2025年3月11日，星期二，第1200期

那个“卖不了的秫秸戳起来”的尹锡悦，国际社会已经不感兴趣了

【媒体报道】

3月10日，受美国总统特朗普关税政策影响，美国经济衰退风险上升，引发市场严重担忧，美国股市当日收盘暴跌。

【讨论纪要】

●特朗普政府对外政策一片惨淡，对内陷入“苦斗”，究其原因就在到目前为止未能处理好对华关系

在上次的回顾中，我们讨论了美国“效率部长”马斯克与美国国务卿卢比奥发生公开争执的话题。由于特朗普政府至今仍无法有效缓和对华关系，在其对外政策搞得一片惨淡的同时，特朗普阵营内部也出现“内讧”。

显然，“特朗普们”已经在美国内部恶斗中陷入“苦斗”状态，以至于整个西方内部，尤其是目前仍代言西方资本利益的美国资本利益内部的方方面面，尤其是特朗普或“特朗普们”的“盟友”们都开始纷纷怀疑，特朗普到底有没有能力尽快做大“蛋糕”。

以上也再次验证了我们早在2025年1月22日作出的相关评估：不论是对外还是对内，特朗普想要玩“合纵连横”，前提都是处理好对华关系。

在继续展开讨论前，我们再来看一则新闻报道。

●决策困难中的特朗普政府的中东政策，尤其是叙利亚政策和伊朗政策

3月10日，以军战机空袭了叙利亚南部多处军事设施，包括叙前政权遗留的防空系统。以军在一份声明中说，其战机击中了叙方用于收集情报的雷达和侦测设备、多个军事指挥站和武器库，这次行动的目的是为了“清除后患”。总部设在英国的“叙利亚人权观察组织”表示，以军战机10日晚在叙南部德拉省实施至少17次轰炸，暂不清楚是否有人员伤亡。

近日，以色列总理内塔尼亚胡叫嚣将永久性驻扎戈兰高地，并称将会阻止叙利亚新政权的军队进入叙利亚南部三个省份，理由是以色列要在此建立所谓“军事缓冲区”。与此同时，欧盟和土耳其支持的叙利亚临时政府在叙利亚北部与美国支持的“库尔德人武装”（实际上就是“换了军帽”的ISIS极端恐怖组织）对峙。此外，就在前几天，效忠叙利亚前总统阿萨德的叙利亚阿拉维派武装（背后有俄罗斯的影子）也袭击了叙利亚临时政府的安全人员。而以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家，以及其它一些重要的中东国家，如，埃及，在尝试与叙利亚临时政府建立新关系。

不难看出的是，目前叙利亚的局势可谓“全面混乱”。而“全面混乱”的叙利亚局势的一个显著特点就是，方方面面已经介入，或打算介入，包括想要有效重返叙利亚的方方面面都尴尬地发现，自己想要在叙利亚实现既定的战略目标，并非易事！当然，对国际社会来说，仍然不急于主动介入叙利亚局势后续发展，至少在叙利亚临时政府撇清和“东突”极端恐怖组织关系之前是这样。

在叙利亚局势中“最活跃”的莫过于以色列，内塔尼亚胡小集团认定，现在是实现“大以色列”梦并进一步巩固政权的绝佳时机。为此，不惜将特朗普政府拉下战争的泥潭。

面对这样一个以色列，特朗普政府也是极其无奈。一方面，迫于国内恶斗的压力与日俱增，特朗普政府根本不敢得罪美国国内掌握媒体资源的所谓“犹太资本”势力（“关键少数”），甚至为了讨好他们，至少表面上继续表现出对以色列的支持；另一方面，特朗普政府很清楚，如果真的帮助内塔尼亚胡小集团去实现所谓“大以色列”梦，特朗普的中东政策将走入“死胡同”——包括欧盟、俄罗斯、土耳其、埃及等，以及海湾阿拉伯国家，包括站在其背后的国际社会，都将站在特朗普中东政策的对立面上。这恐怕是目前特朗普政府无法接受的。

于是，特朗普政府只能退而求其次，在“不谈就打”的基调下对伊朗威逼利诱，无论是发展所谓“伊朗和以色列新关系”，还是进行军事打击，总之，目的都在于彻底将伊朗获取核武器的途径掐断。这让伊朗当局感到了巨大威胁。而这或是进退维谷的伊朗当局愿意与中国，俄罗斯一起进行海上联合演习的主要原因所在。

问题在于，当伊朗当局从“投降路线”摇摆回“强硬路线”后，特朗普政府立刻陷入了决策困难，如果不继续强硬下去，甚至亲自下场打击伊朗的核设施，就很难对以色列内塔尼亚胡政府解释。而一旦解释不好，显然将对特朗普政府在美国内部恶斗中的处境产生不利影响。更何况特朗普阵营内部已经发生明显分裂。

●这“千日打柴一日烧，一朝回到解放前”的一幕着实讽刺

在进一步展开讨论前，我们再来看一则新闻报道。

3月11日，美国媒体报道，美国国务卿鲁比奥在飞往沙特阿拉伯吉达参加即将举行的美乌会谈的飞机上对媒体表示，作为结束俄乌冲突任何协议的一部分，乌克兰必须做出领土让步。

特朗普政府不得不在总体上进一步表现出愿意对俄罗斯让步的姿态，这是特朗普政府至今未能处理好对华关系产生的又一恶果。

俄罗斯至少有理由认为，俄罗斯有权就乌克兰问题，甚至由乌克兰问题扩展出的叙利亚问题上提出新要求，于是，也就有了俄罗斯一边拿着《伊斯坦布尔协议》说事儿，一边和中国、伊朗搞海上联合军演的一幕（俄罗斯参与军演也有就中美关系“拱火”的小心思）。当然，在客观上，俄罗斯参与军演的态度也对中国形成一种战略策应。

面对这样一个“摇来摆去”的伊朗，面对这样一个“给点阳光就漫天要价”的俄罗斯，特朗普政府鼓吹的“合纵连横，远交近攻”策略可谓碎了一地。从1月20日特朗普正式走马上任以来，已经过去了将近两个月的时间，好不容易才从国际社会阵营中“连忽悠带吓唬”出去的俄罗斯和伊朗，如今又和美国的“终极敌人”——中国，站在了一起。这“千日打柴一日烧，一朝回到解放前”的一幕着实讽刺。

话说，仅从2015年“转折年”算起到今天，10年过去了，美国无论是绝对实力还是相对实力水平下降甚巨。而一直以来坚持原则毫不动摇的态度，每每在关键时刻都会让众多国家齐齐看向中国，无一不在寻思，如何借中国的态度为“支点”撬动自己利益的最大化。

有趣的是，美国前总统罗斯福在研读毛泽东主席的著作《论持久战》后曾意味深长地对美国前总统杜鲁门说道，千万不要低估和小看红色中国，尤其是不要对其使用心理战。两个月的时间过去了，特朗普政府无论对内还是对外，都交了“白卷儿”，甚至自己的阵营也出现了公开分裂的迹象，也许特朗普真的应该好好反省一下了，尤其是仔细琢磨琢磨罗斯福对杜鲁门说过的话。作为一个大国的领导人，只懂得房地产商人那套“踹门以求先声夺人”的把戏是不够的。

●那个“卖不了的秫秸戳起来”的尹锡悦，国际社会已经不感兴趣了

在本次回顾的最后，我们再来看一则新闻报道。

3月11日，菲律宾媒体报道，前总统杜特尔特当天从境外返回抵达马尼拉国际机场后被警方拘留。菲律宾媒体表示，国际刑警组织此前根据国际刑事法院的逮捕令，对杜特尔特发出了红色通缉令。

有消息说，菲律宾前总统杜特尔特出行香港是为了总统竞选，但在东方时事解读的观察与评估中，这更像是一个预先编辑好的“剧本”。或者说，杜特尔特出行香港，某种意义上说就是为了回去被抓。

对于菲律宾当局而言，也就是小马科斯政权而言，巴不得杜特尔特出行香港一去不回。菲律宾当局完全可以给杜特尔特按上一个“畏罪潜逃”，甚至“叛国”的罪名，让杜特尔特永远无法返回菲律宾兴风作浪。但杜特尔特这个“老狐狸”并不这样认为，尽管这一招是“兵行险棋”，但也是瞅准了才做的。所谓“瞅准了”，一则是自己在菲律宾，尤其是在棉兰老岛的固有势力；二则是国际局势的最新变化，严格意义上说，是特朗普政府对外政策一片惨淡，对内陷入“苦斗”背景下国际局势的最新变化。如果说杜特尔特绝对这次自己能赢，倒不如其更相信这次特朗普政府恐怕要对中国做更大让步就在眼前。

对特朗普政府来说，这一操作类似于围绕特朗普访华问题，通过将韩国总统尹锡悦释放对国际社会进行讹诈。也就是说，如果美国以进一步向中国做出让步，也就是满足中国提出的条件为筹码换取特朗普访华，恐怕今天杜尔特尔被怎么抓起来的，明天就得怎样放掉他。而这意味着特朗普政府在菲律宾问题上有了新态度，且不利于目前当权的小马科斯政府。而美国调整菲律宾政策的本质就是愿意和中国谈南海问题。

特朗普政府目前的内外交困，国际社会自然也看在眼里。某种意义上说，特朗普对外越狼狈，导致对内越焦虑，其对国际社会进一步让步的可能性越大。既然特朗普政府比之以往任何时候都急于实现特朗普访华，而且态度恶劣，那么特朗普访华的条件自然也要变一变。至少在目前，那个“卖不了的秫秸戳起来”的尹锡悦，国际社会已经不感兴趣了。如果美国人打算用此人做文章，大可去问问朝鲜同志答不答应！

与尹锡悦相比，南海问题当然可以谈，至少基于落地执行“太平洋足够大，容得下中美两国”，也就是美帝要实质性让出西太，国际社会是感兴趣的。当然，如果特朗普政府“诚意足够”，甚至愿与国际社会谈谈澳大利亚问题则更好，这里恰好是所谓“第三岛链”的重要节点所在。至少澳大利亚方面到目前为止并未表示反对，这一点从“055型”大驱“遵义舰”编队“绕澳航行”没去澳大利亚当局承认租期有效的达尔文港能够看出一些端倪。

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Tuesday, March 11, 2025, Issue No. 1200

Yoon Suk-yeol, the "Unsalable Stalk," No Longer Interests the International Community*

[Media Coverage]

On March 10, due to the impact of U.S. President Trump's tariff policies, the risk of an economic recession in the United States increased, causing severe market concerns. The U.S. stock market plummeted at the close of the day.

【Discussion Summary】

● The Trump administration's foreign policy is bleak and it is in a "struggle" internally, which is due to its failure to handle relations with China well so far

Clearly, the "Trump faction" is mired in a "bitter struggle" within the U.S., to the point where various factions within the Western world, especially those representing U.S. capital interests, are beginning to question whether Trump has the ability to expand the "economic pie" quickly.

This once again confirms our assessment from January 22, 2025: whether dealing with foreign or domestic affairs, Trump's ability to play "alliances and rivalries" depends on his ability to manage relations with China.

Before continuing the discussion, let us look at another news report.

● The Trump administration's Middle East policy, particularly its Syria and Iran policies, is in a state of decision-making difficulty.

On March 10, Israeli warplanes attacked multiple military facilities in southern Syria, including air defense systems left by the previous regime. In a statement, the Israeli military claimed that its aircraft struck Syrian radar and surveillance equipment used for intelligence gathering, as well as several military command posts and weapon depots. The operation was aimed at "eliminating future threats." The UK-based "Syrian Observatory for Human Rights" reported that Israeli warplanes conducted at least 17 airstrikes in the Daraa province of southern Syria on the evening of March 10, though it remains unclear if there were any casualties.

Recently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to permanently station troops in the Golan Heights and prevent the new Syrian regime's forces from entering three southern provinces, citing the need to establish a "military buffer zone." Meanwhile, the EU and Turkey-backed Syrian interim government is facing off against U.S.-backed "Kurdish forces" (essentially ISIS in different uniforms) in northern Syria. Additionally, just a few days ago, Syrian Alawite forces loyal to former President Bashar al-Assad (with Russian backing) attacked security personnel of the interim government. Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia, along with other key Middle Eastern countries like Egypt, are attempting to establish new relations with the interim government.

It is evident that the situation in Syria is in "complete chaos." A notable feature of this chaos is that various factions have either already intervened or are planning to intervene, only to find that achieving their strategic goals in Syria is far from easy! Of course, the international community remains in no hurry to actively intervene in Syria's developments, at least not until the interim government clarifies its relationship with the "East Turkestan" extremist group.

Among the most active players in the Syrian conflict is Israel. Netanyahu's clique believes that now is the perfect time to realize the "Greater Israel" dream and further consolidate their power. To this end, they are willing to drag the Trump administration into the quagmire of war.

Faced with such an Israel, the Trump administration is utterly helpless. On one hand, under increasing pressure from domestic conflicts, the administration dares not offend the so-called "Jewish capital" forces that control U.S. media resources (the "critical minority"). To appease them, the administration continues to show at least superficial support for Israel. On the other hand, the Trump administration is well aware that if it truly helps Netanyahu's clique realize the "Greater Israel" dream, its Middle East policy will hit a dead end—opposed by the EU, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Gulf Arab states, and the broader international community. This is something the Trump administration cannot afford.

Thus, the Trump administration has no choice but to resort to pressuring and enticing Iran, either by promoting so-called "new relations between Iran and Israel" or through military strikes, all with the aim of cutting off Iran's path to nuclear weapons. This has placed enormous pressure on the Iranian regime, which may explain why Iran is willing to participate in joint naval exercises with China and Russia.

The problem is that as the Iranian regime shifts from a "surrender approach" back to a "hardline stance," the Trump administration immediately faces decision-making difficulties. If it does not continue to take a hardline approach, or even directly strike Iran's nuclear facilities, it will struggle to justify its actions to Netanyahu's government. Any misstep in this regard could further worsen the Trump administration's position in the ongoing domestic power struggles. Moreover, the Trump camp is already showing signs of internal division.

● The irony of "burning in a day what took a thousand days to gather" is palpable.

Before delving further into the discussion, let us look at another news report.

On March 11, U.S. media reported that Secretary of State Marco Rubio, while en route to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for upcoming U.S.-Ukraine talks, told reporters that any agreement to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict must include territorial concessions from Ukraine.

The Trump administration is increasingly forced to show a willingness to make concessions to Russia, another consequence of its failure to manage relations with China effectively.

Russia now has every reason to believe it can make new demands on Ukraine, and even extend these demands to Syria. This explains why Russia is simultaneously invoking the "Istanbul Agreement" while participating in joint naval exercises with China and Iran (with Russia also subtly stoking tensions between China and the U.S. through its participation). Of course, objectively, Russia's participation in the exercises also provides strategic support for China.

Faced with a "wavering" Iran and a Russia that "demands the sky at the slightest hint of concession," the Trump administration's strategy of "alliances and rivalries, befriending the distant while attacking the near" has completely fallen apart. Since Trump officially took office on January 20, nearly two months have passed, and the Russia and Iran that were "bamboozled and intimidated" out of the international community have now joined forces with China, the U.S.'s "ultimate enemy." The irony of "burning in a day what took a thousand days to gather" is indeed striking.

It is worth noting that from the "turning point year" of 2015 to today, a decade has passed, and the U.S. has seen a significant decline in both absolute and relative power. Meanwhile, China's unwavering stance on principles has repeatedly drawn the attention of many nations at critical moments, all seeking to leverage China's position to maximize their own interests.

Interestingly, after studying Chairman Mao's "On Protracted War," former U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt once remarked to former President Harry S. Truman: "Never underestimate or belittle Red China, especially in psychological warfare." Two months have passed, and the Trump administration has delivered a "blank slate" both domestically and internationally, with its own camp showing signs of open division. Perhaps Trump should seriously reflect on his approach, especially on Roosevelt's advice to Truman. As the leader of a major power, relying solely on the tricks of a real estate tycoon—like "kicking down doors to make a grand entrance"—is simply not enough.

● Yoon Suk-yeol, the "unsalable stalk," no longer interests the international community.

At the end of this review, let us look at one final news report.

On March 11, Philippine media reported that former President Rodrigo Duterte was detained by police upon his return to Manila International Airport from abroad. Philippine media stated that Interpol had previously issued a Red Notice for Duterte based on an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court.

There are rumors that Duterte traveled to Hong Kong for his presidential campaign, but according to the observations and assessments of "Eastern Strategic Analysis," this seems more like a pre-scripted "play." In other words, Duterte's trip to Hong Kong was, in a sense, intended to lead to his arrest.

For the Philippine authorities, specifically the Marcos Jr. administration, it would be ideal if Duterte never returned from Hong Kong. The authorities could easily accuse Duterte of "fleeing justice" or even "treason," ensuring he never returns to stir up trouble in the Philippines. However, the "old fox" Duterte does not see it this way. While this move is a "gamble," it is one he took after careful consideration. By "careful consideration," he is banking on his established influence in the Philippines, particularly in Mindanao, as well as the latest changes in the international situation—specifically, the Trump administration's faltering foreign policy and internal struggles. If Duterte believes he can win this time, it is because he is more confident that the Trump administration will soon make even greater concessions to China.

For the Trump administration, this move is akin to using South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol as leverage to pressure the international community over Trump's visit to China. In other words, if the U.S. is willing to make further concessions to China—essentially meeting China's conditions—in exchange for Trump's visit, then Duterte may be released just as quickly as he was detained. This would signal a shift in the Trump administration's stance on the Philippines, one that is unfavorable to the current Marcos Jr. government. Ultimately, the U.S. adjustment of its Philippine policy reflects a willingness to discuss the South China Sea issue with China.

The international community is well aware of the Trump administration's current domestic and foreign predicaments. In a sense, the more chaotic Trump's foreign policy becomes, the more anxious he is domestically, and the more likely he is to make further concessions to the international community. Since the Trump administration is more eager than ever to arrange Trump's visit to China, and its attitude is increasingly hostile, the conditions for such a visit must also change. At the very least, the international community is no longer interested in Yoon Suk-yeol, the "unsalable stalk." If the U.S. intends to use him as a bargaining chip, it should first ask whether North Korea would agree!

Compared to Yoon Suk-yeol, the South China Sea issue is certainly negotiable, especially if the U.S. is willing to genuinely implement the principle that "the Pacific is big enough for both China and the U.S.," meaning the U.S. must substantially withdraw from the Western Pacific. The international community is interested in this. Of course, if the Trump administration shows "sufficient sincerity," it could even discuss the issue of Australia, a key node in the so-called "Third Island Chain." At the very least, Australia has not yet expressed opposition, as evidenced by the fact that the "055-class" destroyer "Zunyi" and its fleet did not visit Darwin Port, which the Australian authorities recognize as leased.

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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