2025年2月13日，星期四，第1178期

10年过去了，乌克兰利益与叙利亚利益置换这个问题，早已是“曾经沧海难为水，除却巫山不是云”

【媒体报道】

2月13日，美国总统特朗普称他认为乌克兰有可能实现停火，但他听他的俄罗斯同事弗拉基米尔·普京说，需要永久解决问题。

2月13日，据美国媒体援引熟悉情报报告的官员的话报道，美国情报部门警告称，以色列可能在2025年打击伊朗的核设施。

【讨论纪要】

●代言西方资本利益的美国资本利益内部，尽管矛盾在尖锐，分裂在加剧，但不同利益集团之间也在尝试新的排列组合

2月12日，刚刚经历特朗普政府“大清洗”的美国情报机构称，以色列可能在未来几个月对伊朗的核项目发动先发制人打击。美媒称，这可能将使德黑兰的核进展延迟数周甚至数月，加剧整个中东地区的紧张局势。

从拜登政府末期到特朗普政府初期的多份情报报告中都包含对以色列可能发动打击的内容，但最全面的是参谋长联席会议情报局和国防情报局在2025年1月初的一份报告。报告称，以色列可能会在2025年上半年打击伊朗的福尔道和纳坦兹核设施。了解这份情报的几名现任和前任美国官员告诉媒体称，这一发现来自对以色列去年10月底轰炸伊朗后的计划分析，那次轰炸削弱了伊朗的防空能力，让德黑兰暴露在后续袭击的危险中。

对“特朗普们”来说，拉“外援”只是手段，目的则在于“内政”。这是特朗普政府不遗余力拉拢内塔尼亚胡小集团，并将其首先服务于“内斗”的又一例证。

内塔尼亚胡小集团奉行极端犹太复国主义，且在美国内部，获得意识形态相同或相近的所谓“犹太资本”的支持。尽管我们很少使用“犹太资本”这个词，并将他们看作是西方资本利益中的一部分（传统意义上的“犹太资本”早已融合在西方资本利益中，而今天的“犹太人”不过是一个“标签”），但在特朗普眼中，却是对其巩固政权极其重要的所谓“关键少数”。讨好内塔尼亚胡小集团就是讨好这些所谓“关键少数”。

这些所谓“犹太资本”，大多掌握美国媒体，在美国内部有举足轻重的作用，这也是特朗普不遗余力拉拢他们，以及他们可以被称作“关键少数”的主要原因。

在我们的观察与评估中，在美国“内斗”不断深入和复杂化的背景下，在国际局势的外在影响下，随着特朗普进一步向内塔尼亚胡小集团提供“帮助”，不排除有一天，在美国“内斗”的关键时刻，这些所谓“犹太资本”会明确站队“特朗普们”。其中，甚至不排除包括“拜登们”之“索罗斯们”的可能性。这也意味着，代言西方资本利益的美国资本利益内部，尽管矛盾在尖锐，分裂在加剧，但不同利益集团之间也在尝试新的排列组合。

现阶段，“特朗普们”大杀四方是在对外，尤其是对内没有占据主动的具体表现。如果有一天“特朗普们”开始稳扎稳打，则说明“特朗普们”首先在争取到有利“外援”的情况下，获取更有利的“内政”局面。也就是说，如果我们将2025年1月20日，特朗普顺利上位称作“部分占优”的话，那么“在争取到有利‘外援’的情况下，获取更有利的‘内政’局面”就可以称之为“全面占优”。而能够获得这一“特朗普们”梦寐以求局面的“钥匙”就在“金融游戏”上，只要能赚取足够多的利润，“对手”也可以变为“帮手”。

对内塔尼亚胡小集团来说，巩固政权依然是其重中之重，所以，在特朗普政府竭尽全力拉拢内塔尼亚胡小集团的问题上，没有什么比支持其获得梦寐以求的“大胜中的大胜”（在特朗普所谓“加沙是一个巨大的房地产项目”的“承诺”中，不仅包括派遣美军进驻加沙地带、对外的外交协调，更有加沙地带重建项目及相关的融资计划）更为合适的手段了，关键就在于如何死死压住伊朗，而在这一问题上，没有什么比核讹诈更合适的手段了。值得一提的是，就在10天前的2月4日，特朗普还表示称，愿意会见伊朗领导人，而今天，却已经摇晃着核大棒对伊朗极尽恐吓之能事了。特朗普嬗变这一特点，在对伊朗态度的“快速切换”中展现得淋漓尽致。

●对“特朗普们”来说，愈发危及的美国“内斗”意味着必须尽快争取更多的内部支持

上一节我们讨论的重点仍在于美国“内斗”话题，对特朗普政府如何看待“外援”和“内政”两者之间的关系加以阐述，以及初步评估美国“内斗”未来的可能走向，以及特朗普政府是否有机会在残酷的“内斗”中赢得主动。

在我们的观察与评估中，美国“内斗”只有更激烈，没有最激烈，甚至用“危及”形容美国的内政问题也一点不为过。其中一个非常典型的案例就是马斯克第17次修改遗嘱，而且基于类似“核捆绑”理念对方方面面，包括所谓的“盟友”以及“敌人”在内发出强烈警告。警告信号很明白，所谓“核捆绑”理念，简单理解就是“无论谁打我，我就打全世界”。也就是说，无论是“他”“她”还是“它”，无论是谁所为，只要马斯克遭遇不测（用他自己的话说就是，72小时内失联），马斯克所掌握的“一切秘密”都将公之于众，无论“敌”还是“友”。

在这种情况下，我们甚至不排除当前阶段“马斯克们”的死对头，如，“盖茨们”或“盖茨们”中的一部分，在美国“内斗”的某一关键时刻“挺身而出”，对前者大加保护的可能性。而对“特朗普们”来说，这种可能意味着必须尽快争取更多内部支持，比如，第一节中提到的，特朗普眼中“关键少数”的所谓“犹太资本”们的高额支持。

如果将这个问题投射到美国对外政策上，具体就落在伊朗不能坏了内塔尼亚胡小集团的“好事儿”上（不得阻止内塔尼亚胡小集团获得“大胜中的大胜”上）。特朗普深知，尽管伊朗当局的对外政策仍然运行在“投降主义”上，但随着国际局势的变化，尤其是乌克兰、中东局势的变化，伊朗为“实质性重返叙利亚”，恢复此前的国际声望，是有可能在巴以问题上重归“强硬路线”的。

●尽管“南亚破局”进程这一形式本身已被“暂时冻结”，但其本质，对于美国（西方）而言却从未改变

除了通过拉拢内塔尼亚胡小集团进而尽量争取美国内部“关键少数”所谓“犹太资本”势力的支持外，在当前国际局势的主要战略方向：中东、乌克兰和西太方向，在以色列之上，如何在对华、对欧、对欧关系上谋取“最大公约数”同样非常重要，尤其是对华关系，可以说是特朗普政府有机会“理顺”内政，稳定外政之“基础的基础”。也就是说，如何妥善处理中美关系，仍处于特朗普政府对外政策中最重要的位置。

2月12日，美国总统特朗普先后与俄罗斯总统普京和乌克兰总统泽连斯基通电话。特朗普当天在社交媒体上发文说，美俄双方同意就结束俄乌冲突进行“紧密合作”，并派遣各自团队“立即开始谈判”。

值得一提的是，乌克兰问题在“中东时间陷阱”外溢到乌克兰之前，就已经是俄罗斯和西方关系之中的一个死结。尤其在2014年2月，亲俄的亚努科维奇政权被西方推翻后，西方与俄罗斯之间在乌克兰问题上的争斗达到了一个顶峰。

从2014年2月到2025年2月，11年过去了，然而，在乌克兰利益置换叙利亚利益的问题上，却早已是“曾经沧海难为水，除却巫山不是云”。

西方一开始企图通过对俄罗斯在叙利亚利益的承认、让渡乌克兰利益，停止北约东扩以换取俄罗斯在“南亚破局”进程上的配合。需要强调的是，“南亚破局”进程是西方瞄着俄罗斯始终不肯实质性放弃的“阿富汗问题小九九”，企图实质性瓦解中俄战略互信的战略计划。后经“两机事件”，俄罗斯的叙利亚政策（中东政策）几乎被西方吃得毛干爪净。而到了2024年12月，俄罗斯在叙利亚的影响力则被彻底清零。

尽管俄罗斯早已经不再是十几年前人们眼中的俄罗斯，但经过将近3年俄乌战争后的北约也不再是人们原来认识中的北约。在我们看来，今天，特朗普与普京通电话，尽管话题起于乌克兰问题，但也许双方谈的却都不在乌克兰问题上。对俄罗斯来说，也许和美国谈的是如何有效重返叙利亚的问题。对美国来说，恐怕谈的则是“南亚破局”进程。“南亚破局”在2021年8月美军撤离阿富汗后被“暂时冻结”。

值得一提的是，美国（拜登政府）当年撤离阿富汗，企图通过这一战略动作引诱中俄争夺阿富汗。后调整为战略诱骗俄罗斯提供“莫斯科通道”远程影响阿富汗继续推动“南亚破局”进程，甚至在乌克兰问题上对俄罗斯反复威、逼、利、诱。由于中国始终手中捏着“若俄罗斯敢牺牲中国核心利益和西方媾和，随时将俄罗斯送上被西方实质性消化之快车道”这张牌，俄罗斯始终不敢轻举妄动，结果最终酿成俄乌战争的爆发，且持续至今。

●特朗普欲寻求对华、对欧、对俄关系之“最大公约数”的过程中，或已为俄罗斯设下致命陷阱

在美国看来，俄罗斯目前的处境很困难，俄罗斯现在最担心的除了北约继续东扩之外，中国从俄乌战争中获利更大也是要点，甚至后者在俄罗斯眼中的威胁已超过前者。这是俄罗斯有意和美国缓和关系的一个重要基础，这也是特朗普重提“南亚破局”的基本逻辑。至少在特朗普眼中，将目前仍处于“暂时冻结”状态的“南亚破局”进程“解冻”是完全有可能的。

当然，原则是不到万不得已，不触碰中国的红线。毕竟，目前特朗普对外政策的所有调整首先服务于内政问题，且总体上与中国缓和关系是特朗普能够相对顺利地进行“内外兼修”的重要基础。

但是，在我们看来，这对俄罗斯而言，则存在一个巨大的陷阱，那就是诱骗俄罗斯最大限度接触红线，且在关键时刻一把把俄罗斯推到中国的红线之上，之后，特朗普政府在鬼话关系上会立刻从“上一秒谋求南亚破局”调整为“下一秒就和好对华关系”并全力推动对俄罗斯的实质性消化进程。

再次强调，对中国来说，俄罗斯是死是活并不是根本关心的问题，根本在于绝不坐视西方顺利完成对俄罗斯的实质性消化。值得一提的是，如果俄罗斯敢于损害中国核心利益与西方媾和，在其选择“半渡”后，中国也会采取相应措施。所谓“相应措施”当然包括经“动态评估”判断局势“不可逆”后进行“半渡而击”，而在这个前提下，不与第三方交易俄罗斯之核心利益的前提恐怕就不存在了。

美国对俄罗斯拿出了胡萝卜，比如，美国防长说恢复乌克兰2014年前边界“不现实”；美国国防部长排除乌克兰加入北约可能性等，但大棒也有，这几天扎波罗热核电站可谓非常热闹。对特朗普政府而言，当然要提防俄罗斯在中美之间两边讨要好处。特朗普最希望看到的，当然是上文中提到的“解冻”南亚破局进程，比如，在俄罗斯总统普京2024年5月访华过程中签署的《中俄共同声明》中就阿富汗问题说过的观点。值得一提的是，这一态度俄方始终停留在口头上，始终没有落实。

也就是说，国际社会需密切关注俄方是否在“美军侵略占领阿富汗20年”等说法上出现反复（此前普京称，美军在阿富汗的存在是“反恐”，且与俄罗斯长期国家利益不冲突。当然，这是“阿富汗政策小九九”的一面，另一面是借中国之力抗衡西方在中亚，欧洲，乃至全世界的打压）。对此，中国当然会给俄罗斯颜色看，但总体上也会继续放在瓮城效应看。俄罗斯是否再拿阿富汗说事儿当然这不是唯一观察指标。

最后需要补充的是，美国内部火并的两拨人，稍有不慎是可能出人命的，比如，马斯克、比尔·盖茨等，一旦如此，局面很难收拾。所以，某种意义上说，马斯克的遗嘱是警告双方：都不要动手，一旦有事便是天下大乱。所以，不要出现“意外”，谁都不能出事！而对世界而言，如果美国内部因“内斗”到一定程度引发“内爆”，必然对全球经济，尤其是金融造成巨大冲击。

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声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Thursday, February 13, 2025, Issue No. 1178

Ten years have passed, and the idea of trading Ukrainian interests for Syrian interests is now "like water that has flowed into the vast sea, it can hardly return; like clouds that have drifted beyond Wu Mountain, they are no longer the same."

[Media Coverage]

On February 13th, U.S. President Trump stated that he believed a ceasefire in Ukraine was possible, but he heard from his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin that a permanent solution was needed.

On February 13th, U.S. media, citing officials familiar with intelligence reports, reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had warned that Israel might strike Iran's nuclear facilities in 2025.

【Discussion Summary】

●Within the U.S. capital interests that represent Western capital interests, despite sharpening contradictions and intensifying divisions, different interest groups are also attempting new configurations.

On February 12th, U.S. intelligence agencies, which had just undergone a "purge" under the Trump administration, stated that Israel might launch a preemptive strike against Iran's nuclear program in the coming months. U.S. media reported that this could delay Tehran's nuclear progress by weeks or even months, exacerbating tensions throughout the Middle East.

Multiple intelligence reports from the end of the Biden administration to the early days of the Trump administration contained content about possible Israeli strikes, but the most comprehensive was a report from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Intelligence Directorate and the Defense Intelligence Agency in early January 2025. The report stated that Israel might strike Iran's Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities in the first half of 2025. Several current and former U.S. officials familiar with the intelligence told the media that this finding was based on an analysis of Israel's plans after its bombing of Iran in late October last year, which weakened Iran's air defense capabilities and exposed Tehran to the risk of subsequent attacks.

For the "Trumps," seeking "external support" is just a means to an end, with the goal being "domestic politics." This is another example of the Trump administration sparing no effort to court the Netanyahu faction and prioritize it for "internal strife."

The Netanyahu faction adheres to extreme Zionism and is supported within the United States by the so-called "Jewish capital" with ideologically similar or aligned interests. Although we rarely use the term "Jewish capital" and consider them part of Western capital interests (traditional "Jewish capital" has long been integrated into Western capital interests, and today's "Jews" are merely a "label"), in Trump's eyes, they are a crucial "critical minority" for consolidating his power. Appeasing the Netanyahu faction is appeasing these so-called "critical minorities."

Most of this so-called "Jewish capital" controls U.S. media and plays a pivotal role within the United States, which is why Trump spares no effort to court them and why they can be called a "critical minority."

In our observations and assessments, against the backdrop of the deepening and complicating "internal strife" within the United States, and under the external influence of the international situation, as Trump continues to provide "assistance" to the Netanyahu faction, it cannot be ruled out that one day, at a critical juncture of the U.S. "internal strife," these so-called "Jewish capitalists" will explicitly take sides with "the Trumps." Among them, there is even the possibility of including the "Soroses" of the "Bidens." This also means that within the U.S. capital interests that represent Western capital interests, despite sharpening contradictions and intensifying divisions, different interest groups are also attempting new configurations.

At this stage, the "Trumps" are aggressively attacking all sides as a specific manifestation of not having the initiative domestically, especially internally. If one day the "Trumps" start playing it safe, it means that they have first secured favorable "external support" and are now seeking a more advantageous "domestic political" situation. In other words, if we refer to Trump's smooth ascension to power on January 20, 2025, as a "partial advantage," then "securing favorable 'external support' and achieving a more advantageous 'domestic political' situation" can be called a "comprehensive advantage." The "key" to achieving this "comprehensive advantage" that the "Trumps" long for lies in the "financial game." As long as they can earn enough profits, "opponents" can become "helpers."

For the Netanyahu faction, consolidating power remains their top priority. Therefore, in the Trump administration's all-out efforts to court the Netanyahu faction, nothing is more appropriate than supporting them in achieving their dreamed-of "victory within a greater victory" (in Trump's so-called "Gaza is a huge real estate project" "promise," it not only includes sending U.S. troops to Gaza, diplomatic coordination externally, but also reconstruction projects in the Gaza Strip and related financing plans). The key lies in how to firmly suppress Iran, and on this issue, nothing is more appropriate than nuclear blackmail. It's worth mentioning that just 10 days ago, on February 4th, Trump also expressed his willingness to meet with Iranian leaders, but today, he is already waving the nuclear stick and threatening Iran with all his might. Trump's characteristic of being fickle is fully demonstrated in his "rapid switching" of attitudes towards Iran.

● For "the Trumps," the increasingly perilous "internal strife" in the U.S. signifies the urgent need to garner more internal support.

In the previous section, our discussion centered on the topic of "internal strife" in the U.S., elaborating on how the Trump administration views the relationship between "external aid" and "internal politics," and providing a preliminary assessment of the possible future trajectory of U.S. "internal strife," as well as whether the Trump administration has a chance to seize the initiative in the brutal "internal strife."

In our observations and assessments, the "internal strife" in the U.S. is only getting more intense, with no sign of peaking, and it is not an exaggeration to describe the domestic political issues as "perilous." A very typical example is Musk's 17th revision of his will, which, based on a concept similar to "nuclear binding," sends strong warnings to all parties, including so-called "allies" and "enemies." The warning is clear: the concept of "nuclear binding" can be simply understood as "whoever attacks me, I will attack the world." That is, regardless of whether it's "he," "she," or "it," whoever is responsible, if Musk encounters misfortune (in his own words, if he goes missing within 72 hours), all the "secrets" he possesses will be made public, regardless of whether they are "enemies" or "friends."

In this situation, we cannot even rule out the possibility that the sworn enemies of "the Musks," such as "the Gateses" or a portion of "the Gateses," may "step forward" at a critical moment in the U.S. "internal strife" to provide significant protection to the former. For "the Trumps," this possibility means that they must quickly seek more internal support, such as the high-level support from the so-called "Jewish capital" that Trump considers a "critical minority," as mentioned in the first section.

If we project this issue onto U.S. foreign policy, it specifically falls on the fact that Iran must not spoil the "good things" of the Netanyahu faction (must not prevent the Netanyahu faction from achieving a "big victory within a big victory"). Trump is well aware that although Iran's foreign policy is still geared towards "appeasement," with changes in the international situation, especially in Ukraine and the Middle East, Iran may return to a "hardline stance" on the Israeli-Palestinian issue in order to "substantially return to Syria" and restore its previous international prestige.

● Although the process of "breaking the deadlock in South Asia" has been "temporarily frozen" in form, its essence remains unchanged for the U.S. (the West).

In addition to trying to win the support of the so-called "Jewish capital" faction, a "critical minority" within the U.S., by courting the Netanyahu faction, it is also very important to seek the "greatest common divisor" in relations with China, Europe, and others, especially in relations with China, in the main strategic directions of the current international situation: the Middle East, Ukraine, and the Western Pacific, as well as in relations with Israel. In particular, how to properly handle Sino-U.S. relations remains the most important position in the Trump administration's foreign policy.

On February 12th, U.S. President Trump spoke by phone with Russian President Putin and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy. Trump posted on social media that day, stating that the U.S. and Russia agreed to "work closely together" to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict and to send their respective teams to "immediately begin negotiations."

It is worth mentioning that the Ukraine issue was already a sticking point in relations between Russia and the West before the "Middle East time trap" spilled over into Ukraine. Especially after the pro-Russian Yanukovych regime was overthrown by the West in February 2014, the struggle between the West and Russia over the Ukraine issue reached a peak.

From February 2014 to February 2025, 11 years have passed, and yet, on the issue of trading Ukrainian interests for Syrian interests, it has already become "once one has tasted the vastness of the sea, other waters seem but paltry; having seen the clouds over Wu Mountain, other clouds appear insignificant."

The West initially attempted to obtain Russia's cooperation in the process of "breaking the deadlock in South Asia" by recognizing Russia's interests in Syria, ceding Ukrainian interests, and halting NATO's eastward expansion. It should be emphasized that the process of "breaking the deadlock in South Asia" is a strategic plan aimed at substantially eroding Sino-Russian strategic trust, which the West has been eyeing and refuses to substantially abandon, namely the "Afghan issue gimmick." Following the "two plane incidents," Russia's Syria policy (Middle East policy) was almost completely devoured by the West. And by December 2024, Russia's influence in Syria was completely wiped out.

Although Russia is no longer the Russia that people saw a decade or so ago, NATO, after nearly three years of the Russia-Ukraine war, is also no longer the NATO that people used to know. In our view, today, when Trump talks to Putin, although the conversation starts with the Ukraine issue, perhaps neither side is really talking about the Ukraine issue. For Russia, it may be discussing how to effectively return to Syria with the U.S. For the U.S., it may be discussing the process of "breaking the deadlock in South Asia," which was "temporarily frozen" after the U.S. (Biden administration) withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021.

It is worth mentioning that when the U.S. (Biden administration) withdrew from Afghanistan, it attempted to lure China and Russia into competing for Afghanistan through this strategic move. Later, it adjusted to strategically deceiving Russia into providing a "Moscow corridor" to remotely influence Afghanistan and continue to push forward the process of "breaking the deadlock in South Asia," and even repeatedly threatened, coerced, enticed, and induced Russia on the Ukraine issue. As China always held the card of "if Russia dares to sacrifice China's core interests to make peace with the West, it will immediately put Russia on the fast track to being substantially digested by the West," Russia never dared to make any rash moves, which ultimately led to the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, which continues to this day.

●Trump May Have Set a Fatal Trap for Russia in Seeking the "Greatest Common Divisor" in Relations with China, Europe, and Russia

From the American perspective, Russia is currently in a difficult situation. Apart from the continued eastward expansion of NATO, Russia is also greatly concerned that China stands to benefit more from the Russia-Ukraine war, a threat that Russia perceives as even greater than the former. This forms an important basis for Russia's intention to ease relations with the United States, and it is also the fundamental logic behind Trump's revival of the "South Asian Breakthrough" strategy. At least in Trump's view, it is entirely possible to "unfreeze" the currently "temporarily frozen" process of the "South Asian Breakthrough."

Of course, the principle is not to cross China's red lines unless absolutely necessary. After all, all adjustments to Trump's foreign policy primarily serve his domestic political agenda, and an overall rapprochement with China is a crucial foundation for Trump to relatively smoothly pursue both domestic and foreign policies.

However, in our view, this poses a significant trap for Russia, namely luring Russia to approach the red line to the maximum extent and, at a critical moment, pushing Russia over China's red line. Afterward, the Trump administration would immediately shift its focus in Sino-American relations from "seeking a South Asian breakthrough one moment" to "mending relations with China the next" and fully pursue the substantive digestion of Russia.

It bears repeating that for China, Russia's fate is not a fundamental concern. The essence lies in never allowing the West to successfully complete the substantive digestion of Russia. It is worth noting that if Russia dares to harm China's core interests to make peace with the West, after it chooses to "cross halfway," China will also take corresponding measures. The so-called "corresponding measures" certainly include a "halfway attack" after a "dynamic assessment" judges the situation to be "irreversible." Under this premise, the premise of not negotiating Russia's core interests with third parties may no longer exist.

The United States has offered carrots to Russia, such as the U.S. Secretary of Defense stating that restoring Ukraine's pre-2014 borders is "unrealistic" and excluding the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO. However, there are also sticks, as evidenced by the recent commotion at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. For the Trump administration, it is essential to guard against Russia seeking benefits from both China and the United States. What Trump hopes to see most is, of course, the "unfreezing" of the South Asian Breakthrough process mentioned above, such as the views on Afghanistan expressed in the "Joint Declaration of China and Russia" signed during Russian President Putin's visit to China in May 2024. It is worth noting that Russia has only paid lip service to this attitude and has not implemented it.

That is to say, the international community needs to closely monitor whether Russia reverses its stance on issues such as "the U.S. military's 20-year occupation of Afghanistan" (previously, Putin stated that the U.S. military's presence in Afghanistan was for "counterterrorism" and did not conflict with Russia's long-term national interests. Of course, this is one side of the "Afghanistan policy calculus"; the other side is leveraging China's strength to counter Western pressure in Central Asia, Europe, and even the world). In response, China will certainly show Russia its displeasure, but will generally continue to observe the situation from the perspective of the "bottleneck effect." Whether Russia raises the Afghanistan issue again is not the only indicator to observe.

Lastly, it should be added that the two factions within the United States are engaged in a fierce internal struggle, and a slight misstep could lead to fatal consequences, as seen with figures like Musk and Bill Gates. If such an event occurs, the situation could become uncontrollable. Therefore, in a sense, Musk's will can be seen as a warning to both sides: do not resort to violence, as it could lead to chaos. So, no "accidents" should occur, and no one should be harmed! For the world, if internal conflicts within the United States escalate to a certain point and trigger an "implosion," it will inevitably have a huge impact on the global economy, especially finance.

[Related Topics]

Issue 7789 - Will Musk, Who is "Charging Ahead" for Trump, End Up Like Zhu Fuyi in Ancient China's Han Dynasty? (February 10, 2025)
Issue 7792 - AI Diplomacy (1): China Builds a "Second Option" for the World in AI (February 11, 2025)
Issue 7797 - Musk Amends His Will for the 17th Time, Setting Measures Such as "Releasing Starlink Source Code if Missing for 72 Hours" - Whom is He Issuing a Strong Warning To? (February 12, 2025)

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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