2025年1月27日，星期一，第1169期

种种迹象表明，特朗普政府的外交极可能完全服务于“美国内政”

【媒体报道】

1月26日，伊朗伊斯兰共和国外交部长阿巴斯·阿拉格奇已经率领一个代表团抵达阿富汗进行正式访问。

1月26日，白俄罗斯总统卢卡申科表示，白俄罗斯永远不会奉行反华政策，美国收买不了明斯克。

【讨论纪要】

●至少在目前阶段，俄罗斯暂无意配合并提供“莫斯科通道”

如果说特朗普政府在拜登政府阿富汗政策失败的基础上也在总结经验的话，那么他们吸取的唯一经验就是“不吸取任何教训”，至少在战略层面是这样的。透过美国国务卿卢比奥近期关于阿富汗问题的言论（威胁要巨额悬赏捉拿阿塔领导层）观察，特朗普政府似乎有意以阿富汗问题为“行棋步调”并在揣摩着什么。对此，方方面面都有注意，比如，俄罗斯，伊朗。

1月26日，我们注意到，白俄罗斯总统卢卡申科表示，白俄罗斯永远不会奉行反华政策，美国收买不了明斯克。

值得注意的是，卢卡申科围绕白俄罗斯总统选举一事说出上述这番言论的。在我们的观察与评估中，首先，意味着俄罗斯，至少在当前阶段，不打算向西方像伊朗那样投降，或者说，暂时不会出现伊朗在对外政策上如此剧烈的摇摆；其次，尽管美国务卿鲁比奥在美国调整阿富汗政策的问题上将“重点工作对象”选择在俄罗斯身上，但至少在目前阶段，俄罗斯暂无意配合并提供“莫斯科通道”；最后，白俄罗斯总统卢卡申科至少在目前为止，仍将自己和白俄罗斯国家的命运和中国绑在一起；

●尽管特朗普瞄着阿富汗问题做文章，有类似下围棋“脱先”的意思，在阿富汗方向“落子”，但也是瞅准才下的

上一节讨论，我们提到了对外政策出现剧烈摇摆的伊朗。我们注意到，阿富汗媒体对伊朗外长阿拉格齐首访阿富汗的相关报道——此次访问正值边界争端、伊朗所谓的“赫尔曼德河水权”分歧、阿富汗毒品走私以及阿富汗人向邻国大规模移民的影响等问题引发紧张局势之际。

2023年5月，阿富汗与伊朗就赫尔曼德河水权问题再次爆发争端。随着旱季临近，2月和4月，位于赫尔曼德河下游盆地的伊朗锡斯坦地区民众分别在扎博勒和哈蒙湖抗议游行，要求伊朗政府向阿富汗索要水权。作为回应，时任伊朗总统莱希在5月18日走访锡斯坦—俾路支斯坦省时公开警告阿富汗临时政府立即履行两国之间的水协议。

在上面的伊朗外长访问阿富汗事件的背景中，大家不难发现一个近期我们多次提及的名词——“锡斯坦—俾路支斯坦省”。

在进一步展开讨论前，我们不妨回顾“衍射+东方讨论核心摘要，12月20日【第2024-1136期】”中的一段内容，摘要如下：

●“俄罗斯是否全面从叙撤军”及“伊朗是否实质性参与南亚反恐”是观察两国战略决策走向的绝佳窗口

让我们把讨论焦点带回到中巴“勇士-8”联合反恐演上，对伊朗来说，由于活跃在俾路支省的武装组织大多有穆斯林什叶派的宗教背景，所以，伊朗是否实质性参与其中，代表伊朗在基于宗教层面之“野望”，也就是“大波斯主义”上的态度变化。而“大波斯主义”某种意义上说和俄罗斯至今死抱着不放的“阿富汗政策小九九”是一类东西。

不难想象的是，如果伊朗能够参与伊朗、巴基斯坦和阿富汗三国交界的俾路支地区的联合反恐，维护地区稳定，那么阿富汗很可能在中俄的共同推动下也加入其中，这样一来，“巴基斯坦通道”就稳定了，且在这个过程中，俄罗斯是否愿意与中国实质性联手的态度也就随之明晰化了。只要中俄实质性联手，上合被“有效重启”，中亚的稳定就指日可待，伊朗作为国际社会前出中东，将与西方博弈的前线推到叙利亚的“战略支点”作用就被突出出来。而一个由被“有效重启”的上合组织为强力依托（印度不同意可以靠边，中俄可成立“党小组”共同决策），在国际社会的全面策应下，由伊朗和俄罗斯共同防守的叙利亚恐怕没有那么容易被颠覆政权。大家知道，自叙利亚内战爆发以来，叙利亚国内遍布着各式各样的恐怖组织，如果上述情况变为现实，那么中巴“勇士-8”联合反恐演在军事上的成功案例就可以借助政治层面的强力放大变为“大捷”且将这一成功案例拷贝到叙利亚进行反恐。这也是在12月5日的讨论中，我们提出，不排除出现国际社会与西方各自主导的两种“反恐模式”在叙利亚“打擂台”的可能性的逻辑。值得一提的是，叙利亚地形远不如巴基斯坦和阿富汗复杂，在这里开展反恐行动是相对容易的，尤其适合无人作战模式。这种军事实力和政治决心组合而成的成功案例，自然也可以哪里需要哪里搬。

值得一提的是，在伊朗始终无意参加中巴“勇士-8”联合反恐演习的同时，俄罗斯在中亚问题上对国际社会也没有交代，这个没有交代主要体现在，俄罗斯总统普京今年5月访华期间，很多双方达成的共识，签订的协议等都没有落地执行。此外，俄罗斯在乌克兰（北约）军事入侵俄罗斯“纯血领土”的库尔斯克地区的问题上，至今没有展开“有效反击”。作为“小号的俄罗斯”，伊朗无论在以色列问题上，还是在叙利亚问题上都说过的“将适时反击”都没有进行，就更别提“有效反击”了。12月19日凌晨，以色列国防军对也门胡塞武装发动猛烈空袭，数十架战机袭击了也门西海岸的胡塞武装目标，并首次袭击也门首都萨那。在我们看来，伊朗已经成为各方耻笑的对象，而以色列更是用炸弹公开嘲笑伊朗决策层的无能和愚蠢。对内塔尼亚胡小集团来说，曾经遥不可及的“大胜”，似乎唾手可得

结合上述回顾，我们想要着重强调几点的是：

第一，“巴基斯坦通道”也称为“南亚通道”。是从中国途径阿富汗、巴基斯坦、伊朗到达中东地区的“战略影响力输送通道”，其中，伊朗起着重要作用；

第二，在“第一”的基础上，所谓“伊朗起着重要作用”的意思在于，伊朗即可以积极响应国际社会的背景下，对“巴基斯坦通道”的稳定，甚至中亚地区的稳定起到积极促进作用；也可以在消极应对国际社会的背景下，将通道向西方“反向提供”，成为西方国家对中亚、南亚地区施加战略影响力的通道，我们姑且将其称作“伊朗通道”；

第三，在“第二”的基础上，在我们的观察与评估中，不排除伊朗本次罕见外长访问阿富汗有为美国“当说客”“插标（‘伊朗通道’）卖首”的可能性；

第四，在“第三”的基础上，如果真是如此，阿富汗可能成为“第二个叙利亚”，情势要比2021年9月美军撤离阿富汗前要乱得多得多，甚至会进一步激发俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”。各方都会打阿富汗的主意，这里会变成另一个“合纵连横”的平台；

第五，在“第四”的基础上，由于阿富汗在中国周边，是中国的邻国（瓦罕走廊），所以，阿富汗问题是中国很难回避的，类似美国无法回避中东问题。这是特朗普政府着手在阿富汗问题上做文章的阴毒之处。尽管在我们看来，特朗普瞄着阿富汗问题做文章，有类似下围棋“脱先”的意思，也就是说，由于以叙利亚问题为代表的中东问题，特朗普政府还没有想好如何“行棋”，于是索性在阿富汗方向“落子”，但也是瞅准才下的。

●尽管阿富汗问题无法回避，但中国未必会选在阿富汗方向加以应对

有的网友也许会问，特朗普政府既然是看准了才下的，中国应如何应对？是不是我们因此在战略上会变得比之以往更加被动？

对中国来说，尽管阿富汗问题无法回避，但中国未必会选在阿富汗方向加以应对。一个方面，中国在应对美国此类挑衅的问题上，会采取类似应对“洞朗事件”的方式，一则，你打你的，我打我的；二则，直接揪住幕后黑手——美国的“衣领子”单练！另一方面，避免出现中国在阿富汗问题上“无私也有私”的局面。

基于以上应对原则，在我们看来，中国的应对可能会在阿富汗方向之外的任何地方，比如，中东、乌克兰、西太方向，甚至以特朗普急于缓和对华关系为切入点进行强力反击。

我们就以中东局势为例，比如，在叙利亚问题上，中国不妨选择支持公开介入叙利亚局势的一方或两方。由于中东地区是美国全球战略的重中之重，无论是原本存在的“中东地方王国家”也好，还是后来介入叙利亚局势的“新贵”也罢，他们任何在叙利亚问题上追逐各自利益诉求的行为本质上都是美国不愿看到的。以已经介入叙利亚局势后续发展且一心想要从中东方向拉一条摆脱美国控制之能源管线的欧盟（“老欧洲”），首先就会将阿富汗问题作为筹码，在叙利亚问题上和特朗普政府讨价还价。

所以，特朗普政府瞄着阿富汗问题玩“脱先”是不成立的。也就是说，以目前美国的“棋力”（绝对实力与相对实力）水平，瞄着阿富汗问题“脱先行棋”，是很难掌握局面的。甚至中国只围绕阿富汗周边国家做文章就可以让阿富汗问题，包括“伊朗通道”，在特朗普政府眼中变成“鸡肋”，甚至“包袱”。一旦美国阿富汗政策被动到一定阶段，恐怕伊朗也会关闭“伊朗通道”。至于伊朗如何关闭，为什么关闭“伊朗通道”，有一种可能性就是，在外部强大压力的作用下，伊朗内部出现“内乱”并导致目前奉行“投降主义”（对西方）对外政策路线的伊朗现政府倒台。

●同样作为“新兴势力”的“特朗普们”感受到了切实的危险

在讨论了中国如何应对之后，再来看看特朗普政府在阿富汗问题上“落子”的真实意图是什么。在我们看来，某种意义上说，在特朗普正式走马上任后，特朗普政府的“工作重点”恐怕并不在外交上，而是在内政上。这与此前我们讨论的，有关特朗普政府看似在“战略扩张”，实际上是在“战略收缩”的观点相吻合。

在继续展开讨论前，我们来看一则新闻报道：

1月25日，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普日前签署行政令，解密美国前总统约翰·F·肯尼迪、他的弟弟罗伯特·F·肯尼迪以及黑人民权运动领袖马丁·路德·金遇刺案的全部剩余档案。

关于美国前总统肯尼迪遇刺案，到现在仍然是个谜。值得一提的是，这个“迷”字似乎“有意留之”，类似“爱泼斯坦意外死亡案件”。我们不妨将美国前总统肯尼迪与现任总统特朗普做一个横向比较，探究一下美国前总统肯尼迪可能的遇刺原因，也就是肯尼迪到底为何遇刺。

在我们的观察与评估中：

第一，肯尼迪遇刺或与越战密切相关。准确地说，或与肯尼迪想要停止越南密切相关。有趣的是，特朗普也公开呼吁俄乌战争停火，至少表面上看是这样的。显然，战争停止，或向停止的方向演化，都是美国军工复合体不愿看到的；

第二，尽管我们常说，以美国前总统尼克松访华为标志，美国开始全面从产业资本主义阶段跃迁至金融资本主义阶段，但在肯尼迪时代，甚至更早，这种跃迁的强烈诉求就已存在。值得一提的是，肯尼迪在位的时候，出于种种原因，其一直想要拿回被“铸币权”，而这显然动了华尔街的奶酪。无独有偶，今天特朗普公开呼吁废除美联储，更是大玩、特玩加密货币；

第三，特朗普和肯尼迪一样，都“挨了一枪”。区别只在于，肯尼迪死了，特朗普还活着。而特朗普之所以没有被打死，恐怕就在于那时候的特朗普还没有正式上台。但似乎警告的意味是相同的；

第四，所谓“警告的意味是相同的”的意思在于，肯尼迪的死显然不是“被暗杀”，而是“被镇压”。或者说，是“杀肯尼迪给‘肯尼迪们’看”。某种意义上说，当时的“肯尼迪们”是一股新兴势力，而今天的“特朗普们”（包括“马斯克们”）也是一股新兴势力，他们要做，或已经在做的事情，不是改良，而是变革，甚至触及革命的范畴。

第五，尽管如此，这些“新兴势力”依然属于西方资本利益范畴，比如，华尔街中的“一部分人”。他们的对手也属于西方资本利益范畴，比如，华尔街中的“另一部分人”。也就是说，所谓“新兴势力”是从原来的旧势力或保守势力中“异化”出来的。所以，特朗普之所以要解密文件，首先在于，同样作为“新兴势力”的“特朗普们”感受到了切实的危险。

●美国“内政”问题的核心之一就是，特朗普急于解决“美国的经济问题”，或者更干脆一点说——“美国的金融问题”

在继续展开讨论前，我们再来看一则新闻报道：

有美国媒体报道称，美国总统特朗普在1月25日表示，他将在30天内就短视频社交媒体平台TikTok一事做出最终决定。

在1月21日的讨论中，我们讨论了一个话题，那就是特朗普将TikTok禁令推迟时间从90天缩短至75天向外界释放了怎样的信号？当时给出的初步评估是，特朗普在TikTok问题上的最新说法，首先在于普释放希望尽快访华之强烈信号。

从1月21日到1月29日，仅仅一周时间，美国总统特朗普再次将处理TikTok的时间从75天内，缩短至30天内，足见特朗普比以前更加急于访华，甚至连2025年的第一季度都等不得了。之所以特朗普如此着急访华，主要原因之一就在于上一节中我们就美国“内政”问题做出的讨论中，也就是，同样作为“新兴势力”的“特朗普们”感受到了切实的危险。而无论古今中外，凡是在内部处于激烈博弈中的一方，尤其是处于相对弱势的一方，必然寻找外援作为战略支撑，特朗普恐怕也是。

让我们将讨论的焦点移回到中国如何应对特朗普政府瞄着阿富汗问题做文章上，只要中国稍微“歪一歪，动一动”，瞄准美国“内政”问题出手，美国内部矛盾会被激化到何种程度，恐怕不难想象！所以，在我们的观察与评估中，在“特朗普们”的对手和“特朗普们”都在尽量寻找外援之际，特朗普政府瞄着阿富汗问题做文章的首要目的自然也是服务于所谓美国“内政”问题，那就是借此作为向中国讨价还价的手段，威、逼、利、诱方方面面，尤其是中国，“协助”处理美国“内政”问题。而美国“内政”问题的核心之一就是，特朗普急于解决“美国的经济问题”，或者更干脆一点说——“美国的金融问题”。如果特朗普想要尽早且相对顺利的大规模、公开“启动印钞机”，不仅访华行程越早越好（最晚不能晚于2025年第二季度），而且要尽量争取中国不去干扰、破坏之态度。

值得注意的是，在特朗普签署行政令，解密美国前总统约翰·肯尼迪、他的弟弟罗伯特·肯尼迪以及黑人民权运动领袖马丁·路德·金遇刺案的全部剩余档案后，根据这一行政令，国家情报总监、总检察长应与总统国家安全事务助理等，自即日起15天内要向特朗普提交一份全面彻底公开约翰·肯尼迪遇刺有关档案的计划。而罗伯特·肯尼迪与民权领袖马丁·路德·金相关的期限为45天。

显然，特朗普就是要通过这种方式告诉全美国，美国民主党是最大的“美奸”（共和党和民主党本质一样，也是一种“异生”力量），而对这些美国的叛徒，人人得而诛之！

有趣的是，肯尼迪在当年美国内部的一些人（既有民主党人，也有共和党人）眼中也是叛徒。在他们看来，允许信奉天主教的肯尼迪上位已经是“开天恩”（这与当时多数信仰新教的美国人显得格格不入），然而肯尼迪“不是报恩”，反而作为“新兴势力”要动军工复合体和华尔街的“奶酪”。今天的特朗普的处境似乎与当时的肯尼迪非常相似，其在美国内部的一些人（同样既有民主党人，也有共和党人，比如，切尼的女儿，小布什家族等）眼中也是如此。

●这是典型的以牺牲美国外交为代价的以公谋私

特朗普政府在阿富汗问题上做文章的真实目的，俄罗斯决策层怕是看清了，这或是目前阶段，俄罗斯在对外政策上没有表现得像伊朗那样剧烈摇摆的主要原因。在俄罗斯看来，美国人就阿富汗问题抛出的这枚“球”，尽管俄罗斯感兴趣，但不着急去接，否则，很可能被特朗普当作访华的“伴手礼”，到了那个时候，俄罗斯可就被动了。不仅得罪中国，而且还得罪了中亚地区的很多国家。

相比之下，伊朗当局的处境恐怕就没有那么从容，这或是内外交困的伊朗当局急于在“伊朗通道”问题上“插标卖首”的主要原因之一。但问题是，在我们看来，以现在的中东局势来看，伊朗当局相当叛徒恐怕也没那么容易，否则，特朗普政府如何面对以色列、沙特，尤其是中国？

通过今天的讨论，大家不难看出，特朗普政府的行事风格类似下围棋中的一种情况：表面上不断对外进攻，甚至下“无理棋”，而实际上是以此作掩护，谋求“两眼活棋”。值得一提的是，在这种情况下，特朗普政府的外交已经出现某种“突变”。原本应该回归相对远离2024年11月5日的拜登政府之中东政策的特朗普政府的中东政策，出现了明显反复。比如，特朗普政府开始对以色列内塔尼亚胡政府的“疯狂支持”——不仅解除拜登对向以色列供应2000磅炸弹的禁令，甚至扬言将迁移加沙巴勒斯坦人。其目的首先就在于尽全力争取美国内部所谓“犹太资本”（“关键少数”）的支持。这是典型的以牺牲美国外交为代价的以公谋私。

某种意义上说，特朗普是死过一次的人，对他来说，加密货币、AI、新军工复合体等全部要放开了去做，伴随其崛起的就是所谓“新兴势力”，而他们如上文所述，是从保守势力中，或旧势力中“异化”而来，既不是“卵生”，也不是“胎生”。在“特朗普们”，包括“马斯克们”眼中，面对如此强大的中国，不变革就是死亡。当然，退一万步说，即便变革成功无望，也要去做，关键在于，在所谓推动变革的过程中，尽最大可能为自己所在的小集团谋取私利。所以，所谓“变革”既是真的，也是假的。

最后需要补充的是，在特朗普政府的中东政策明显出现“突变”后，伊朗似乎在手捧“伊朗通道”对美国“插标卖首”的问题上选错了时机，如此软弱的伊朗当局，如果特朗普政府和内塔尼亚胡政府真的要对伊朗进行军事打击，甚至打击伊朗的核设施，伊朗当局恐怕只能“瞪眼看着”，但伊朗国内并非所有人都甘心“瞪眼看着”，若如此，伊朗距离爆发“内乱”还远吗？

【相关话题】

第7757期－强调并宣称“无意发展核武”的伊朗当局是否重会蹈卡扎菲的覆辙？（2025-1-23）
第7760期－为什么说以色列在约旦河西岸杰宁发起大规模军事行动，本质是瞄着欧美关系为特朗普挖的一个“坑”？（2025-1-24）
第7766期－如何理解，必要时即，便俄、伊不想要，国际社会也会着眼于拉高其余西方媾和成本“强行”给予“战略策应”？（2025-1-26）

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Monday, January 27, 2025, Issue No. 1169

Signs indicate that the Trump administration's foreign policy is highly likely to serve entirely "domestic American politics"

[Media Coverage]

On January 26th, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi led a delegation to Afghanistan for an official visit.

On January 26th, Belarusian President Lukashenko stated that Belarus would never pursue an anti-China policy and that the United States could not buy Minsk.

【Discussion Summary】

● At least at this stage, Russia has no intention of cooperating and providing a "Moscow channel"

If the Trump administration is also learning from the failures of the Biden administration's Afghanistan policy, then the only lesson they seem to have learned is "not to learn any lessons," at least at the strategic level. Observing the recent remarks by US Secretary of State Rubio on the Afghanistan issue (threatening a huge bounty for capturing the Taliban leadership), it appears that the Trump administration may be using the Afghanistan issue as a "pawn move" and contemplating something. All parties are paying attention, such as Russia and Iran.

On January 26th, we noted that Belarusian President Lukashenko stated that Belarus would never pursue an anti-China policy and that the United States could not buy Minsk.

It is worth noting that Lukashenko made these remarks in the context of the Belarusian presidential election. In our observation and assessment, firstly, it means that Russia, at least at this stage, has no intention of surrendering to the West like Iran, or in other words, there will be no such drastic swings in Russia's foreign policy; secondly, although US Secretary of State Rubio has chosen Russia as the "key focus" in adjusting US policy on Afghanistan, at least at this stage, Russia has no intention of cooperating and providing a "Moscow channel"; finally, Belarusian President Lukashenko, at least so far, still ties his and Belarus's fate to China;

● Although Trump is focusing on the Afghanistan issue, similar to making a "passing move" in Go, placing a "stone" in the Afghanistan direction, he is also choosing his moves carefully

In the previous section, we mentioned Iran, whose foreign policy has undergone drastic swings. We have noticed reports from Afghan media on Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi's first visit to Afghanistan – this visit comes amid tensions triggered by border disputes, disagreements over Iran's so-called "water rights to the Helmand River," drug trafficking in Afghanistan, and the impact of large-scale immigration of Afghans to neighboring countries.

In May 2023, Afghanistan and Iran once again had a dispute over water rights to the Helmand River. As the dry season approached, in February and April, people in Iran's Sistan region, located in the lower basin of the Helmand River, protested in Zabol and Hamun Lake, demanding that the Iranian government claim water rights from Afghanistan. In response, then-Iranian President Raisi, during his visit to the Sistan-Baluchestan province on May 18th, publicly warned the Afghan interim government to immediately fulfill the water agreement between the two countries.

In the background of the event of Iranian Foreign Minister's visit to Afghanistan mentioned above, everyone can easily find a term that we have mentioned multiple times recently – "Sistan-Baluchestan Province."

Before further discussion, let's review a passage from "Diffraction + East Discussion Core Summary, December 20th [Issue 2024-1136]":

● "Whether Russia fully withdraws from Syria" and "Whether Iran substantially participates in counter-terrorism in South Asia" are excellent windows for observing the strategic decision-making trends of the two countries

Let's bring the discussion back to the China-Pakistan "Warrior-8" joint counter-terrorism exercise. For Iran, since most of the armed organizations active in Balochistan have a Muslim Shiite religious background, whether Iran substantially participates in it represents a change in Iran's attitude based on the religious aspect of "ambition," that is, "Greater Persianism." In a sense, "Greater Persianism" is similar to Russia's lingering "Afghanistan policy calculations."

It is not hard to imagine that if Iran can participate in joint counter-terrorism efforts in the Balochistan region, where Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan meet, to maintain regional stability, then Afghanistan is likely to join in under the joint push of China and Russia. In this way, the "Pakistan Corridor" will be stabilized, and in this process, Russia's attitude towards substantially joining hands with China will also become clear. As long as China and Russia substantially team up, the SCO will be "effectively restarted," and stability in Central Asia will be within reach. Iran's role as a "strategic fulcrum" for the international community to advance into the Middle East and push the frontline of the game with the West to Syria will be highlighted. With an effectively restarted SCO as a strong backing (India can be sidelined if it disagrees, and China and Russia can form a "party group" for joint decision-making), and with comprehensive support from the international community, Syria, jointly defended by Iran and Russia, will not be so easily overthrown. As we know, since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, various terrorist organizations have spread throughout Syria. If the above situation becomes a reality, then the military success of the China-Pakistan "Warrior-8" joint counter-terrorism exercise can be politically amplified into a "great victory" and this successful model can be replicated for counter-terrorism in Syria. This is also the logic behind our proposal in the discussion on December 5th that we cannot rule out the possibility of two "counter-terrorism models" led by the international community and the West respectively competing in Syria. It is worth mentioning that the terrain of Syria is much less complex than that of Pakistan and Afghanistan, making counter-terrorism operations relatively easier to carry out, especially suitable for unmanned combat modes. This successful model, combining military strength and political determination, can naturally be applied wherever needed.

It is worth noting that while Iran has consistently shown no interest in participating in the China-Pakistan "Warrior-8" joint counter-terrorism exercise, Russia has also failed to provide clarity to the international community on Central Asian issues. This lack of clarity is mainly reflected in the fact that during Russian President Putin's visit to China in May this year, many consensuses reached and agreements signed between the two sides have not been implemented. In addition, Russia has not launched an "effective counterattack" against the military invasion of the Kursk region, Russia's "pure blood territory," by Ukraine (NATO). As a "miniature Russia," Iran has not carried out its stated "timely counterattacks" on either the Israel issue or the Syria issue, let alone "effective counterattacks." In the early morning of December 19th, the Israeli Defense Forces launched a fierce airstrike on the Houthi armed forces in Yemen, with dozens of fighter jets attacking Houthi targets on the west coast of Yemen and striking the Yemeni capital Sana'a for the first time. In our view, Iran has become the laughingstock of all parties, and Israel has publicly ridiculed the incompetence and stupidity of Iran's decision-makers with bombs. For the Netanyahu group, a "great victory" that once seemed out of reach now seems within grasp.

Based on the above review, we want to emphasize several points:

First, the "Pakistan Corridor," also known as the "South Asia Corridor," is a "strategic influence delivery corridor" from China through Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran to the Middle East. Iran plays an important role in this.

Second, based on the first point, the so-called "important role of Iran" means that Iran can either actively respond to the international community and play a positive role in stabilizing the "Pakistan Corridor" and even Central Asia; or it can passively respond to the international community and "reverse provide" the corridor to the West, turning it into a channel for Western countries to exert strategic influence on Central and South Asia. We tentatively call this the "Iran Corridor."

Third, based on the second point, in our observation and assessment, we cannot rule out the possibility that Iran's rare visit by its foreign minister to Afghanistan is to act as a "lobbyist" for the United States and "mark (the 'Iran Corridor') for sale."

Fourth, based on the third point, if this is indeed the case, Afghanistan may become the "second Syria," with a situation much more chaotic than before the US military withdrawal in September 2021, and may even further stimulate Russia's "Afghanistan policy calculations." All parties will have their eyes on Afghanistan, which will become another platform for "diplomatic maneuvering."

Fifth, based on the fourth point, since Afghanistan is located near China and is a neighboring country (Wakhan Corridor), the Afghanistan issue is difficult for China to avoid, similar to how the United States cannot avoid the Middle East issue. This is the insidious aspect of the Trump administration's focus on the Afghanistan issue. Although in our view, the Trump administration's focus on the Afghanistan issue is similar to playing a "passing move" in Go, that is, since they haven't figured out how to "play" with the Middle East issue represented by Syria, they have simply "placed a stone" in the Afghanistan direction, but they have chosen their move carefully.

● Although the Afghanistan issue cannot be avoided, China may not choose to respond in the Afghanistan direction

Some netizens may ask, since the Trump administration has chosen its move carefully, how should China respond? Will we become more passive strategically than before?

For China, although the Afghanistan issue cannot be avoided, China may not choose to respond in the Afghanistan direction. On the one hand, in dealing with such provocations by the United States, China will adopt a similar approach to the "Donglang Incident," namely, "you play your game, and I'll play mine;" and secondly, directly grab the "collar" of the behind-the-scenes manipulator, the United States, and confront them alone! On the other hand, avoid a situation where China's involvement in the Afghanistan issue is "selfless yet also selfish."

Based on the above response principles, in our view, China's response may be in any place other than the Afghanistan direction, such as the Middle East, Ukraine, the Western Pacific, or even use Trump's eagerness to ease relations with China as an entry point for a strong counterattack.

Taking the situation in the Middle East as an example, China could choose to support one or both parties that have publicly intervened in the Syrian situation. Since the Middle East is a top priority in the US global strategy, whether it is the "local Middle Eastern kingdoms" that originally existed or the "newcomers" that later intervened in the Syrian situation, their pursuit of their respective interests in the Syrian issue is essentially something that the United States does not want to see. The EU ("Old Europe"), which has already intervened in the subsequent development of the Syrian situation and is eager to establish an energy pipeline that breaks free from US control in the Middle East direction, will first use the Afghanistan issue as a bargaining chip to negotiate with the Trump administration on the Syrian issue.

Therefore, the Trump administration's attempt to play a "passing move" by focusing on the Afghanistan issue is not valid. That is to say, with the current level of the United States' "chess skills" (absolute and relative strength), aiming at the Afghanistan issue to "play a passing move" will be difficult to control the situation. China can even make the Afghanistan issue, including the "Iran Corridor," become a "chicken rib" or even a "burden" in the eyes of the Trump administration by simply focusing on the countries surrounding Afghanistan. Once the US Afghanistan policy becomes passive to a certain extent, Iran may also close the "Iran Corridor." As for how and why Iran would close the "Iran Corridor," one possibility is that under external pressure, internal "turmoil" may occur in Iran, leading to the collapse of the current Iranian government that pursues a foreign policy of "surrenderism" (towards the West).

● The "Trumps" as another "emerging force" feel a real threat

After discussing China's response, let's delve into the true intentions behind the Trump administration's moves on the Afghanistan issue. In our view, to some extent, after Trump officially took office, the "priority" of the Trump administration was likely not diplomacy but domestic affairs. This aligns with our previous discussion that, despite appearing to be "strategically expanding," the Trump administration was actually "strategically contracting."

Before continuing our discussion, let's look at a news report:

On January 25, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order to declassify all remaining records related to the assassinations of former US President John F. Kennedy, his brother Robert F. Kennedy, and civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr.

The assassination of former President Kennedy remains a mystery to this day. It's worth noting that the word "mystery" seems to be "intentionally left," similar to the "Epstein's unexpected death case." Let's make a horizontal comparison between former US President Kennedy and current President Trump and explore the possible reasons behind Kennedy's assassination, that is, why Kennedy was assassinated.

Based on our observations and assessments:

Firstly, Kennedy's assassination may be closely related to the Vietnam War. Specifically, it may be linked to Kennedy's intention to end the war in Vietnam. Interestingly, Trump has also publicly called for a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war, at least on the surface. Clearly, a cessation of war or a move towards that direction is not something the US military-industrial complex wants to see.

Secondly, although we often say that with former US President Nixon's visit to China, the US began its full transition from industrial capitalism to financial capitalism, the strong desire for this transition already existed during the Kennedy era or even earlier. It's worth mentioning that during Kennedy's term, for various reasons, he wanted to regain the "coinage power," which obviously threatened Wall Street's interests. Similarly, today, Trump publicly calls for the abolition of the Federal Reserve and is heavily involved in cryptocurrencies.

Thirdly, like Kennedy, Trump has also "taken a bullet." The difference is that Kennedy died, while Trump survived. The reason Trump wasn't killed is probably because he hadn't officially taken office at that time. However, the warning seems to be the same.

Fourthly, by "the warning seems to be the same," we mean that Kennedy's death was not an "assassination" but a "suppression." Or, to put it another way, "Kennedy was killed as a warning to other 'Kennedys'." To some extent, the "Kennedys" at that time were an emerging force, and today's "Trumps" (including "Musks") are also an emerging force. What they aim to do or are already doing is not reform but transformation, even bordering on the scope of revolution.

Fifthly, nevertheless, these "emerging forces" still belong to the Western capital interest group, such as "a portion" of Wall Street. Their opponents also belong to the Western capital interest group, like "another portion" of Wall Street. That is to say, the so-called "emerging forces" have "differentiated" from the original old or conservative forces. Therefore, the reason Trump wants to declassify the documents is that the "Trumps," as another "emerging force," feel a real threat.

● One of the core issues of US "domestic affairs" is that Trump is eager to address "America's economic problems," or more bluntly, "America's financial problems."

Before continuing our discussion, let's look at another news report:

According to US media reports, on January 25, US President Trump stated that he would make a final decision on the short-video social media platform TikTok within 30 days.

In our discussion on January 21, we explored the signal sent by Trump shortening the TikTok ban postponement from 90 days to 75 days. Our initial assessment was that Trump's latest statement on the TikTok issue was primarily intended to signal his strong desire to visit China as soon as possible.

From January 21 to January 29, just within a week, US President Trump further shortened the time to address the TikTok issue from 75 days to 30 days, indicating that Trump is even more eager to visit China and cannot even wait until the first quarter of 2025. The main reason for Trump's urgency to visit China lies in our previous discussion on US "domestic affairs," that is, the "Trumps" as another "emerging force" feel a real threat. Throughout history, whenever a party in internal intense competition, especially a relatively weaker one, inevitably seeks external support as a strategic prop, and Trump is probably no exception.

Let's shift our focus back to how China should respond to the Trump administration's maneuvers on the Afghanistan issue. If China just "tilts or moves slightly" and targets US "domestic affairs," it's not difficult to imagine how intensified internal conflicts in the US could become! Therefore, in our observations and assessments, as both the opponents and the "Trumps" seek external support, the primary goal of the Trump administration's maneuvers on the Afghanistan issue is naturally to serve the so-called US "domestic affairs," that is, to use it as a bargaining chip with China, employing various tactics of coercion, intimidation, benefits, and inducements, especially towards China, to "assist" in addressing US "domestic affairs." One of the core issues of US "domestic affairs" is that Trump is eager to address "America's economic problems," or more bluntly, "America's financial problems." If Trump wants to start "the printing press" on a large scale and openly as soon as possible and relatively smoothly, not only should his visit to China be as soon as possible (no later than the second quarter of 2025), but he should also strive for China's non-interference and non-disruption attitude.

It's worth noting that after Trump signed the executive order to declassify all remaining records related to the assassinations of former US President John F. Kennedy, his brother Robert F. Kennedy, and civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr., according to this executive order, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, among others, shall submit a comprehensive and thorough plan to fully disclose the records related to John F. Kennedy's assassination to Trump within 15 days from the date of the order. The deadline for records related to Robert Kennedy and civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. is 45 days.

Obviously, Trump aims to tell the whole of the US that the Democratic Party is the biggest "traitor to America" (the Republican Party and the Democratic Party are essentially the same, also a "heterogeneous" force), and that everyone has the right to condemn these traitors to America!

Interestingly, Kennedy was also seen as a traitor by some people within the US at that time (including both Democrats and Republicans). In their view, allowing a Catholic like Kennedy to take office was already a "heaven-sent favor" (which was out of place among the majority of Protestant Americans at that time). However, instead of "showing gratitude," Kennedy, as an "emerging force," aimed to touch the "cheese" of the military-industrial complex and Wall Street. Today, Trump seems to be in a very similar situation to Kennedy, as he is also viewed this way by some people within the US (again, including both Democrats and Republicans, such as Cheney's daughter and the Bush family).

●This is a classic case of using public office for private gain at the expense of U.S. diplomacy.

The Russian decision-makers may have seen through the true purpose of the Trump administration's maneuvering on the Afghanistan issue, which could be the main reason why Russia hasn't shown the same drastic swings in its foreign policy as Iran has at this stage. From Russia's perspective, although it is interested in the "ball" thrown by the Americans on the Afghanistan issue, it is not in a hurry to catch it, otherwise it might be used as a "souvenir" by Trump during his visit to China. At that point, Russia would be in a passive position, offending not only China but also many countries in Central Asia.

In contrast, the Iranian authorities may not be in such a relaxed situation, which could be one of the main reasons why they are eager to "sell out" on the "Iranian Corridor" issue amid internal and external difficulties. But the problem is, from our perspective, given the current Middle East situation, it won't be easy for the Iranian authorities to play the role of traitor. Otherwise, how can the Trump administration face Israel, Saudi Arabia, and especially China?

Through today's discussion, it is not difficult to see that the Trump administration's style of conduct is similar to a situation in Go: on the surface, it constantly launches offensives and even makes "irrational moves," but in reality, it uses this as a cover to seek a "living position with two eyes." It's worth mentioning that in this situation, the Trump administration's diplomacy has undergone a certain "mutation." The Trump administration's Middle East policy, which was originally supposed to return to a policy relatively distant from the Biden administration's Middle East policy by November 5, 2024, has shown significant reversals. For example, the Trump administration has started to "vehemently support" the Netanyahu government in Israel - not only lifting Biden's ban on supplying 2,000-pound bombs to Israel but also threatening to relocate Gazan Palestinians. Its primary goal is to strive for the support of the so-called "Jewish capital" ("critical few") within the United States. This is a classic case of using public office for private gain at the expense of U.S. diplomacy.

In a sense, Trump is a person who has "died once," and for him, cryptocurrencies, AI, the new military-industrial complex, and everything else must be pursued aggressively. The so-called "emerging forces" that rise along with him are "alienated" from the conservative or old forces, neither "born from eggs" nor "born from wombs." In the eyes of "Trumps" and "Musks," facing such a powerful China, not changing means death. Of course, even if the prospect of successful change is bleak, they will still pursue it. The key is that in the so-called process of promoting change, they will seek to maximize private gains for their small group. Therefore, the so-called "change" is both real and fake.

Finally, it should be added that after the Trump administration's Middle East policy has clearly undergone a "mutation," Iran seems to have chosen the wrong timing in "selling out" to the United States by holding the "Iranian Corridor,". If the Trump administration and the Netanyahu government really intend to launch military strikes against Iran, or even attack Iran's nuclear facilities, the Iranian authorities may only be able to "watch helplessly." However, not everyone in Iran is willing to "watch helplessly," and if this is the case, is Iran far from erupting into "civil unrest"?

[Related Topics]

Issue 7757 - Does the Iranian authorities' emphasis and declaration of "no intention to develop nuclear weapons" put them at risk of repeating the fate of Gaddafi? (January 23, 2025)
Issue 7760 - Why is Israel's large-scale military operation in Jenin in the West Bank essentially a "pit" dug for Trump with the aim of targeting Euro-American relations? (January 24, 2025)
Issue 7766 - How to understand that when necessary, even if Russia and Iran do not want it, the international community will "forcefully" provide "strategic support" with the aim of raising the cost of peace negotiations for other Western countries? (January 26, 2025)

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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