2025年2月22日，星期六，第1186期

基于传统安全层面很难构建战略互信的美俄，在非传统安全层面有“彼此靠近”的土壤

【媒体报道】

2月22日，“随着美俄靠拢，中国应该担心吗？”对此，多名学者表示，截至目前，没有迹象表明美俄关系可以恢复到“莫斯科可能选择背离北京”的地步。他们解释说，俄罗斯已经失去对美西方社会的信任，同时中俄关系多年来已紧密交织、难以破裂，两国不仅有着共同的战略目标，而且彼此间经济联系极为深厚。

【讨论纪要】

●在今天，在没有达到中国要求的条件之前，美国总统特朗普想要淘换一张“飞往北京的机票”恐怕并非易事

特朗普政府基于内斗，需要外部策应，这一点似乎正变得越来越清晰，这也是我们反复提及的特朗普政府当前阶段努力执行的“攘外必先安内”政策。除此之外，特朗普政府还有另一个主要意图，那就是在不遗余力执行“攘外必先安内”政策的同时，尽量拆解中俄战略互信。

2月21日，美国媒体在一篇分析报道中认为，特朗普突然“示好”俄罗斯总统普京是出于一种战略意图，意在挑拨离间中俄关系，使这两个长期以来一直试图终结美国在国际秩序中主导地位的大国之间出现裂痕。这家美国媒体认为，过去在冷战时期，尼克松执政时曾改变美国的对华政策路线，由此削弱了苏联的全球影响力。由此，报道将特朗普现在的做法与尼克松时期相提并论，但一些学者认为“今时不同往日”，彼时中苏关系恶化，而如今中俄关系持续深化，特朗普效仿尼克松恐怕不会收获相同的结果，反而可能导致西方的分裂。

东方时事解读应该是第一时间将可能的特朗普访俄与美国前总统尼克松访华一事相提并论的智库，在2月14日的讨论中，我们就为广大听友提供了“从美前总统尼克松访华这一历史事件角度观察美总统特朗普或将访俄”这一观察视角。

1972年2月美国前总统尼克松访华，恰逢中苏关系在1969年珍宝岛冲突后全面恶化之际。而在随后的1973年，美军撤离越南，并承认越南的独立和主权。

越战失利的美国同样面临着是否能够安全战略收缩的巨大战略挑战。有一种说法是，通过1972年2月尼克松访华，美国成功地借“中国的肩膀”（中国允许美国“重新做人”）实现紧随其后的访苏（1972年5月），进而与苏联重新划定“势力范围”。中国则借此机会跳出了美苏二战后制订的，旨在“共管地球”的雅尔塔体系。

值得一提的是，中国不是帝国主义的奉行者，中国有自己的原则和立场，在今天，在没有达到中国要求的条件之前——台湾问题中国是不会与美国人谈的，南海问题可以谈。但从近日美国国务院发言人就黄岩岛问题发表的错误言论来看，从特朗普政府欲借台湾问题以及南海问题为“支点”欲在南亚问题上搞阴谋谋求继续对抗中国的险恶用心来看，美国总统特朗普想要淘换一张“飞往北京的机票”恐怕并非易事。

●尽管基于传统安全层面很难构建战略互信的美俄，在非传统安全层面有“彼此靠近”的土壤，这个土壤就是利益

我们注意到有关学者，就中俄关系提出的观点。他们认为俄罗斯已经失去对美西方社会的信任，同时中俄关系多年来已紧密交织、难以破裂，两国不仅有着共同的战略目标，而且彼此间经济联系极为深厚。

在我们看来，相关学者似乎只注意到了传统安全层面，比如，政治层面的中俄关系，而忽略了非传统安全层，比如，经济层面中俄关系存在的某种变数。

近段时间，多名特朗普政府的高官，比如，美国财长本贝森特，美国国务卿卢比奥，美国副总统万斯等，对欧洲，对乌克兰可谓恶语相向。有媒体爆料，美国财长贝森特拿着文件直接让乌克兰总统泽连斯基直接签字，甚至泽连斯基要看看文件都不允许，态度极其傲慢。甚至有传闻称，如果泽连斯基拒绝不签字，其人身安全可能会出现很大问题。

贝森特逼着泽连斯基签字的文件中就包括但不局限于，把乌克兰50%矿产所有权划归美国，用于偿还所谓的债务（3500亿美元）。讽刺的是，如今，美国在带头将“俄罗斯入侵乌克兰”这样的字眼儿废掉，甚至特朗普政府指责乌克兰总统泽连斯基发动了俄乌战争。

在我们看来，特朗普之所以对俄罗斯一躬到底，首要问题就是时间太急了。尤其是尽快缓和，哪怕是阶段性缓和代言西方资本利益的美国资本利益内部日益尖锐的矛盾。特朗普政府比之以往任何时候都更加急需“乌克兰优质资产包”。

问题在于，如果美国要50%乌克兰的矿产，那么其余的50%的乌克兰矿产归谁所有？恐怕不是乌克兰的，也不是欧洲，而有可能是俄罗斯。或者说，俄罗斯可以拿去。所谓“可以拿去”的意思在于，乌克兰的很多矿产资源恰恰在东乌克兰，而这里大部分地区已被俄罗斯占领。

值得一提的是，包括乌克兰在内，俄罗斯对很多前苏联加盟共和国，甚至蒙古国的矿产资源分布一清二楚。乌克兰到底有没有美国人感兴趣的矿产资源，比如稀土，首先要问的就是俄罗斯。

值得大家注意的是，就在俄美利雅得会晤后，俄罗斯总统普京公开声称，应该认真看待外国公司重返俄罗斯市场的可能。基于以上讨论，在东方时事解读的观察与评估中，尽管基于传统安全层面很难构建战略互信的美俄，在非传统安全层面有“彼此靠近”的土壤。这个土壤就是利益，比如，乌克兰的矿产资源；再比如，乌克兰重建问题。

●会出现“新北约”替代“旧北约”的情况吗？

在继续展开讨论之前，我们再来阅读一条新闻报道。

2月21日，专注于探索通用人工智能的DeepSeekAI团队在社交媒体上发布了一则振奋人心的消息，正式拉开了他们参与 #OpenSourceWee（开源周）活动的序幕。DeepSeekAI团队宣布，从下周开始，他们将开源5个代码仓库，以完全透明的方式与全球开发者社区分享他们的研究进展。

不难看出，DeepSeekAI团队宣布的是真正意义上“彻底开源”，显然，在AI技术及应用方面，美国不仅卡不住中国，而且还要面对“DeepSeek冲击”的V2.0版。目前阶段，美国只有在算力卡方面对中国还有所限制，但中国也在稀有金属、硬质材料、光刻机重要零部件等方面卡美国人的脖子。美国对此感到极度痛苦，急于扭转败局。所以，在乌克兰的矿产资源中，如果真的包括稀土矿产，美国某种意义上说永动机对俄罗斯“寻求合作”，比如，以“乌克兰的稀土资源”为切入点进行合作，以打破所谓的“中国封锁”（中国对美国在稀土制品的制裁后，美国军工体系的生产受到巨大影响，包括美国的芯片制造，比如，镝元素），而对俄罗斯来说，恐怕也有意和美国“寻求合作”，充当全球继中国之外的“第二大稀材料土供应商”，这显然符合俄罗斯以“世界主要大宗商品供应商”身份成为世界一级的既定全球战略。

此外，俄美的另一个可能的合作点可在格陵兰岛，比如，用美国将乌克兰“典当”给俄罗斯，以换取俄罗斯在格陵兰岛“并入”美国的问题上的默许和支持。而美俄之间这种可能的“合作前景”或“合作意向”也相对容易得到欧、日、韩等西方国家的支持。

如果俄美基于利益层面，比如，经济利益层面达成某种程度上的合作，作为经济“外延”的“政治”的具体形式恐怕就没有那么重要了。再加上俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”始终根深蒂固，俄美在非传统安全层面（也包括美俄在遏制中东能源输欧问题上可能形成的合作）的“彼此靠近”，值得国际社会保持警惕。在我们看来，这种可能性如果变为现实并被顺利推进，乌克兰出现亲俄政权也是有可能的，甚至出现“新北约”替代“旧北约”的可能性。也就是以美俄联盟为基础建立的“北冰洋公约组织”替代以美欧联盟为基础建立的“北大西洋公约组织”。

●代言西方资本利益的美国资本利益与俄罗斯利益并不容易找到长远且广泛的合作方向

2月21日，乌兹别克斯坦外交部长赛义多夫21日与美国国务卿鲁比奥通电话，双方就双边和多边合作等议题进行了交流。

乌兹别克斯坦在东方时事解读一直以来从来是很特殊的一个国家，显然中亚国家闻到了中俄之间的距离再度拉开的味道。尽管俄罗斯受骗于西方多次，但基于阿富汗政策小九九和美国的衰弱，三年战争，无论是俄罗斯和美国都回不到原来的状态和实力了，他们更弱了，但中国强大的太多了，此消彼长，让他们感到恐惧。尤其俄罗斯在经济上极度依赖中国，俄罗斯还是本能地和中国拉开了距离。甚至在我们看来，中吉乌铁路再度出现反复的可能性也是有可能。如果真的出现了类似情况，其中大概率是俄罗斯在起主要作用。值得一提的是，这条“绕过俄罗斯的铁路”首先牵着的就是经济利益，而且这里的“乌”恰恰就是乌兹别克斯坦。

此外，在非传统安全层面俄罗斯和美国之间可能的合作还要观察，以稀土为例，第一，观察俄罗斯、美国是否有加工提炼稀土矿产的技术和能力。中国目前在稀土制品加工的问题上，不仅提供提炼后的稀土原材料，也制造含有稀土元素的重要工业零部件。要知道，这个世界上并不乏富有稀土的国家和地区；第二，观察乌克兰到底有没有稀土资源。值得大家注意的是，即便乌克兰没有稀土资源，格陵兰岛一定有。所以，格陵兰岛可以成为俄美可能结盟的一个重要切入点，无论在传统安全层面还是非传统安全层面。

需要补充的是，乌克兰重建问题对俄罗斯和美国都有巨大经济利好前景。但俄罗斯和美国对于如何将此巨大经济利好前景转化为具体的利益则截然不同。俄罗斯需要切实的重建工作，但美国则会首先将项目用于金融炒作。当然，也可以从俄罗斯这边抢回一些市场份额。

对特朗普来说，最急的就是内斗，现在做的一切都是为了内斗，所以美国这样对俄罗斯低头就是迫不得已。美国找俄罗斯谈，就失去了优势。对美国来说，急于和俄罗斯缓和也是因为其暂时无法和中国缓和。此外俄罗斯也要清楚，俄罗斯今天的处境第一是因为中国的策应，第二是俄罗斯付出了巨大代价。特朗普也知道，就算将乌克兰给你，你短期也消化不了，但美国可以立刻去金融炒作。

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Saturday, February 22, 2025, Issue No. 1186

The United States and Russia, which find it difficult to build strategic mutual trust on the traditional security level, have the soil for "drawing closer to each other" on the non-traditional security level.

[Media Coverage]

On February 22, scholars were asked, "Should China be concerned as the U.S. and Russia draw closer?" They responded that there are currently no signs indicating that U.S.-Russia relations can revert to a state where "Moscow might distance itself from Beijing." They explained that Russia has lost trust in Western societies, and over the years, China-Russia relations have become deeply intertwined and are unlikely to fracture. Both nations share common strategic goals and have exceptionally close economic ties.

【Discussion Summary】

● Today, without meeting China's conditions, it will not be easy for U.S. President Trump to secure a "ticket to Beijing."

The Trump administration, driven by internal conflicts, needs external support. This is becoming increasingly clear and is part of the "secure the homeland first" policy we have repeatedly mentioned. Additionally, the Trump administration has another primary intention: to dismantle Sino-Russian strategic mutual trust while vigorously pursuing the "secure the homeland first" policy.

On February 21, a U.S. media analysis suggested that Trump's sudden "charm offensive" toward Russian President Putin is driven by a strategic intent to drive a wedge between China and Russia, creating fissures between these two major powers that have long sought to end U.S. dominance in the international order. The media drew parallels with Nixon's shift in U.S. policy toward China during the Cold War, which weakened the Soviet Union's global influence. However, some scholars argue that "times have changed," as the current Sino-Russian relationship is far more robust than the strained Sino-Soviet relations of that era. They believe Trump's attempt to emulate Nixon is unlikely to yield the same results and may instead lead to Western division.

Eastcast was among the first to draw comparisons between Trump's potential visit to Russia and Nixon's visit to China during a discussion on February 14. We provided our listeners with the perspective of analyzing Trump's possible visit to Russia through the lens of Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China.

In February 1972, former U.S. President Nixon visited China amid severely deteriorated Sino-Soviet relations following the 1969 Damansky Island clash. In 1973, the U.S. withdrew its military from Vietnam and recognized Vietnam's independence and sovereignty.

The U.S., having lost the Vietnam War, also faced significant strategic challenges in safely shrinking its military presence. It has been argued that Nixon's 1972 visit to China allowed the U.S. to "rejoin the international community" with China's support, leading to subsequent visits to the Soviet Union in May 1972 and the redrawing of "spheres of influence." China, in turn, broke free from the Yalta system devised by the U.S. and Soviet Union after World War II.

It is important to note that China is not an imperialist power and has its own principles and stance. Today, without meeting China's conditions—such as resolving the Taiwan issue—Trump's efforts to secure a "ticket to Beijing" will not be easy. Furthermore, recent statements by the U.S. State Department regarding the Scarborough Shoal (Panatag Shoal) and Trump's attempts to use the Taiwan and South China Sea issues as leverage for schemes in South Asia reveal the administration's sinister intentions.

● Despite difficulties in building strategic trust on traditional security issues, the U.S. and Russia have common ground in non-traditional security areas, and that ground is mutual interest.

Scholars have noted that Russia has lost trust in Western societies, and Sino-Russian relations have become deeply intertwined over the years, making them difficult to sever. Both nations share strategic goals and deep economic ties.

In our view, these scholars have focused only on the traditional security aspects, such as political relations, while overlooking non-traditional security areas, particularly economic ones, where variables in Sino-Russian relations may exist.

Recently, high-ranking Trump administration officials, including Treasury Secretary Benbenson, Secretary of State Rubio, and Vice President Vance, have been openly critical of Europe and Ukraine. Media reports allege that Secretary Benbenson pressured Ukrainian President Zelenskyy to sign documents, even forbidding him from reviewing them, displaying extreme arrogance. There are rumors that Zelenskyy's personal safety could be at risk if he refuses to comply.

The documents allegedly include, but are not limited to, transferring 50% of Ukraine's mineral rights to the U.S. to repay so-called "debts" worth $35 billion. Ironically, the U.S. is now dropping the phrase "Russian invasion of Ukraine" and even blaming Zelenskyy for starting the Russia-Ukraine war.

In our assessment, Trump's eagerness to align with Russia stems primarily from urgency, particularly the need to quickly alleviate internal contradictions within Western capitalist interests. The Trump administration urgently needs a "high-quality Ukrainian asset package."

However, if the U.S. seeks 50% of Ukraine's mineral rights, the remaining 50% would likely not belong to Ukraine or Europe but possibly to Russia. This could mean that Russia can claim these resources, especially since much of Ukraine's mineral wealth lies in Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine.

It is worth noting that Russia has detailed knowledge of mineral resources in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics, even Mongolia. Whether Ukraine possesses rare earth minerals, for instance, is a question better answered by Russia.

Following the Riyadh meeting between Russian and U.S. officials, Russian President Putin openly suggested considering the possibility of foreign companies reentering the Russian market. Based on this discussion, *East Wind Current Affairs* observes that while the U.S. and Russia face challenges in traditional security areas, they share common ground in non-traditional security areas, primarily economic interests, such as Ukraine's mineral resources and reconstruction efforts.

● Will a "new NATO" replace the "old NATO"?

Before continuing the discussion, let's examine another news report.

On February 21, DeepSeek-R1-Llama-70B, a team focused on general AI research, shared exciting news on social media, marking the start of their participation in #OpenSourceWee (Open Source Week). The team announced that it would open-source five code repositories beginning next week, sharing its research progress transparently with the global developer community.

It is clear that DeepSeek-R1-Llama-70B is pursuing true open-source collaboration, signaling that the U.S. not only cannot hinder China's progress in AI but must also confront a "DeepSeek impact" 2.0. Currently, the U.S. can only restrict China in computing power, but China has its own leverage, such as rare metals, hard materials, and critical components for semiconductor manufacturing. The U.S. is deeply troubled by this and eager to reverse the situation. Therefore, if Ukraine's mineral resources include rare earth elements, the U.S. may seek cooperation with Russia to break China's dominance in rare earth supplies, particularly for elements like neodymium, which are critical for U.S. military and chip production.

Additionally, Russia may collaborate with the U.S. to become the world's second-largest supplier of rare earth materials after China, aligning with its global strategy as a leading supplier of major commodities.

Another potential area of U.S.-Russia cooperation could be Greenland, where the U.S. might offer Ukraine as leverage in exchange for Russian acquiescence or support on issues like Greenland's integration into the U.S. Such cooperation could relatively easily gain support from Western nations like Europe, Japan, and South Korea.

If the U.S. and Russia achieve some level of cooperation based on economic interests, the specific political forms of their collaboration may become less significant. Additionally, Russia's longstanding "Afghan policy tactics" and potential cooperation with the U.S. in non-traditional security areas, such as curbing Middle Eastern energy exports to Europe, warrant international vigilance. In our view, if such cooperation materializes and progresses smoothly, the emergence of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine is possible, or even the replacement of the "old NATO" with a "new NATO," such as a "North Pacific Convention" led by a U.S.-Russia alliance instead of the "North Atlantic Treaty Organization" led by U.S.-Europe.

● Western capitalist interests represented by the U.S. and Russian interests do not easily find long-term and broad cooperation directions.

On February 21, Uzbekistan's Foreign Minister Soidov held a phone call with U.S. Secretary of State Rubio to discuss bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Uzbekistan has always been a unique case in Eastcast analysis. Clearly, Central Asian nations sense that the distance between China and Russia is widening again. Despite Russia being deceived by the West multiple times, due to its "Afghan policy tactics" and U.S. decline, both Russia and the U.S. have weakened after three years of war. China, on the other hand, has grown significantly stronger, causing fear among both nations. Especially for Russia, which is heavily economically dependent on China, there is an instinctive desire to distance itself from China. In our view, the repeated delays in the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project could resurface, likely with Russian involvement. Notably, this "bypass Russia" railway project is economically motivated, and the "U" in question is Uzbekistan.

Furthermore, potential U.S.-Russia cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as rare earth processing, requires observation. First, we must assess whether Russia and the U.S. have the technology and capability to process rare earth minerals. Currently, China not only supplies refined rare earth materials but also manufactures industrial components containing rare earth elements. It is worth noting that while many countries and regions are rich in rare earth minerals, few have the processing capabilities of China. Second, we must verify whether Ukraine actually possesses rare earth resources. Even if Ukraine lacks them, Greenland certainly does. Thus, Greenland could become a critical point of potential U.S.-Russia alliance, both in traditional and non-traditional security areas.

Additionally, Ukraine's reconstruction offers significant economic prospects for both Russia and the U.S. However, their approaches to translating these prospects into concrete benefits differ. Russia would focus on actual reconstruction, while the U.S. would prioritize financial speculation, though it could also reclaim some market share.

For Trump, the urgency lies in internal conflicts. Everything he is doing now is to address these conflicts, making U.S. concessions to Russia unavoidable. The U.S. loses its advantage when it seeks negotiations with Russia. For Russia, it is clear that its current position is due to Chinese support and the immense sacrifices it has made. Trump also understands that even if he hands over Ukraine to Russia, it will take time for Russia to absorb it, but the U.S. can immediately leverage it for financial speculation.

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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