https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/R2sZufFqvPEOeYZI-z0QfQ
2025年3月8日，星期六，第1198期 西方资本利益的“新的代言者”会是谁？ 【媒体报道】 3月7日，俄罗斯总统新闻秘书佩斯科夫向记者表示，俄总统普京称，2022年签署的《伊斯坦布尔协议》可成为俄乌和平协议的基础。 3月7日，美国总统特朗普在社交媒体发文表示，鉴于俄罗斯目前在前线对乌克兰发起了“猛烈的攻击”，他强烈考虑对俄罗斯实施包括银行业在内的大规模制裁以及关税制裁，直到达成停火和最终和平协议。特朗普敦促俄罗斯和乌克兰“坐到谈判桌上”。 3月7日，欧洲议会发言人证实，欧洲议会日前撤销了限制议员与部分中国官方人员会晤的规定。报道认为，在美欧关系迅速破裂的当下，此举或可视为中欧关系解冻的新迹象。 3月8日，两位参加伊斯兰合作组织会议的外长透露，该组织7日通过了阿拉伯国家的加沙重建计划。该计划是对美国总统特朗普接管加沙建议的回应。 【讨论纪要】 ●2022年3月出现的《伊斯坦布尔协议》的本质是个什么？ 3月7日，美国总统特朗普在社交媒体发文表示，鉴于俄罗斯目前在前线对乌克兰发起了“猛烈的攻击”，他强烈考虑对俄罗斯实施包括银行业在内的大规模制裁以及关税制裁。 特朗普政府对俄政策的最新表态让人们感到一头雾水，不是说好了美国现在对俄罗斯“一躬到地”了吗？甚至用近乎“投降”来形容也不为过？那为什么突然宣布对俄罗斯进行大规模制裁？难道仅仅是因为俄罗斯人发动了新一轮的军事进攻？话说，这种“俄军攻过去，乌军打过来”的情况在三年多的俄乌战场上早就司空见惯了吧。 在继续展开讨论前，我们再来看一则新闻报道。 3月7日，俄罗斯总统新闻秘书佩斯科夫向记者表示，俄总统普京称，2022年签署的《伊斯坦布尔协议》可成为俄乌和平协议的基础。 媒体有关《伊斯坦布尔协议》的报道并不多，据俄罗斯总统普京最新的披露，当时双方达成三点协议堪称政治解决的黄金方案：乌克兰承诺永久中立、承认克里米亚现状、保障俄语族群权益。如果协议达成，俄罗斯随即从基辅周边撤军。遗憾的是，在2022年3月29日俄罗斯和乌克兰在土耳其伊斯坦布尔举行的最后一轮谈判中，乌克兰未与俄罗斯签署协议草案。 从以上的内容大家不难看出有关《伊斯坦布尔协议》本质的一些端倪： 第一，当时距离俄乌战争爆发仅有1个月左右的时间。当时俄军已经对基辅兵临城下，大有一举占领之势。可以说，当时的战场形势对俄军非常有利； 第二，尽管《伊斯坦布尔协议》中美方没有直接参加，但与俄罗斯谈判的乌克兰一方的“底色”是美国拜登政府； 第三，在俄乌战争进入到第四个年头后，在国际社会的策应下，尤其是朝鲜以某种“特殊形式”参与战争的背景下，俄军在战场上总体来说占据优势，此时俄方再提《伊斯坦布尔协议》可以作为俄乌和平协议的基础，足见《伊斯坦布尔协议》的内容对俄方非常有利。用普京自己的话说就是，当时双方达成三点协议（（乌克兰承诺永久中立、承认克里米亚现状、保障俄语族群权益））堪称政治解决的黄金方案。在普京看来，现在是特朗普政府在乌克兰问题上对俄罗斯有求于人，鉴于美国内部恶斗的日趋激烈，俄罗斯有资格再提《伊斯坦布尔协议》； 第四，如果说《伊斯坦布尔协议》的内容对俄方非常有利，那就一定对西方非常不利，显然，拜登政府控制下的乌克兰政府之所以表现出愿意与俄方签署协议，主要原因在于当时乌克兰（西方）在军事上极其不利的处境，而不得不使出的一招缓兵之计。换言之，当初西方压根儿就没想和俄罗斯签署《伊斯坦布尔协议》。 ●在欧盟公开呼应“中国建议”的背后，距离真正意义上的“欧美公开争吵”还有多远？ 通过第一节的讨论，我们再去观察特朗普政府突然宣布要对俄罗斯进行大规模制裁这件事。尽管特朗普政府对俄罗斯“一躬到地”，甚至用“投降”形容都不为过，但通过特朗普政府对《伊斯坦布尔协议》避而不谈的情况来看，特朗普政府对俄罗斯的“一躬到地”显然是假的，或者说，是留有后手的。而我们想要提醒俄罗斯决策层的是，在特朗普政府敢于这样玩“变脸”的背后也是对俄罗斯如今实力的一种否定，而且在其眼中远不及2022年3月时的俄罗斯，只不过碍于特朗普政府全力执行“攘外必先安内”之政策，不得不在对俄政策上，仅在表面“意思意思”而已，俄罗斯不要敬酒不吃吃罚酒！ 特朗普政府对今天俄罗斯的看法并非没有道理，我们不妨简单盘点一下今天俄罗斯的优势和劣势并从综合角度看一看，今天俄罗斯的实力到底比2022年3月的时候如何。 在我们看来，今天俄罗斯的优势在于，第一，特朗普政府因基于应对内部恶斗问题的确对俄罗斯有求于人；第二，在国际社会的策应下，尤其在朝鲜以某种形式参与到俄乌战争的背景下，在军事上俄军总体尚能保持优势；第三，美欧关系因乌克兰问题、中东问题不断恶化，至少表面上看是这样的。 今天俄罗斯的不利在于，第一，在特朗普政府对外政策开始运行在“远交近攻，合纵联合”策略下，至少在表面上对俄罗斯“一躬到地”，尤其是围绕“北溪2”天然气管道重启一事出现“金刀计”之局后，中俄战略互信因俄罗斯心思活泛，尤其是“阿富汗政策小九九”再度“闪闪发光”而受到较大影响；第二，由于俄罗斯在有“效重返叙利亚”的问题上期待得到美国的战略策应，在遏制中东输欧能源管线问题上自认为与美国有共同利益，尤其是对以政策出现靠近美国的调整迹象后，俄罗斯与中东地区或明，或暗的地缘政治对手之间的矛盾开始尖锐对立；第三，俄罗斯不仅丢掉了叙利亚（阿萨德政权），其在中东地区施加影响的又一“重要抓手”——伊朗，也已经“支离破碎”。 特朗普的突然“变脸”对俄罗斯来说，可以说是“遇到了新情况”，而且场面一度非常尴尬。也许此时此刻的俄罗斯决策层们有打量着如何派遣政要访华，再打“中国牌”的事情，但问题在于，有些事情俄罗斯已经做了，俄罗斯就要承担相应的后果并付出应有的代价，比如，中欧关系的靠近。有趣的是，话音未落，欧洲议会已经撤销限制议员与中方代表会晤的限制了，看样子，欧洲对中国给其指出的那条“明路”还是有所感悟的，开始在改善中欧关系的问题上有所行动（更多是基于非传统安全层面）。接下来大家不妨密切观察，欧洲政要是不是也要紧急访华。在欧盟开始公开呼应“中方建议”的背后或意味着，在乌克兰问题上和中东问题上，欧盟准备在中国的战略策应下与美国和俄罗斯继续博弈了。 如果特朗普政府依旧打算以总体上继续向俄罗斯妥协的方式阶段性缓和美俄关系，同时对以色列内塔尼亚胡政府在巴勒斯坦加沙地带，尤其是约旦河西岸，以及黎巴嫩南部地区横行霸道不仅不加以限制，还进一步表示支持，继续将欧洲在中东的利益丢在脚下肆意践踏的话，那么真正意义上的“欧美公开争吵”的火候也许就差不多了（如果美国资本利益仍然代言西方资本利益的话，恐怕欧美吵不出什么，而一旦真的“公开争吵”，那么已经跑到和计划跑到欧洲的美国资本利益的那部分就可以和美国资本利益争吵，也就是到底谁现在代言西方资本利益。当然，火候现在还没有到，但“北溪-2”天然气管道重启一事被抛出，让我们看到了这个迹象）。 由于中东、乌克兰问题已经长期化，欧盟在中国的策应下，在非传统安全层面，在乌克兰问题上是有优势的。如果我们将美国与俄罗斯在乌克兰问题上的更多优势看作是基于传统安全层面的“蛮力”的话，那么他们的致命弱点就在一个字，“拖”——美国内耗剧烈，基于缓和，哪怕是阶段性缓和内部矛盾，特朗普政府拖不起！俄罗斯战争消耗剧烈，急于结束战争，急于有效重返叙利亚，普京政府也拖不起！如果欧盟看懂了这一点，保不齐其也动了想要品尝一下“河渡人”是个啥味道的心思。 ●国际社会应高度警惕，从马六甲海峡到波斯湾的这段海域上，或会有与海上航线安全相关的事情突然出现 在欧洲方面公开呼应“中国建议”并开始有所行动后，特朗普政府的乌克兰政策就显得有些尴尬了，在我们看来，特朗普政府现在只能做两件事，第一，强压俄罗斯尽快签署协议；第二，强压乌克兰（欧盟）尽快签署协议。甚至不排除特朗普政府为此将泽连斯基政权推翻的可能性。 特朗普政府之所以如此焦急地想要拿到美俄关系缓和，是因为其更焦急于尽快访华。也就是说，在乌克兰，尤其是中东决不能接受被活活拖死的特朗普政府不排除特朗普政府在西太方向“狗急跳墙”的可能性，所以我们提醒国际社会高度警惕，从马六甲海峡到波斯湾的这段海域上，或会有与海上航线安全相关的事情突然出现。 这里相对于台湾问题、朝鲜半岛问题（包括）和南海问题而言，对中国不是特别敏感的话题，但又能对中国产生某种威胁。至于理由，可以是强化制裁伊朗，不让其运出一滴油。 如果特朗普真的这样做了，一方面，我们会观察伊朗方面如何应对；另一方面，视波斯湾到马六甲海峡的具体形势而定。无论是因为什么原因，这段航线实质性中断了，那么本着“在水管的5米处掐断是掐断，在水管的95米处掐断也是掐断”的原理，中国或会选择适时启动“南海红绿灯体系”并绝对控制南海！同时伴随进行的或还有黄岩岛“填岛”！建立南海防空识别区等。 值得一提的是，埃及之乱的时候提出了经略南海这个概念，准确地说是欧美就叙利亚利益和利比亚利益交换。埃及之乱是美国资本利益不惜损害美国国家利益，全面恶化中国外在安全环境，尤其是经济环境。这个时候代言西方资本利益的美国资本利益也从这个时候游离在欧美平台之外。 现在，局面似乎已经倒退到了欧美初步合流的地步。在金融上从QE3倒退到了“海湖庄园协议”的地步。一旦公开争吵，美，俄，欧什么都没有得到，但局面至少倒退14年到2011年。当然，还有伊朗，也什么没得到，什叶派抵抗之弧已经消散，伊朗想要投敌都没有门路。当然，也并不是完全对国际局势有利，比如泰国局势，似乎就向泰国之乱方向移动，再加上缅甸（俄罗斯插手其中）。 中美贸易战，某种意义上这是一种“脱稿运行”，因为金融防火墙还没修好，这种“打乱战”的做法被我们形容为“N步并1步”。虽然他们还在为之努力，但在经过2015年“转折年”后，14年过去了（从2011年埃及之乱算起），局面已经彻底改变了。值得一提的是，从埃及之乱到今天的AI战、芯片战，其间对方是一直在动手，是一环扣一环，而且都是朝着致命的地方招呼，只是我们越战越强，对方越战越弱。 ●一旦在内斗中落入下风，假以时日，拜登们之索利斯们+欧洲利益联手将特朗普们贴上“西方叛徒”标签特朗普又当如何自处？ 说到伊朗，我们注意到美国总统特朗普称已致信伊朗，但伊朗方面称未收到新闻报道。 特朗普政府对伊朗总体上是又打又拉。在特朗普看来，用一个相对缓和的伊朗和以色列关系进一步缓和对俄关系，再用阶段性缓和的美俄关系为基础访华，最后以阶段性缓和对华关系为基础缓和内部矛盾。但问题在于，在拜登政府不惜损害美国国家长远利益打开后阿萨德政权时期的叙利亚局势后续发展之“潘多拉魔盒”后，叙利亚局势的复杂性远超特朗普政府的想象。 在我们看来，目前在叙利亚这个“中东十字路口”盘踞的势力大致有三家： 其一，美国人支持的以色列和所谓的“库尔德人”武装分子（实际上就是“换了军帽”的ISIS极端恐怖组织）； 其二，欧盟、土耳其、沙特（阿盟）支持的叙利亚临时政府； 其三，俄罗斯暗中支持的效忠于叙利亚前总统阿萨德阿的阿拉维派武装。 不难看出，在俄罗斯再提“伊斯坦布尔协议”的背后是明确向美国提出利益诉求：美国如果能够帮俄罗斯有效重返叙利亚，俄罗斯就考虑进一步在乌克兰问题和配合美国。但问题在于，特朗普现在只能选择以色列，这就势必得罪以沙特为首的海湾阿拉伯国家和一部分中东主要国家，比如，埃及。而此前伊朗之所以“投降不成”，很大程度上就在于美国忌惮沙特在中东的影响力。讽刺的是，现在的特朗普政府似乎只能在沙特和伊朗之间选择伊朗了，或者说，对于只会在中东问题上玩“拉一派，打一派”的美国来说，只能选择“拉伊朗对抗沙特”了。具体手段就包括“创造”一出让人大跌眼镜的“老鼠和猫结婚”式的奇葩关系——新伊以关系。 对内塔尼亚胡来说，新伊以关系没有什么，但有两件事美国必须协助其完成，一个是实质性解除伊朗的核（项目）威胁，另一个是帮助内塔尼亚胡集团巩固政权，比如打造一个“大以色列”。否则，所谓新伊以关系对以色列没有任何意义。 所以，这段时间以色列在巴勒斯坦毫不掩饰地横行霸道，而这会让特朗普彻底得罪中东国家，得罪欧盟（巴勒斯坦，黎巴嫩是欧盟的地盘儿）。 对内塔尼亚胡来说，新伊以关系没有什么，但有两件事美国必须协助其完成，一个是实质性解除伊朗的核（项目）威胁，另一个是帮助内塔尼亚胡集团巩固政权，比如打造一个“大以色列”。否则，所谓新伊以关系对以色列没有任何意义。所以，这段时间以色列在巴勒斯坦毫不掩饰地横行霸道，而这会让特朗普彻底得罪中东国家，得罪欧盟（巴勒斯坦，黎巴嫩是欧盟的地盘儿）。 对伊朗来说，这样的处境同样非常尴尬，伊朗答应了，好处不大，更无法继续在中东做人。不答应，可能会挨打。讽刺的是，在我们看来，透过美国的伊朗政策来看，特朗普政府的伊朗政策何尝也很尴尬。而俄罗斯和这样的伊朗和美国混，能有什么好结果？如果特朗普政府就这样被拖下去的话，一旦在内斗中落入下风，假以时日，“拜登们之索利斯们”与欧洲利益联手将“特朗普们”贴上“西方叛徒”标签后，特朗普当如何自处？而那个时候代言西方资本利益的又应该是谁呢？仍然是美国资本利益？或者其它什么？
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第7869期-从中国历史上著名阳谋“金刀计”的角度再谈“北溪-2”天然气管道重启事件后续发展（2025-3-5） 声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。
Saturday, March 8, 2025, Issue No. 1198 Who Will Be the New Spokesperson for Western Capital Interests? [Media Coverage] On March 7, Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov told reporters that President Vladimir Putin stated the *Istanbul Agreement* signed in 2022 could serve as the foundation for a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement. On March 7, U.S. President Donald Trump posted on social media that, given Russia's current "fierce attacks" on the frontlines in Ukraine, he is strongly considering imposing large-scale sanctions on Russia, including on its banking sector and tariffs, until a ceasefire and final peace agreement are reached. Trump urged Russia and Ukraine to "come to the negotiating table." On March 7, a spokesperson for the European Parliament confirmed that the European Parliament recently revoked restrictions on meetings between its members and certain Chinese officials. Reports suggest that, amid the rapid deterioration of U.S.-EU relations, this move could be seen as a new sign of thawing China-EU relations. On March 8, two foreign ministers attending the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting revealed that the organization approved the Arab countries' Gaza reconstruction plan on March 7. This plan is a response to U.S. President Trump's proposal to take over Gaza. 【Discussion Summary】 ● What is the essence of the *Istanbul Agreement* that emerged in March 2022? On March 7, U.S. President Donald Trump posted on social media that, given Russia's current "fierce attacks" on the frontlines in Ukraine, he is strongly considering imposing large-scale sanctions on Russia, including on its banking sector and tariffs. The Trump administration's latest stance on Russia has left many puzzled. Wasn't it said that the U.S. was now "bowing deeply" to Russia, even to the point of near "surrender"? So why the sudden announcement of large-scale sanctions against Russia? Is it simply because Russia launched a new round of military offensives? However, this kind of "Russian forces advance, Ukrainian forces counterattack" situation has long been commonplace in the over three-year-long Russia-Ukraine conflict. Before continuing the discussion, let us look at another news report. On March 7, Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov told reporters that President Vladimir Putin stated the *Istanbul Agreement* signed in 2022 could serve as the foundation for a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement. Media coverage of the *Istanbul Agreement* has been sparse. According to President Putin's latest disclosure, the two sides reached a three-point agreement at the time, which could be considered a golden solution for political resolution: Ukraine's commitment to permanent neutrality, recognition of the status quo in Crimea, and protection of the rights of Russian-speaking communities. If the agreement had been reached, Russia would have immediately withdrawn its troops from around Kyiv. Unfortunately, during the final round of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul, Turkey, on March 29, 2022, Ukraine did not sign the draft agreement with Russia. From the above content, it is not difficult to discern some clues about the essence of the *Istanbul Agreement*: First, at the time, only about a month had passed since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Russian forces were already at the gates of Kyiv, seemingly on the verge of capturing the city. In other words, the battlefield situation was highly favorable to Russia at the time. Second, although the U.S. was not directly involved in the *Istanbul Agreement*, the Ukrainian side negotiating with Russia was essentially representing the Biden administration. Third, as the Russia-Ukraine war enters its fourth year, with the support of the international community, especially North Korea's involvement in the war in a "special form," Russian forces generally maintain an advantage on the battlefield. In this context, Russia's renewed emphasis on the *Istanbul Agreement* as the foundation for a peace agreement clearly indicates that the agreement's terms are highly favorable to Russia. As Putin himself stated, the three-point agreement reached at the time (Ukraine's commitment to permanent neutrality, recognition of the status quo in Crimea, and protection of the rights of Russian-speaking communities) could be considered a golden solution for political resolution. In Putin's view, the Trump administration now needs Russia's cooperation on the Ukrainian issue, and given the intensifying internal strife in the U.S., Russia is justified in revisiting the *Istanbul Agreement*. Fourth, if the *Istanbul Agreement* is highly favorable to Russia, it must be highly unfavorable to the West. Clearly, the Ukrainian government under the Biden administration's control was willing to sign the agreement with Russia mainly because Ukraine (and the West) was in an extremely disadvantageous military position at the time, forcing them to use a delaying tactic. In other words, the West never truly intended to sign the *Istanbul Agreement* with Russia. ● How far are we from a genuine "public U.S.-EU quarrel" behind the EU's public endorsement of the "Chinese proposal"? Through the discussion in the first section, let us revisit the Trump administration's sudden announcement of imposing large-scale sanctions on Russia. Although the Trump administration has been "bowing deeply" to Russia, even to the point of near "surrender," its avoidance of the *Istanbul Agreement* suggests that this "bowing deeply" is merely a facade or a contingency plan. We want to remind Russian decision-makers that behind the Trump administration's willingness to play this "face-changing" game lies a denial of Russia's current strength, which they perceive as far inferior to Russia in March 2022. However, due to the Trump administration's focus on "dealing with internal issues before external ones," it can only superficially "show some courtesy" in its Russia policy. Russia should not mistake this for genuine goodwill! The Trump administration's assessment of Russia today is not without reason. Let us briefly evaluate Russia's current strengths and weaknesses and compare them to its position in March 2022. In our view, Russia's current strengths are: First, the Trump administration, due to its need to address internal strife, indeed requires Russia's cooperation; Second, with the support of the international community, especially North Korea's involvement in the war in a "special form," Russian forces generally maintain an advantage on the battlefield; Third, U.S.-EU relations continue to deteriorate over the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern issues, at least on the surface. Russia's current weaknesses are: First, as the Trump administration's foreign policy operates under the strategy of "befriending the distant and attacking the near," it has at least superficially "bowed deeply" to Russia, especially after the "Golden Dagger Scheme" surrounding the Nord Stream 2 pipeline restart. This has significantly affected China-Russia strategic trust, particularly due to Russia's shifting focus, especially its "Afghanistan policy considerations"; Second, as Russia seeks U.S. strategic support for its "effective return to Syria" and believes it shares common interests with the U.S. in blocking Middle Eastern energy pipelines to Europe, especially after adjusting its policy toward Israel to align more closely with the U.S., Russia's geopolitical conflicts with Middle Eastern rivals have become increasingly acute; Third, Russia has not only lost Syria (the Assad regime) but also its other "important leverage" in the Middle East—Iran—which is now "fragmented." Trump's sudden "face-changing" presents Russia with a "new situation," and the scene is highly awkward. Perhaps at this moment, Russian decision-makers are considering how to send officials to visit China and play the "China card" again. However, the problem is that some actions Russia has already taken will have corresponding consequences and costs, such as the growing closeness of China-EU relations. Interestingly, no sooner had these words been spoken than the European Parliament revoked restrictions on meetings between its members and Chinese representatives. It seems that Europe has begun to grasp the implications of the "Chinese proposal" and is taking steps to improve China-EU relations (primarily based on non-traditional security). Next, we should closely observe whether European officials will also urgently visit China. Behind the EU's public endorsement of the "Chinese proposal" may lie its preparation to continue its strategic game with the U.S. and Russia over the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern issues, with China's strategic support. If the Trump administration continues to seek a temporary easing of U.S.-Russia relations through overall compromise with Russia, while not only failing to restrain the Netanyahu government's domineering actions in the Palestinian Gaza Strip, especially the West Bank, and southern Lebanon but also further supporting them, thus continuing to trample on European interests in the Middle East, then the conditions for a genuine "public U.S.-EU quarrel" may soon be ripe (if U.S. capital interests still represent Western capital interests, there may not be much to quarrel about, but once a "public quarrel" does occur, the portion of U.S. capital interests that has already fled or plans to flee to Europe could quarrel with U.S. capital interests over who now represents Western capital interests. Of course, the conditions are not yet ripe, but the Nord Stream 2 pipeline restart has shown us this possibility). As the Middle Eastern and Ukrainian issues have become protracted, the EU, with China's support, holds an advantage in the Ukrainian issue on the non-traditional security front. If we view the U.S. and Russia's greater advantages in the Ukrainian issue as "brute force" based on traditional security, their fatal weakness lies in one word: "delay"—the U.S. is plagued by internal strife, and the Trump administration cannot afford to delay, even for temporary internal compromise; Russia is exhausted by the war and eager to end it and effectively return to Syria, and the Putin government cannot afford to delay either! If the EU understands this, it may well be tempted to see what it feels like to "cross the river and leave others behind." ● The international community should remain highly vigilant, as incidents related to maritime route security may suddenly occur in the waters from the Strait of Malacca to the Persian Gulf. After Europe's public endorsement of the "Chinese proposal" and its initial actions, the Trump administration's Ukraine policy appears somewhat awkward. In our view, the Trump administration can now only do two things: First, pressure Russia to quickly sign an agreement; Second, pressure Ukraine (and the EU) to quickly sign an agreement. It is even possible that the Trump administration may overthrow the Zelensky regime to achieve this. The Trump administration's urgency in seeking a U.S.-Russia détente stems from its even greater urgency to visit China. In other words, the Trump administration, which cannot afford to be dragged to death in Ukraine and especially the Middle East, may resort to desperate measures in the Western Pacific. Therefore, we remind the international community to remain highly vigilant, as incidents related to maritime route security may suddenly occur in the waters from the Strait of Malacca to the Persian Gulf. Compared to the Taiwan issue, the Korean Peninsula issue (including), and the South China Sea issue, this is not particularly sensitive for China but could pose a certain threat. The reason could be to strengthen sanctions on Iran, preventing it from exporting a single drop of oil. If Trump indeed takes such actions, on one hand, we will observe how Iran responds; on the other hand, depending on the specific situation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca, if this route is substantially interrupted for any reason, then following the principle that "cutting off a water pipe at the 5-meter mark is the same as cutting it off at the 95-meter mark," China may choose to activate the "South China Sea Traffic Light System" and assert absolute control over the South China Sea! This may also be accompanied by the "island-building" at Scarborough Shoal and the establishment of a South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. It is worth noting that during the chaos in Egypt, the concept of "managing the South China Sea" was proposed, specifically referring to the exchange of Syrian and Libyan interests between Europe and the U.S. The chaos in Egypt saw U.S. capital interests, at the expense of U.S. national interests, severely deteriorating China's external security environment, especially its economic environment. At this time, U.S. capital interests representing Western capital interests also began to operate outside the European and U.S. platforms. Now, the situation seems to have regressed to the initial stage of U.S.-EU integration. Financially, it has regressed from QE3 to the "Mar-a-Lago Agreement." Once a public quarrel occurs, the U.S., Russia, and the EU will gain nothing, but the situation will have regressed at least 14 years to 2011. Of course, Iran will also gain nothing, as the Shia Resistance Arc has dissipated, and Iran has no path to surrender. However, this is not entirely favorable for the international situation, as Thailand seems to be moving toward chaos, along with Myanmar (where Russia is involved). The U.S.-China trade war, in a sense, is a form of "off-script operation," as the financial firewall has not yet been fully constructed. This "chaotic war" approach has been described by us as "taking N steps in one." Although they are still striving for it, after the "turning point year" of 2015, 14 years have passed (counting from the chaos in Egypt in 2011), and the situation has completely changed. It is worth noting that from the chaos in Egypt to today's AI war and chip war, the other side has been continuously taking action, step by step, targeting fatal areas. However, we have grown stronger in the fight, while the other side has grown weaker. ● Once Trump loses the upper hand in internal strife, given time, "Bidens and Soroses" + European interests may label Trump as a "Western traitor." How will Trump handle this? Speaking of Iran, we note that U.S. President Trump claimed to have sent a letter to Iran, but Iranian officials stated they had not received any news reports. The Trump administration's approach to Iran has been a mix of pressure and engagement. In Trump's view, using a relatively eased Iran-Israel relationship to further ease U.S.-Russia relations, then using a temporarily eased U.S.-Russia relationship as a basis to visit China, and finally using a temporarily eased U.S.-China relationship to alleviate internal conflicts. However, the problem is that after the Biden administration, at the expense of U.S. national long-term interests, opened the "Pandora's box" of post-Assad regime Syria, the complexity of the Syrian situation far exceeds the Trump administration's imagination. In our view, the forces currently entrenched in Syria, the "crossroads of the Middle East," can be roughly divided into three groups: First, the U.S.-supported Israel and the so-called "Kurdish" militants (essentially ISIS extremists in different uniforms); Second, the Syrian interim government supported by the EU, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia (the Arab League); Third, the Alawite armed forces loyal to former Syrian President Assad, covertly supported by Russia. It is not difficult to see that behind Russia's renewed emphasis on the *Istanbul Agreement* lies a clear demand to the U.S.: If the U.S. can help Russia effectively return to Syria, Russia will consider further cooperation with the U.S. on the Ukrainian issue. However, the problem is that Trump can now only choose Israel, which will inevitably alienate Gulf Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia and some major Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt. Previously, Iran's "failure to surrender" was largely due to U.S. fears of Saudi influence in the Middle East. Ironically, the Trump administration now seems to have no choice but to side with Iran over Saudi Arabia, or in other words, for a U.S. that only knows how to "play one side against the other" in the Middle East, it can only choose to "support Iran against Saudi Arabia." Specific measures include "creating" a jaw-dropping "marriage of mice and cats"—a new Iran-Israel relationship. For Netanyahu, the new Iran-Israel relationship is insignificant, but there are two things the U.S. must help him achieve: First, substantially eliminate Iran's nuclear (program) threat; Second, help the Netanyahu group consolidate power, such as building a "Greater Israel." Otherwise, the so-called new Iran-Israel relationship is meaningless for Israel. Thus, during this period, Israel has been openly domineering in Palestine, which will completely alienate Trump from Middle Eastern countries and the EU (Palestine and Lebanon are EU spheres of influence). For Iran, this situation is equally awkward. If Iran agrees, the benefits are minimal, and it will lose face in the Middle East. If it refuses, it may face attacks. Ironically, in our view, through the lens of U.S. Iran policy, the Trump administration's Iran policy is equally awkward. And what good can come from Russia mixing with such an Iran and the U.S.? If the Trump administration continues to be dragged down in this way, once it loses the upper hand in internal strife, given time, "Bidens and Soroses" + European interests may label Trump as a "Western traitor." How will Trump handle this? And who should represent Western capital interests at that time? Still U.S. capital interests? Or someone else?
[Related Topics]
Issue 7869 - Revisiting the Golden Dagger Scheme in Chinese History in the Context of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Restart (March 5, 2025)
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