言西方资本利益的美国资本利益已经公开分裂，其中的一部分，比如“拜登们之索罗斯们”已经准备在欧洲“重敲锣，另开张”，且还有其他人正在谋划出逃欧洲。在此情况下，在“引狼入室”的问题上，到底是“引狼（欧）入室（西太）”还是“引狼（“拜登们”之“索罗斯们”）入室（西太）”？或者说，准备借美国人送过来的“肩膀”访华的“欧洲政要”到底是欧洲政要还是“特朗普们”的政敌们呢？显然，这首先是特朗普需要搞清楚的事情。

结局最终如何，也许特朗普自己都看不懂了。但特朗普知道，被欧盟利用就利用吧，至少欧盟愿意帮忙在西太问题上策应美国，有利于其尽早实现访华。

对中国来说，面对这样一个狼狈不堪的美国，还有必要谈吗？或者说，谈什么呢？要不然，一步到位，谈谈国际金融秩序改革的问题吧。对此，西方在当年英镑如何向美元“和平交接”的问题上是有经验的。或者说，对特朗普政府来说，搞“红巨星效应”不是不可以，但与此同时“交印”吧！至少，“意向协议”是要签署的，比如，IMF和世界银行是时候要改一改了（投票比例，特别提款权，贷款话语权，条件等）！

●围绕乌克兰问题、中东问题，中欧海上航线安全问题，美国被进一步孤立的氛围也正在形成

在本次回顾的最后，我们再来看一则新闻报道。

3月12日，胡塞武装领导人阿卜杜勒·马利克·胡塞发表声明，正式重启针对以色列船只在红海、曼德海峡、亚丁湾、阿拉伯海的航行禁令，一切驶入上述海域的以色列船只都将成为军事打击的目标。

目前，有迹象表明，伊朗当局似乎正在从“投降路线”摇摆回“强硬路线”，无他，“投美无门”尔。在特朗普看来，一个是得罪不起的“活爹”——内塔尼亚胡小集团，另一个是同样不好闹翻的，在中东影响力大幅提升的沙特，接受伊朗投降怕是不合时宜的。所以，在胡塞武装对以色列“重启禁运”的背后，或就有从“投降路线”摇摆回“强硬路线”之伊朗的影子，也有在乌克兰问题上被赶下“餐桌”气恼不已的俄罗斯的影子。

如果再加上特朗普政府有意在马六甲海峡搞事情，威胁中欧海上航线的角度去观察，围绕中东问题，尤其是巴以问题，叙利亚问题，以色列被进一步孤立的氛围正在形成。围绕乌克兰问题、中东问题，中欧海上航线安全问题，美国被进一步孤立的氛围也正在形成。

值得一提的是，无论中欧航线如何中断，其本质都被中国整合的亚洲经济，尤其是东亚经济（包括东盟）向全世界提供商品的物流不畅，这无形中损害了除了美、以之外的，世界绝大多数国家的共同利益，包括欧盟、俄罗斯在内。也就是说，无论是红海、苏伊士运河出事也好，还是马六甲海峡出事也罢，亦或是中国绝对控制南海，都因美、以而起。也许真到了那一天，其一，美国的海上贸易航线也会因此受到巨大冲击，休想独善其身；其二，绝大部分的中东国家、欧洲国家、东南亚国家、俄罗斯、中国恐怕会联合在一起全面制裁以色列，甚至最终演化为制裁美国。

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Wednesday, March 12, 2025, Issue No. 1201

How to Understand the Mutual Interests of Europe and the U.S. in the Arrest of Former Philippine President Duterte?

[Media Coverage]

On March 12, with the cooperation of the Philippine government, former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was taken by a chartered flight to The Hague, Netherlands, on the evening of March 11 local time, to face trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of so-called "crimes against humanity." Late that night, current Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. held a press conference, confirming that the plane was en route to The Hague. He defended the Philippine government's role in the arrest, stating that it was in line with the Philippines' commitment to Interpol, and that "we did not assist the ICC in any way."

【Discussion Summary】

● In the arrest of former Philippine President Duterte, Europe and the U.S. are pursuing their respective interests.

We have noted the news report that former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was taken by a chartered flight to The Hague, Netherlands, on the evening of March 11 local time, to face trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of so-called "crimes against humanity."

Duterte is no ordinary figure; he is a former president of the Philippines, and his daughter is the current vice president. Additionally, his family holds significant influence in the Philippines, particularly in Mindanao. Therefore, the essence of Duterte's arrest, as one commentator put it, is that "someone is preparing to open the so-called 'killing gate,' but this 'preparation to open' continues to spin the so-called 'revolving door.'" This was expected! It is important to emphasize that "as long as the 'Qingfu' (the U.S. empire) does not die, the 'door' (the Philippines) will keep spinning!"

The phrase "as long as the 'Qingfu' (the U.S. empire) does not die, the 'door' (the Philippines) will keep spinning" means that this event was orchestrated by the U.S. empire (the Trump administration), which acted as the "driving force." Of course, this also involved the European Union (EU), which remains largely in a state of "European-American convergence." The International Criminal Court (ICC) is under the control of the EU, and the Netherlands, where the ICC is headquartered, is an unambiguously EU member state. Describing the EU as the "executor" is entirely accurate. In our observations and assessments, in the arrest of former Philippine President Duterte, Europe and the U.S. are pursuing their respective interests.

Before continuing the discussion, let us look at another news report.

● Russia Has Clearly Labeled the "Temporary Ceasefire" as a "Stalling Tactic"

On March 11, the U.S. and Ukrainian delegations meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, announced that they had reached a consensus on implementing a temporary ceasefire, resuming intelligence sharing, and providing security assistance. The two delegations issued a joint statement after the meeting. In response, various European parties following the talks expressed their welcome.

It is unclear whether the Russian delegation was present at the talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, but public information indicates that Russia did not participate in this meeting. In other words, Russia is currently not "on the menu," let alone "at the table." For the EU, moving from "on the menu" to "at the table" naturally led to "expressions of welcome." As for the so-called "temporary ceasefire," we have seen it repeatedly since the start of the current round of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on October 1, 2023.

Various signs indicate that Russia is extremely dissatisfied, even angry, about the outcome of the talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Notably, about ten days ago, on March 2, the UK and France proposed a one-month "partial ceasefire plan." This plan did not include stopping ground combat but hoped that Russia and Ukraine would cease attacks on air, sea, and energy infrastructure. Russia immediately rejected this, stating that the so-called "temporary ceasefire" was unacceptable. Russia believes this would give Ukraine a breathing space. As Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova put it, "We are dealing with (the Ukrainian military's) attempts to achieve a respite at all costs and prevent a collapse on the front lines." In other words, Russia has clearly labeled the "temporary ceasefire" as a "stalling tactic." It is worth mentioning that in the Ukraine issue, there have been so-called "temporary ceasefires" before, with the most typical case being the "Minsk Agreement." Later, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former French President François Hollande personally confirmed that the "Minsk Agreement" was a stalling tactic to deceive Russia.

In this regard, the Eastern Affairs Review has previously commented that although this move is very sinister and malicious—by labeling Russia's top leaders or decision-makers as "fools who were deceived," it attempts to create extreme dissatisfaction within Russian society towards the Putin regime, severely impacting its stability, and even seeking to overthrow it.

However, when this sinister tactic ultimately failed, the consequences of the West (Europe and the U.S.) "outsmarting themselves" became apparent: now, anything the West (Europe and the U.S.) says, Russia is extremely unlikely to believe. This is highly ironic: those who tried to label others as "fools who were deceived" ended up proving to the world that they themselves were the "fools."

It is worth noting that Russia has used its own methods to express dissatisfaction and anger towards the West (Europe and the U.S.), leading to the "Peace Bond-2025" joint naval exercises conducted by China, Russia, and Iran. Of course, while expressing anger and dissatisfaction, Russia's participation in these exercises also has the subtle intention of stoking tensions in U.S.-China relations. It can be said that a further deterioration in U.S.-China relations, or even a direct military conflict or localized war, is one of the international developments Russia most hopes to see.

● On the Ukraine issue, as the Trump administration struggles to balance U.S.-Russia and U.S.-EU relations, U.S.-China relations continue to operate on the principle of "China is getting better every day, while the U.S. empire is deteriorating daily."

The Trump administration clearly has little patience left for Russia on the Ukraine issue. In Trump's view, Russia's "exorbitant demands" are out of touch with reality. Thus, while negotiating a so-called "U.S.-Russia version of a permanent ceasefire agreement," Trump also engaged the EU in talks on a so-called "U.S.-EU version of a temporary ceasefire agreement," attempting to use both "carrots" and "sticks" to pressure Russia into signing the Trump administration's proposed "Ukraine peace agreement."

The problem is that Russia's "exorbitant demands" at this moment are also calculated. The so-called "calculation" refers to: first, the Trump administration has so far failed to properly handle U.S.-China relations, which have not only failed to improve but have shown signs of further deterioration; second, the intense internal strife in the U.S., with even open signs of escalating contradictions within the Trump camp. Given this situation, Russia believes it would be a disservice to itself not to take advantage. Any concessions must come from the Trump administration. This is further proof of the Eastern Affairs Review's earlier assessment that on the Ukraine issue, U.S.-Russia and U.S.-EU relations are like "pressing down on a gourd only to have a ladle pop up" for the Trump administration.

It is important to remind everyone that for the Trump administration, making concessions to Russia does not fundamentally undermine the U.S.'s established global strategy, which is based on NATO and the Western Pacific (traditional security dimensions). However, the same cannot be said for China. Even if the U.S. merely indicates a willingness to discuss the topic of "the Pacific Ocean being big enough to accommodate both China and the U.S.," the negative impact could severely destabilize the Western Pacific security framework, potentially leading to its collapse. Therefore, the Trump administration finds it difficult to make a decision on this issue, or to meet the preconditions China has set for Trump's potential visit to China.

In this regard, both the EU and Russia have likely already seen through this. For Russia, if the U.S. cannot handle China, why should Russia be the first to compromise? For the EU, if the U.S. cannot even handle Russia, how can it face a much stronger China? If neither China nor Russia can be managed, why should the EU be the first to compromise and make concessions? It is clear that as long as China remains unwavering in its principles and stance on the issue of Trump's visit to China, the Trump administration will remain trapped in a "deadlock" where "pressing down on one side inevitably causes the other to rise" in its relations with Russia and the EU.

In this "deadlock," unless the Trump administration meets China's conditions, it will face the reality of being "teased" in turn by China, the EU, and Russia. Although China, the EU, and Russia are no longer the "core members" of the international community as they once were, and even the strategic mutual trust between China and Russia has faded, on the issue of "taking this opportunity to extract the maximum benefits from the Trump administration," the three parties are tacitly cooperating, each pursuing their own interests. While this is not strategic coordination, it is better than strategic coordination. However, if the Trump administration meets China's conditions, it will mean that the process of fundamentally overthrowing U.S. global hegemony, especially its financial hegemony, will be significantly accelerated.

From this, it is not difficult to see that China's refusal to discuss the Taiwan issue with the U.S. (China ignores U.S. hints about "abandoning Taiwan," and does not even mention the idea of "selling Taiwan cheaply to China"—Taiwan is a province of China, and the Taiwan issue is purely China's internal affair, with nothing to discuss) has the "subtle effect" of ensuring that as the Trump administration struggles to balance U.S.-Russia and U.S.-EU relations on the Ukraine issue, U.S.-China relations continue to operate on the principle of "China is getting better every day, while the U.S. empire is deteriorating daily." First, from a national perspective, time is on China's side and against the U.S.; second, beyond the national concept, time is extremely favorable for the international community and extremely unfavorable for Trump and "the Trump faction." It can be said that China has already locked in victory, and the only remaining question is how the U.S. empire chooses to "die." Perhaps the U.S. is finally beginning to truly understand what it means to "cross the river while helping others." In this regard, the Trump administration can choose to remain silent or express anger, but what can it really do?

● In the subsequent development of the Syrian situation, a "messy pot of porridge," U.S.-Russia and U.S.-EU relations are also a case of "pressing down on a gourd only to have a ladle pop up."

For the Trump administration, the problem is that the above "deadlock" is only discussed in the context of the Ukraine issue, which is clearly not the entirety of U.S.-Russia and U.S.-EU relations. Another important component is the "pit" left by the Biden administration for the Trump administration in the post-Assad era of the Syrian situation. After the Biden administration, driven by partisan self-interest at the expense of the U.S.'s long-term national interests, overthrew the Assad regime in Syria, the current Syrian situation has become a "messy pot of porridge." In this "messy pot of porridge," U.S.-Russia and U.S.-EU relations are also a case of "pressing down on a gourd only to have a ladle pop up."

In Russia's eyes, peace in Ukraine is far away, but effectively returning to Syria is close at hand. If the Trump administration is sincere on the Ukraine issue, then helping Russia effectively return to Syria is something the Trump administration must do, and this clearly requires the Trump administration to help Russia deal with numerous geopolitical opponents in the Middle East, both overt and covert, such as the EU. At the very least, Russia does not want to see a Middle Eastern energy pipeline to Europe that is not under its control.

In the eyes of the EU, the Israeli Netanyahu government is supported by the U.S., the Kurdish forces entrenched in northern Syria are supported by the U.S., and the Alawite forces loyal to former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad are currently being courted by Russia, which the U.S. is also trying to please. The question is, why are these three parties now all targeting the Syrian interim government supported by the EU? The EU has every reason to believe that the U.S. is deceiving the EU on the Ukraine issue, trying to use a "temporary ceasefire agreement" and a verbal promise that could at any time kick the EU off the "dining table" to cover the Middle East issue. Clearly, this is unacceptable to the EU.

In the eyes of the Trump administration, the Syrian mess is truly dizzying, but wanting to walk away is not an option, as the first to object would be the Netanyahu clique. The latter has every reason to demand that the Trump administration help it achieve the "Greater Israel Dream" under the pretext of "better supporting the Trump administration in winning internal struggles." Regarding Israel's actions in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, southern Syria, the Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon, the Trump administration cannot say no and should instead strengthen its support for Israel. Otherwise, the so-called "Jewish capital" (the "critical minority") in the U.S., which controls media resources, might do something "out of line," and Netanyahu cannot guarantee what that might be!

The question is, are the EU, Russia, and Israel the entirety of the Syrian issue in Trump's eyes? Of course not! Do not forget the increasingly active Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia, which are relying on the international community's strong strategic support to actively intervene in the subsequent development of the Syrian situation, as well as other important Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt. There is also Iran, which is standing by the "card table" watching the game.

For the international community, although it has not yet actively intervened in the subsequent development of the Syrian situation, "hidden stakes" have already been laid, namely the global discussion on "how to define terrorism, terrorist organizations, and terrorists," including in the Middle East. The core issue is that the U.S. cannot have the final say. Do not forget that on the issue of the "East Turkestan" extremist terrorist organization, the Syrian interim government remains unclear to this day. Of course, it must be said that regarding the active intervention of Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia in the subsequent development of the Syrian situation, the international community will not say anything. The international community believes that Saudi Arabia and other countries have sufficient political wisdom to handle issues such as the Syrian interim government's "timely clarification" on the "East Turkestan" extremist terrorist organization, providing a satisfactory explanation to the international community's basic consensus and the UN Charter. Before this, as a country highly concerned about the Syrian interim government's appointment of "East Turkestan" extremist terrorists to official positions, China can choose to intervene in the Syrian issue or not, and the reasons for refusal are reasonable and beyond reproach!

● Is It "Inviting the Wolf (Europe) into the House (Western Pacific)" or "Inviting the Wolf (the 'Biden Faction's' 'Soros Faction') into the House (Western Pacific)"?

The current predicament of the Trump administration is that it should have based its efforts to win internal struggles on properly handling relations with the "majority" in its relations with China, Europe, and Russia. Instead, it has handed in a "blank paper." In this context, Israel must be mentioned again. Although Israel is only a small country in the Middle East, it has the ability to directly influence U.S. internal affairs, especially as internal U.S. struggles continue to intensify, making this particularly prominent. Due to Israel's constant meddling, the Trump administration has almost no possibility of properly handling the Middle East issue, and thus finds it difficult to handle the Ukraine issue, which is closely linked to the Middle East issue. Ultimately, this is a specific manifestation of the U.S.'s absolute and relative strength visibly declining day by day, to the point where the Trump administration is unable to achieve several of its originally planned strategic intentions, and is instead constantly suffering backlash due to "failed plans."

Yoon Suk-yeol (Trump also knows that at critical moments, whether he can command the U.S. military is another matter), the international community is no longer interested, and U.S. coercion is ineffective! A single North Korea is something the Trump administration cannot handle. On the Korean Peninsula, the initiative for "triggering a conflict" lies with the international community, not the U.S. empire. Not to mention, in the face of the recent Chinese fleet's circumnavigation of Australia, the Trump administration's silence is due not only to "political factors" but also "technical factors"—in the surrounding areas of China, the U.S. (including the entire NATO) is completely at a disadvantage in terms of "electromagnetic control" (China suffered setbacks in electronic warfare before 1996). Or to put it bluntly, the U.S.'s (including the entire NATO's) C4 systems are completely suppressed by the People's Liberation Army, with no ability to fight back, let alone "air control." This is likely a major reason why the Trump administration, in extreme desperation, orchestrated the "arrest of Duterte" incident.

Regarding Duterte's possible outcome (the Marcos Jr. government most hopes that Duterte does not return, so they can charge him with "treason," but Duterte knows Marcos Jr.'s thoughts. After assessment, Duterte believes he has a greater chance of winning, so he returned from Hong Kong. If Duterte were to "die unexpectedly," his daughter could play the "sympathy card," which would be extremely unfavorable for the Marcos Jr. government), let us briefly mention two points.

In our observations and assessments, there are roughly three possibilities: first, Duterte "dies unexpectedly"; second, no verdict is announced, and he is continuously detained; third, he is released. On the surface, the Philippine authorities are involved, but in reality, the West (Europe and the U.S.) is handling this matter. From Duterte's possible outcome, we can roughly observe the future trajectory of European-U.S. relations.

The Trump administration is eager to visit China but has a bad attitude, resulting in a head-on collision with a steel plate, leaving its "head buzzing" and forcing it to seek EU help in a situation where it clearly feels inadequate. The EU, for its part, likely intends to use this opportunity to intervene in the Western Pacific issue. At the very least, on the issue of Duterte's final handling, the EU now has a say.

In our observations and assessments, the EU is unlikely to exchange its intervention in the Western Pacific issue for U.S. concessions on Middle Eastern interests. Instead, European leaders can step on "America's shoulders" to visit China, and the Trump administration will have nothing to say. Moreover, since the U.S. is seeking help in the Western Pacific, shouldn't it be more courteous to the EU on Middle Eastern and Ukrainian issues? In our view, rather than saying the U.S. is inviting the EU to intervene in the Western Pacific issue to help, it is more like "inviting the wolf (Europe) into the house (Western Pacific)." The problem is that the current EU is likely different from before. Do not forget that the U.S. capital interests representing Western capital interests have already split publicly, with some, such as the "Biden faction's Soros faction," preparing to "start anew" in Europe, while others are planning to flee to Europe. In this context, on the issue of "inviting the wolf into the house," is it "inviting the wolf (Europe) into the house (Western Pacific)" or "inviting the wolf (the 'Biden faction's' 'Soros faction') into the house (Western Pacific)"? Or, are the "European leaders" preparing to step on the "shoulders" provided by the U.S. to visit China actually European leaders or the political enemies of the "Trump faction"? Clearly, this is something Trump needs to figure out first.

How this will ultimately play out, perhaps even Trump himself cannot understand. But Trump knows that if the EU uses him, so be it—at least the EU is willing to help support the U.S. on the Western Pacific issue, which is beneficial for his early visit to China.

For China, facing such a disheveled U.S., is there still a need to talk? Or, what is there to talk about? Otherwise, let's go straight to the point and discuss the reform of the international financial order. In this regard, the West has experience from the "peaceful transition" from the pound to the dollar. Or, for the Trump administration, it is not impossible to create a "red giant effect," but at the same time, it must "hand over the seal"! At the very least, an "intent agreement" must be signed, such as reforming the IMF and the World Bank (voting ratios, special drawing rights, loan discourse power, conditions, etc.)!

● An Atmosphere of Further Isolation for the U.S. Is Forming Around the Ukraine Issue, the Middle East Issue, and the Security of the China-Europe Maritime Route

At the end of this review, let us look at another news report.

On March 12, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi movement, issued a statement formally reinstating the ban on Israeli ships navigating the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea. All Israeli ships entering these waters will become military targets.

Currently, there are signs that the Iranian authorities seem to be swinging back from the "capitulation route" to the "tough route," simply because "there is no door to surrender to the U.S." In Trump's view, one is the "living father" he cannot afford to offend—the Netanyahu clique—and the other is Saudi Arabia, whose influence in the Middle East has significantly increased and is also difficult to antagonize. Accepting Iran's surrender would be inappropriate. Therefore, behind the Houthi movement's "reinstatement of the embargo" on Israel, there may be the shadow of Iran swinging back from the "capitulation route" to the "tough route," as well as the shadow of Russia, which is furious about being kicked off the "dining table" on the Ukraine issue.

If we add the Trump administration's intention to stir up trouble in the Strait of Malacca, threatening the China-Europe maritime route, an atmosphere of further isolation for Israel is forming around the Middle East issue, especially the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the Syrian issue. An atmosphere of further isolation for the U.S. is also forming around the Ukraine issue, the Middle East issue, and the security of the China-Europe maritime route.

It is worth noting that no matter how the China-Europe route is disrupted, the essence is that the logistics of Asian economies, especially East Asian economies (including ASEAN), integrated by China to provide goods to the world are hindered. This invisibly harms the common interests of the vast majority of countries in the world, except for the U.S. and Israel, including the EU and Russia. In other words, whether it is trouble in the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, or the Strait of Malacca, or China's absolute control of the South China Sea, it is all caused by the U.S. and Israel. Perhaps when that day really comes, first, the U.S.'s maritime trade routes will also suffer a huge impact, and it will not be able to remain unscathed; second, the vast majority of Middle Eastern countries, European countries, Southeast Asian countries, Russia, and China may unite to comprehensively sanction Israel, and it may eventually evolve into sanctions against the U.S.

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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