2025年2月27日，星期四，第1190期

美国内部恶斗是否会上演美版“土木堡之变”？

【媒体报道】

2月26日，美国总统特朗普召开其第二任期的首次内阁会议。非内阁成员、政府效率部负责人马斯克参加了会议并发表讲话。马斯克表示，美国根本无法承受2万亿美元的赤字，目前仅国债利息就已经超过了国防部的支出。如果这种情况持续下去，这个国家就将破产。他的工作不是一件可做可不做的事，而是一件必须做的事。谈及此，马斯克说，他的行动受到了很多批评，他自己还收到了很多死亡威胁。

2月26日，在华盛顿特区，美国总统特朗普主持了他的首次内阁会议，马斯克出席了会议，马斯克坐在国务卿鲁比奥旁边。特朗普表示，在有媒体报道称马斯克对联邦工作人员的指令已经开始让内阁部长们感到不满的情况下，他的一些内阁成员“有点不同意”马斯克的做法。“有人对埃隆不满意吗？要是有，那我们就把他从这儿赶出去。”特朗普说道。

【讨论纪要】

●有关北极航线，白令海峡，北冰洋，格陵兰岛等话题与乌克兰局势密切相关，也与俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”密不可分

2月26日，有媒体报道称，美俄正在讨论能否把北极作为经济合作新方向的问题，包括共同开采北极资源和开发贸易路线。媒体指出，双方都发出了愿意展开经济合作的信号。

我们不能说美俄之间不存在经济合作的空间。如果美国真的吞并了加拿大，美国和俄罗斯就彼此成为中间没有任何缓冲地区的邻国。北冰洋将成为他们两国的“界洋”。不过，尽管双方在地缘层面有经济合作的可能性，但是在我们看来，俄美之间的经济结构互补性不是很强，甚至有些方面存在激烈竞争，比如，能源、农产品、军火贸易等。

值得一提的是，在2022年俄乌战争爆发之前，俄美双边贸易规模始终维持在500亿美元左右，大约是同期欧俄贸易的十分之一。所以，在我们的观察与评估中，所谓“美俄正秘密谈判开发北极”，更多像是“作秀”，也许美国和俄罗斯都有意炒作这一话题给欧盟，尤其是中国看。

2022年10月5日，我们讨论了“俄罗斯在中俄实质性联手问题上，即便是迈出‘重要、但非关键’一步也不愿做到”这一话题。

根据当时俄方公布的中俄联合巡航所经地区信息，其中仅提及白令海，而未提及白令海峡或穿越白令海峡。白令海位于白令海峡的南部，而进入北冰洋地区必须穿越白令海峡。当时尽管不能排除尚有未披露内容，但就当时我们获得的公开信息来观察，中俄联合巡航没有进入北冰洋地区。这也意味着俄罗斯仍未下定决心和西方彻底决裂，这种“不愿”显然也是一种“态度”。尽管中俄联合巡航的确对西方起到一定警告作用，但同时俄罗斯也向西方再次释放“错误信号”——至少在当前阶段，俄罗斯仍然想谈。

从这段回顾中不难看出，有关北极航线，白令海峡，北冰洋，格陵兰岛等话题与乌克兰局势密切相关，也与俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”密不可分，即便从2022年2月24日俄乌战争爆发开始算起，俄罗斯也从未放弃过要与欧美谈的想法，所以，从这一点反观“美俄正秘密谈判开发北极”的出现，尽管目前阶段观察，这项合作更多在务虚层面，但我们也仍然不感到奇怪。因此，尽管北极航线早就在进行规划，但对国际社会而言，实质性推动航线开通，时机仍不成熟。相比之下，至少在表面上，俄美关系的缓和速度恐怕比很多人预想中的要快得多。

●两个“恶性循环”

特朗普政府在执行“远交近攻，合纵连横”策略的过程中，战略扩张为虚，战略收缩为实，各方已基本明了。特朗普政府的战略被动主要体现在，其一，对外关系缓和进行得越不顺利，“美国内部恶斗”的就越急；其二，“美国内部恶斗”的就越急，对外关系缓和的操作空间就越狭窄。如此形成恶性循环。

一个典型的例子就是，特朗普政府采取了近乎“投降”的姿态与俄罗斯缓和关系，而且这还不是特朗普政府最急切需要缓和的一方（首先应妥善处理中美关系）。

问题在于，如法国总统马克龙所言，这样一个对俄罗斯“一躬到底”的美国如何面对比俄罗斯强大得多得多的中国？也就是说，比俄罗斯强大得多得多的中国看到这样一个对俄罗斯“一躬到底”的美国，一定不会心慈面软，一定会在美国急于所求的缓和中美关系上“加码”。如果美国不同意，那作为特朗普政府只有缓和了美中、美欧、美俄关系中的大多数才能赢得“内斗”首先应该缓和的且是“必选项”的美中关系就无法得到妥善处理，而看到这一幕的欧盟和俄罗斯一定也会分别在特朗普政府同样有求于人的缓和美欧、美俄关系上“加码”。比如，欧盟贸易专员被爆将于3月底访华并宣布“议程可能更积极”，显然，这又是一个恶性循环。

●美国整体上战略极其被动的局面不仅没有得到改观，反而因两个“恶性循环”变得更加恶化

综上讨论，在东方时事解读的观察与评估中，美国整体上战略极其被动的局面不仅没有得到改观，反而因两个“恶性循环”变得更加恶化。在特朗普政府拉着俄罗斯普京政权谈稀土合作、北极合作之余，恐怕继续对俄罗斯有所让步是必然的。

当地时间2月26日，俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫表示，俄罗斯不会考虑任何向乌克兰部署欧洲维和部队的方案，目前为止也没有国家向俄罗斯提起过此类方案。这一新闻报道或意味着美国不得不进一步牺牲欧洲利益以向俄罗斯进一步妥协。

2012年的时候，针对当时国内某敏感政治事件，正在首尔出席核安全峰会的中国最高领导人在下榻饭店会见了时任美国总统奥巴马。“家里最近怎么样？”奥巴马一落座即首先向中方“发出问候”。

我们今天不去讨论“当时国内某敏感政治事件”到底是什么，我们只是想再度强调观察一个国家内政是否存在“大问题”的一个重要角度（这是东方时事解读2012年为了解读当时这起敏感的政治事件的解读观点），那就是：如果一个国家的外交没有出现大问题，这个国家在内政上就没有“大问题”。反观今天的美国，恰恰因为其外交上出了“大问题”，我们则可以断定其内政也一定出了“大问题”。

我们注意到马斯克参加特朗普上任后首次内阁会议中的两个细节：第一，马斯克自称遭遇了死亡威胁；第二，特朗普再次高调重申对马斯克的“坚定支持”。

显然，特朗普现在还需要马斯克继续充当主父偃的角色，更好地去做别人做不了的事情。不难想象的是，如果马斯克继续这样做下去，必然是“鱼死网破”，因为“特朗普们”的冤家对头们并没有屈服。当然，特朗普不到万不得已也不想“鱼死网破”，但这不妨碍特朗普通过马斯克继续对“拜登们”施压，以求迫使对方达成交易。

这和表面上美俄关系缓和得风生水起形成了鲜明对比。这也是美国整体上战略极其被动的局面不仅没有得到改观，反而因两个“恶性循环”变得更加恶化的又一具体表现。

●中国严厉警告特朗普政府——不得损害中国核心利益！同时，将这份警告也一并“抄送”给欧盟和俄罗斯

在此前的讨论中，我们给出了“比俄罗斯强大得多得多的中国看到这样一个对俄罗斯‘一躬到底’的美国，一定不会心慈面软，一定会在美国急于所求的缓和中美关系上‘加码’”的相关评估。也就是说，中国一定会抓住机会，尽可能为己方争取到更多合理利益。值得一提的是，中国恰恰就在这方面越来越多地表现出特立独行的一面。在这里我们不妨继续聊聊“055大驱”带队，前出澳大利亚、新西兰所在南太平洋地区的重大战略意义。

2月26日，055遵义舰、054A衡阳舰和903“微山湖”号补给舰前出澳大利亚、新西兰所在南太平洋地区，对在澳大利亚最大城市悉尼的门口“开枪开炮”。

在我们看来，“055大驱”带队，中国舰队在澳大利亚外海实弹演习，可以说，是从1840年开始到现在这185年的时间里，第一次有中国强大的海军舰艇编队出现在白人国家的外海！所谓的“第三岛链”已经名存实亡。

更加让人感到诧异的是，作为西方国家的领袖，世界唯一超级大国，视中国为“终极敌人”的美国，到现在为止却一声不吭，直接促使澳大利亚和新西兰社会开始广泛讨论是不是要继续跟随美国对抗中国这一问题。

讽刺的是，因中澳贸易高度符合中国，尤其是澳大利亚的国家利益，面对中国舰队保护这条对澳大利亚而言称之为“生命线”也不为过的海上贸易航线，澳大利亚军方（澳大利亚当局）突然发现，这恰恰是自己应该做的。或者说澳大利亚军队的重要任务之一本就应该和中方舰队一样，保护自己的“海上贸易生命线”的安全。更或者说，如果出于澳大利亚国家利益的考量，澳大利亚当局没有任何理由反对中国舰队出现在澳大利亚外海。

对中国来说，特朗普急于缓和中美关系，首先一条，台湾问题不谈！台湾问题也没什么可谈的！甚至，基于“加码”，谈南海问题的兴趣我们也“有所减弱”。与此相比，我们更愿意谈西太的问题。

也就是说，当中国强大的舰艇编队直接将“第三岛链”置于名存实亡后，从实际操作、落地执行的层面向全世界广播——太平洋足够大，容得下中美两国！也就是说，西太，美国要让出来！

说到西太问题，大家自然会联想到台湾问题。尽管在特朗普政府急于缓和中美关系的问题上，中方将有关台湾问题的讨论排除在外，但这并不妨碍中国在台海周边地区有所行动。

2月27日，据所谓“台防务部门”在当地时间26日晚放出台军“班超”舰拍摄的解放军海军986“四明山”舰和886“千岛湖”舰的照片，解放军海军编队已在今天下午抵达并驶离射击训练区。

而在此前一天，台军“基隆”级驱逐舰在台湾东部海域和我075型两栖攻击舰对峙。社交媒体上流传的2月25日卫星图像显示，由解放军075型两栖攻击舰领衔的两栖打击群，包括1艘071型两栖船坞登陆舰、2艘052D型驱逐舰和1艘903型综合补给舰，正在位于台岛以东约250公里处活动。这意味着我两栖打击群从台东外海一路穿过巴士海峡，抵达台湾高雄海域。

在我们的观察与评估中，在中国公开就特朗普政府急于缓和对华关系“哪些应该做，哪些不应该做”下“指导棋”的同时，中国更在严厉警告特朗普政府——不得损害中国核心利益！当然，这份警告也一并“抄送”给欧盟和俄罗斯——“玩麻将”可以，但中国核心利益不是你们的筹码！以损害中国核心利益的方式私相授受，中国绝不答应！所谓“绝不答应”的意思就是，你们前脚达成交易，中国后脚就让其变为“废纸一张”！具体的手段有很多，但作为所有可能方案的“兜底方案”就是必要的时候，武力收台（彻底颠覆西太安全框架，而其实西方世界霸权，尤其是金融霸权的两大支柱之一）！

需要再次强调的是，一旦美国内部矛盾得以缓和，哪怕是阶段性缓和，恐怕特朗普政府在今天很多谈好的事情上都会翻脸。但对于国际社会来说，无论是现在特朗普去“忽悠”，还是日后特朗普去“变脸”，都需要时间！这恰恰是国际社会最需要的。比如，DeepSeek的横空出世，对美国AI计划“星际之门”项目的猛烈冲击，华为的算力底座，同时曝光两款新型战机等等，都是在过去俄乌战争的三年时间里出来的。

此外，值得一提的是，目前状态下，中、欧、俄轮番上阵，分别从美国那里尽量淘换到自己所需的一幕，有了那么一点“第四轮排列组合”的味道（中、欧、俄战略协调，在美国全球战略“重中之重”的中东问题上轮番“消遣”美国）。

●乌克兰问题的解决仍遥遥无期且变数极大，欧盟如此吃相难看是不是太心急了一点？

应该说，特朗普政府对于如何在对华、对欧、对俄关系中先缓和哪个，后缓和哪个，谁是必选，还是有所认知的。在特朗普看来，由于无法达成首先缓和中美关系，于是只能被迫首先缓和俄美关系，不损害欧洲利益就无法缓和俄美关系。而不缓和俄美关系就不能回头再次尝试缓和中美关系，那样无法达到在对华，对欧，对俄关系中“缓和大多数”的目标。

我们注意到乌克兰总理什梅加尔在2月26日表示，乌克兰和美国已制定了矿产协议最终版本，乌政府今天将对此进行审议的相关新闻报道。什梅加尔表示，该协议被称为“关于制定乌克兰重建投资基金规则和条件的协议”，这是一个具有法律效力的初步协议，未来将创建一个用于乌克兰重建的投资基金，乌克兰和美国将平等地管理该基金。

在我们看来，这份协议将乌克兰的核心利益出卖得一干二净，堪称“乌克兰版的辛丑条约”。从最新消息来看，欧洲似乎愿意参与到瓜分乌克兰的过程中。但问题在于，乌克兰和平不是欧洲主导的，而是特朗普急于内斗搞出的，对欧洲来说，这个乌克兰和平是不可靠的。

此外，东乌地区到底有没有传说中的稀土资源还是个问号。即便有，也在东乌地区，而这里现在为俄罗斯所占领，那么欧洲又能从中分到什么呢？更何况一旦美国内部矛盾有所平息，随着特朗普政府对外政策必然的“推倒重来”，所谓的乌克兰和平又能维持多久呢？

也就是说，之所以出现了所谓的乌克兰和平，只不过特朗普政府深陷“两个恶性循环”，对外，对内还有很多问题没有理顺的权宜之计。当“星际之门”计划的融资被“DeepSeek+华为”冲击得七零八落后（核心支撑是PLA，包括“DF-31”，连续曝光两款新型战机。还有开展最低中国经济内循环的坚定底气，比如，雅鲁藏布江工程）后，“乌克兰大礼包”或已成为其唯一将“蛋糕”做大的希望。

●美国版本的土木堡之变随时可能发生

说到将“蛋糕”做大的问题，有一点可以肯定，无论是特朗普的“盟友”还是特朗普的“敌人”，他们的耐心恐怕会随着特朗普政府无法将“蛋糕”做大，在时间轴上呈现出“指数级下降”。

友情提醒特朗普政府的是，重提“MH370事件”，就算给了中国一个交代，也不过是缓和中美关系迈出的第一步，而距离“做好蛋糕”还远着呢。但是，如果无法处理好中美关系，“做蛋糕”就是痴心妄想，更别提“做好蛋糕”了。没有“蛋糕”，美国内部矛盾就无法有效缓和，剩下的只有越来越多的你死我活，玉石俱焚！

如果特朗普政府在始终无法达成有效缓和中美关系的情况下，最终在“只有缓和对华、对欧、对俄关系中的‘大多数’才有可能赢得‘内斗’”的问题上彻底玩脱了稿，在客观上促成欧俄缓和关系，甚至导致俄罗斯输欧能源管道（“土耳其流”之外的）重新接通，恐怕届时的美国就同时成为中、欧、俄三方的“弃子”，此时此刻，也许“第四轮排列组合”就真的“重新启动”了，而随之而来的，叙利亚将不会再有美国的立足之地。

需要补充一点的是，中国历史上的“土木堡之变”之所以败得那么惨，主要原因并不在于公开资料上写的那样，而与明朝内部那些和瓦剌有频繁贸易往来的利益集团为了维护自身既得利益与瓦剌暗通款曲。也就是说，这些明朝内部的利益集团不希望看到明朝对瓦剌的战争取得胜利，或者说他们为了维护自己所在小集团的利益，不惜损害明朝的核心国家利益。在我们看来，今天的美国朝堂之上恐怕已经遍布这样的人了，“拜登们”是的，“特朗普们”也是的。他们同样为了自己小集团的利益也不惜将美国国家利益，甚至核心利益“一卖到底”——美国版的土木堡之变随时可能发生。

●简单聊聊中国研制出全球首台以航空煤油驱动的斜爆轰发动机

在今天讨论的最后，我们简单聊聊中国研制出的全球首台以航空煤油驱动的斜爆轰发动机，飞行速度有望达16马赫这件事。

在我们看来，以航空煤油驱动的斜爆轰发动机，是新型发动机的典型，某种意义上说，是将循环爆轰发动机和斜爆轰发动机结合在一起了，非常具有创造性。中国现在可以说是当之无愧的世界发动机强国，代表就是WS-15。而随着中国自研长江1000A和WS-20（大涵道比）的成功，西方对中国航空发动机断供实际上已无可能。

在此前我们讨论有关2024年年底中国一口气曝出两款“新型战机”的话题中，我们提出了一种假设：如果两款“新型战机”有应急之意，第三台发动机有可能是一台涡喷发动机，其特点是在高空具有较强优势。从中国披露的新型战机来看，是不是六代机不重要，六代机如何划分中国说了算才重要。

此外，氢氧爆轰发动机（与今天聊的发动机类似，只是使用燃料不同）虽然不错，但成本太高。相比之下，以航空煤油驱动的斜爆轰发动机显然更具性价比。由此不难看出，中国好发动机、新发动机实在太多了，PLA也好，民用也罢，恐怕早已挑花了眼。以军用为例，如果类似以航空煤油驱动的斜爆轰发动机这样的新型、性价比很高的发动机量大管饱，面对我们的高超音速武器体系，西方精心构建多年的所谓“拦截体系”就将彻底成为废铜烂铁。

值得一提的是，在民用超高音速飞行器领域，为了更好应对5马赫以上温度急剧升高的问题，以铌基合金为代表的新材料逐渐面世，其中恐怕相当一部分新材料的研究成果就来自我们的太空站——天宫空间站。当然，随之而来的还有一系列与新材料相匹配的“爆矿”，比如，2024年在十堰市竹山县和竹溪县，发现了全国规模最大的铌矿。该矿藏中的氧化铌资源量高达253.8万吨，占据了全国总储量的54%。

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Thursday, February 27, 2025, Issue No. 1190

Will the fierce internal strife in the U.S. lead to an American version of the "Tumu Crisis"?

[Media Coverage]

On February 26, U.S. President Trump held his first cabinet meeting of his second term. Elon Musk, head of the Government Efficiency Department, who is not a cabinet member, attended the meeting and delivered a speech. Musk stated that the U.S. simply cannot afford a $2 trillion deficit, and currently, the interest on national debt alone exceeds the Department of Defense's expenditures. If this situation continues, the country will go bankrupt. He emphasized that his work is not optional but necessary. Musk also revealed that he has faced significant criticism and even received death threats.

During the meeting, Trump addressed reports that some cabinet members were dissatisfied with Musk’s directives to federal employees. Trump joked, "Is anyone unhappy with Elon? If so, we’ll kick him out."

【Discussion Summary】

● The Arctic route, the Bering Strait, the Arctic Ocean, and Greenland are closely tied to the Ukraine situation and Russia’s "Afghanistan policy."

On February 26, media reports indicated that the U.S. and Russia are discussing the Arctic as a new direction for economic cooperation, including joint resource extraction and trade route development. Both sides have signaled a willingness to engage in economic collaboration.

While we cannot deny that there is potential for economic cooperation between the U.S. and Russia, their economic structures are not highly complementary. In fact, they compete fiercely in areas like energy, agriculture, and arms trade. Before the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, U.S.-Russia trade was around $50 billion, only a tenth of EU-Russia trade. Therefore, the so-called "secret U.S.-Russia negotiations on Arctic development" seem more like a show, possibly aimed at influencing the EU and China.

On October 5, 2022, we discussed how Russia was unwilling to take even a "significant but non-critical" step toward substantive cooperation with China. For example, during a joint China-Russia naval patrol, the route mentioned the Bering Sea but not the Bering Strait or the Arctic Ocean, indicating Russia’s reluctance to fully break with the West. This reluctance sends a "wrong signal" to the West: Russia still wants to negotiate.

From this perspective, the Arctic route, the Bering Strait, the Arctic Ocean, and Greenland are closely tied to the Ukraine situation and Russia’s "Afghanistan policy." Even after the Russia-Ukraine war began on February 24, 2022, Russia has never abandoned the idea of negotiating with the West. Therefore, while the "secret U.S.-Russia negotiations on Arctic development" appear to be more symbolic than substantive, we are not surprised by their emergence. However, for the international community, the timing for substantive progress on the Arctic route is still not ripe. Meanwhile, U.S.-Russia relations seem to be warming faster than many expected.

● Two "vicious cycles"

In executing its "distant alliances, divide and conquer" strategy, the Trump administration’s strategic expansion is more about appearances, while its strategic contraction is the reality. The administration’s strategic passivity is evident in two ways: first, the less smoothly its foreign relations improve, the more intense its internal strife becomes; second, the more intense the internal strife, the narrower the room for maneuvering in foreign relations. This creates a vicious cycle.

A typical example is the Trump administration’s near "surrender" posture in easing relations with Russia, which is not even its most urgent priority (the first priority should be improving U.S.-China relations).

As French President Macron pointed out, how can a U.S. that bows so low to Russia face a much stronger China? Seeing such a U.S., China will not show mercy and will certainly "raise the stakes" in the U.S.’s desperate attempts to ease U.S.-China relations. If the U.S. refuses, the Trump administration will fail to properly handle the U.S.-China relationship, which is the "must" for winning the internal political struggle. Observing this, the EU and Russia will also "raise the stakes" in their respective relations with the U.S. For example, the EU Trade Commissioner’s upcoming visit to China in late March suggests a more "positive agenda," signaling another vicious cycle.

● The U.S.’s overall strategic passivity has not improved but has worsened due to these two "vicious cycles."

In summary, the U.S.’s overall strategic passivity has not improved but has worsened due to these two "vicious cycles." While the Trump administration discusses rare earth and Arctic cooperation with Russia, it will likely have to make further concessions to Russia.

On February 26, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia would not consider any plan to deploy European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine, and no country has proposed such a plan to Russia so far. This suggests that the U.S. may have to further sacrifice European interests to compromise with Russia.

In 2012, during the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, the Chinese leader met with then-U.S. President Obama. Obama began the meeting by asking, "How are things at home?" We won’t discuss the specifics of that "sensitive political event" in China, but we emphasize that a country’s internal issues are closely tied to its foreign policy. Today, the U.S.’s foreign policy is in disarray, indicating significant internal problems.

We note two details from Musk’s attendance at Trump’s first cabinet meeting: first, Musk claimed to have received death threats; second, Trump publicly reaffirmed his "strong support" for Musk. Clearly, Trump still needs Musk to act as a key player in pushing forward initiatives that others cannot. However, if Musk continues down this path, it will likely lead to a "mutual destruction" scenario, as Trump’s opponents have not yielded. While Trump may not want to go down this road, he will continue to use Musk to pressure the "Biden faction" to strike a deal.

This contrasts sharply with the seemingly smooth easing of U.S.-Russia relations, further illustrating how the U.S.’s overall strategic passivity has worsened due to the two "vicious cycles."

● China sternly warns the Trump administration—do not harm China’s core interests! This warning is also sent to the EU and Russia.

In previous discussions, we assessed that a much stronger China, seeing the U.S. bow so low to Russia, will not show mercy and will "raise the stakes" in the U.S.’s desperate attempts to ease U.S.-China relations. In other words, China will seize every opportunity to secure its rightful interests. Increasingly, China is demonstrating a unique approach in this regard. Here, we can discuss the strategic significance of the Type 055 destroyer leading a fleet to the South Pacific near Australia and New Zealand.

On February 26, the Type 055 destroyer Zunyi, the Type 054A frigate Hengyang, and the Weishanhu supply ship conducted live-fire exercises near Sydney, Australia.

In our view, this marks the first time in 185 years (since 1840) that a powerful Chinese naval fleet has appeared in the waters of a predominantly white nation. The so-called "third island chain" is now effectively defunct.

Surprisingly, the U.S., the leader of the Western world and the only superpower that sees China as its "ultimate enemy," has remained silent, prompting widespread discussions in Australian and New Zealand societies about whether to continue following the U.S. in confronting China.

Ironically, given the high level of China-Australia trade, which aligns with both countries’ national interests, the Australian military (and government) has realized that protecting this "lifeline" of maritime trade is precisely what it should be doing. In other words, from the perspective of Australia’s national interests, there is no reason to oppose the presence of Chinese naval forces in its waters.

For China, Trump’s eagerness to ease U.S.-China relations must exclude discussions on Taiwan—there is nothing to discuss! Even interest in discussing the South China Sea has "diminished." Instead, China is more willing to discuss the Western Pacific.

This means that as China’s powerful fleet renders the "third island chain" obsolete, it broadcasts to the world that the Pacific is vast enough to accommodate both China and the U.S. In other words, the U.S. must cede the Western Pacific.

Regarding the Taiwan issue, although China has excluded it from discussions on easing U.S.-China relations, this does not prevent China from taking action in the waters around Taiwan.

On February 27, Taiwan’s defense department released photos of the PLA Navy’s Four Mountains (986) and Thousand Island Lake (886) ships taken by the Taiwanese navy’s Ban Chao ship, indicating that the PLA fleet had arrived and departed the training area earlier that day.

The day before, a Taiwanese Keelung-class destroyer confronted a Chinese Type 075 amphibious assault ship in the waters east of Taiwan. Satellite images from February 25 showed a PLA amphibious strike group, led by the Type 075 and including a Type 071 amphibious dock landing ship, two Type 052D destroyers, and a Type 903 supply ship, operating about 250 kilometers east of Taiwan. This suggests the strike group moved from the waters east of Taiwan through the Bashi Channel to the waters off Kaohsiung.

In our assessment, while China is publicly "guiding" the Trump administration on how to ease U.S.-China relations, it is also sternly warning the U.S.—do not harm China’s core interests! This warning is also sent to the EU and Russia: "Playing mahjong" is fine, but China’s core interests are not bargaining chips! Any backroom deals that harm China’s core interests will be met with firm opposition. "Firm opposition" means that any such agreements will be rendered null and void. Among the many possible countermeasures, the ultimate "fallback option" is the use of force to reunify Taiwan (thereby upending the Western Pacific security framework, one of the two pillars of Western global hegemony, especially financial hegemony).

It is worth reiterating that once the U.S.’s internal conflicts ease, even temporarily, the Trump administration may renege on many of today’s agreements. However, for the international community, whether Trump is "bluffing" now or "flipping" later, time is needed! This is precisely what the international community requires. For example, the emergence of DeepSeek, the severe impact on the U.S. AI project "Stargate," Huawei’s computing power base, and the simultaneous unveiling of two new fighter jets have all emerged during the three years of the Russia-Ukraine war.

Additionally, it is worth noting that the current situation, where China, Europe, and Russia take turns extracting what they need from the U.S., has a hint of the "fourth round of realignment" (strategic coordination among China, Europe, and Russia, taking turns "teasing" the U.S. on the Middle East issue, the "top priority" of U.S. global strategy).

● The resolution of the Ukraine issue remains distant and highly uncertain. Is the EU acting too hastily?

It should be said that the Trump administration has some awareness of which relationships to prioritize in easing tensions with China, Europe, and Russia. In Trump’s view, because it cannot first ease U.S.-China relations, it is forced to first ease U.S.-Russia relations, which requires sacrificing European interests. Without easing U.S.-Russia relations, it cannot return to easing U.S.-China relations, failing to achieve the goal of "easing most" of its relationships with China, Europe, and Russia.

On February 26, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that Ukraine and the U.S. have finalized a minerals agreement, which the Ukrainian government will review today. Shmyhal stated that the agreement, titled "Agreement on the Rules and Conditions for Establishing the Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund," is a legally binding preliminary agreement that will create an investment fund for Ukraine’s reconstruction, to be jointly managed by Ukraine and the U.S.

In our view, this agreement sells out Ukraine’s core interests and could be called the "Ukrainian version of the Boxer Protocol." From the latest news, Europe seems willing to participate in carving up Ukraine. However, the problem is that the peace in Ukraine is not led by Europe but by Trump’s desperate need to alleviate internal strife. For Europe, this peace is unreliable.

Furthermore, whether the eastern Ukraine region actually has the rumored rare earth resources is still a question. Even if it does, these resources are located in eastern Ukraine, which is currently occupied by Russia. So, what can Europe gain from this? Moreover, once U.S. internal conflicts ease, with the inevitable "overhaul" of Trump’s foreign policy, how long can this so-called peace in Ukraine last?

In other words, the so-called peace in Ukraine is merely a stopgap measure resulting from the Trump administration’s entrapment in "two vicious cycles," with many unresolved issues both domestically and internationally. After the financing of the "Stargate" project was shattered by "DeepSeek + Huawei" (with core support from the PLA, including the "DF-31" and the simultaneous unveiling of two new fighter jets, as well as the firm confidence in maintaining China’s internal economic circulation, such as the Yarlung Tsangpo River project), the "Ukrainian gift package" may have become its only hope to "enlarge the cake."

● An American version of the "Tumu Crisis" could happen at any time.

When it comes to "enlarging the cake," one thing is certain: whether it’s Trump’s "allies" or his "enemies," their patience will likely decline exponentially as the Trump administration fails to "enlarge the cake."

A friendly reminder to the Trump administration: revisiting the "MH370 incident," even if it provides an explanation to China, is only the first step in easing U.S.-China relations, and there is still a long way to go before "making the cake." However, if the U.S. cannot properly handle U.S.-China relations, "making the cake" is a pipe dream, let alone "making a good cake." Without the "cake," U.S. internal conflicts cannot be effectively eased, leaving only more and more mutual destruction!

If the Trump administration, unable to effectively ease U.S.-China relations, ultimately "overplays its hand" in the goal of "easing most of its relationships with China, Europe, and Russia to win the internal struggle," it may objectively facilitate eased relations between Europe and Russia, even leading to the reconnection of Russia’s energy pipelines to Europe (beyond the "Turkish Stream"). At that point, the U.S. may become a "discarded pawn" for China, Europe, and Russia simultaneously, and perhaps the "fourth round of realignment" will truly "restart," with Syria no longer having a place for the U.S.

It is worth noting that the reason why the "Tumu Crisis" in Chinese history ended so disastrously was not due to the reasons stated in public records but because of the frequent trade interactions between certain interest groups within the Ming dynasty and the Oirat Mongols, who colluded to protect their vested interests. In other words, these internal Ming interest groups did not want the Ming dynasty to win the war against the Oirat Mongols, or they were willing to sacrifice the Ming dynasty’s core national interests to protect their small-group interests. In our view, today’s U.S. political arena is likely filled with such people—both the "Biden faction" and the "Trump faction." They are equally willing to "sell out" U.S. national interests, even core interests, for the sake of their small-group interests—an American version of the "Tumu Crisis" could happen at any time.

● A brief chat about China's development of the world's first oblique detonation engine powered by aviation kerosene

At the end of today's discussion, let's briefly talk about China's development of the world's first oblique detonation engine powered by aviation kerosene, with a potential flight speed of up to Mach 16.

In our view, the oblique detonation engine powered by aviation kerosene is a typical example of a new type of engine. In a sense, it combines a rotating detonation engine with an oblique detonation engine, demonstrating considerable creativity. China can now be rightfully called a world power in engine technology, with the WS-15 as a representative example. And with the successful development of China's indigenously developed Changjiang 1000A and WS-20 (high-bypass ratio) engines, it is virtually impossible for the West to cut off China's supply of aircraft engines.

In our previous discussion on the topic of China unveiling two "new fighter aircraft" at the end of 2024, we proposed a hypothesis: if these two "new fighter aircraft" were intended as contingency measures, the third engine could be a turbojet engine with strong advantages at high altitudes. Whether the new fighter aircraft disclosed by China are sixth-generation aircraft is not important; what matters is that China has the final say in how sixth-generation aircraft are defined.

Furthermore, while hydrogen-oxygen detonation engines (similar to the engine we are discussing today, but using a different fuel) are impressive, they are too costly. In contrast, the oblique detonation engine powered by aviation kerosene is clearly more cost-effective. This highlights the abundance of excellent and innovative engines in China, whether for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) or civilian use. In the military context, if new, highly cost-effective engines like the oblique detonation engine powered by aviation kerosene are available in large quantities, the West's carefully constructed so-called "interception system" will become completely obsolete in the face of our hypersonic weapon system.

It is worth mentioning that in the field of civilian hypersonic aircraft, new materials such as niobium-based alloys are gradually emerging to better address the issue of rapidly increasing temperatures at speeds above Mach 5. A considerable portion of the research results on these new materials may well come from our space station, Tiangong. Of course, this also brings with it a series of "mining booms" related to these new materials. For example, in 2024, the largest niobium mine in China was discovered in Zhushan County and Zhuxi County, Shiyan City. The niobium oxide resources in this deposit amount to 2.538 million tons, accounting for 54% of the total reserves in China.

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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