https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/R2sZufFqvPEOeYZI-z0QfQ
2025年1月22日,星期三,第1164期 为什么说,不论是对外还是对内,特朗普想要玩“合纵连横”,前提都是处理好对华关系? 【媒体报道】 1月20日,美国总统特朗普罕见对俄罗斯总统普京进行了批评,他称,普京“做得不太好”。报道指出,特朗普的态度空前鲜明,把重点放在了俄乌冲突对俄罗斯造成的经济损失上。“我认为俄罗斯将会有大麻烦。你看看他们的经济和通货膨胀率。物价上涨接近10%。”特朗普说,“我和他(普京)相处得很好。我希望他想达成协议。”特朗普还提到了俄罗斯在这场冲突中的伤亡率,西方官员估计有70万俄罗斯人伤亡。 1月21日,*******在北京人民大会堂同俄罗斯总统普京举行视频会晤。 1月22日,美国总统特朗普威胁称,如果俄罗斯不能尽快和乌克兰就结束冲突达成协议,美国或对俄实施制裁、征收高额关税。对此,俄方称有必要研究特朗普所说协议的具体条款,强调任何协议都应解决乌克兰危机的根源。 【讨论纪要】 ●俄方期待的“特朗普团队就国际问题形成观点”终于出台,只是看上去有点“出乎意料” 我们注意到,1月20日,美国总统特朗普罕见地对俄罗斯总统普京进行了批评的新闻报道。2天后,也就是1月22日,美国总统特朗普就乌克兰问题进一步明确态度并对俄罗斯发出胁称,如果俄罗斯不能尽快和乌克兰就结束冲突达成协议,美国或对俄实施制裁、征收高额关税。而此前,在1月20日的年度记者会上,俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫刚刚表示,俄方期待特朗普团队就国际问题形成观点。 尽管拉夫罗夫承认,关于外界盛传的特朗普与普京的可能会晤目前仍未收到来自美方团队的具体提议,但俄方对特朗普政府的期盼之心溢于言表。早在2024年12月5日,在接受美国媒体人卡尔森采访时,俄罗斯外交部长拉夫罗夫就曾公开表示,俄罗斯希望与美国建立正常关系,两国“没有理由不能合作”。现在,俄方期待的“特朗普团队就国际问题形成观点”终于出台,只是看上去有点“出乎意料”。 在我们看来,特朗普向俄罗斯传递的信号很明显:是俄罗斯主动找美国的,而非美国要找俄罗斯。显然,特朗普也“赞成”拉夫罗夫有关“俄美没有理由不能合作”的观点,但“合作”的前提是俄罗斯要按美国说的做。否则,美国或对俄实施制裁、征收高额关税。显然,普京总统突然产生自己可能再次被耍的强烈预感(上次被德国前总理默克尔和法国前总统奥朗德公开羞辱,前两者称,“明斯克协议”就是一个骗局,是为了给乌克兰争取充足战争准备时间而精心策划的)。 ●欧、俄纷纷就特朗普“美国或战略收缩”话题的变化和发展,迅速做出反应和调整 2025年1月21日下午,*******在北京人民大会堂同俄罗斯总统普京举行视频会晤。两国元首互致新年祝福。习近平指出,再过几天就是中国春节,很高兴在这一辞旧迎新的时刻同总统先生视频会晤,祝愿新的一年中俄关系红红火火。普京表示,很高兴在新年伊始同习近平主席视频交流,祝愿习近平主席和中国人民新春快乐,万事如意! 再次强烈感受到自己可能被耍的俄罗斯总统普京将电话打进了北京。在我们的观察与评估中,显然普京向美国传递了一组强烈信号:如果特朗普敢欺骗俄罗斯,那俄罗斯就“摇摆回去”、进一步靠向中国。 无独有偶,继2023年在空军、2024年在海军发表新年演说后,法国总统马克龙当地时间20日明确警告欧洲称,需对美国战略调整保持清醒,并强调欧洲需要实现自我防卫。而就在当天,特朗普签署行政令,将“墨西哥湾”更名为“美国湾”(墨西哥湾改名是虚,如果美国吞并加拿大和格陵兰岛,那就是不可逆的开始执行战略收缩了。美国历史上从墨西哥强夺了大量领土,原本因为墨西哥领土环抱墨西哥湾,所以才这样称呼)。显然,特朗普在强调,其所说的“战略收缩”不是说说而已。 值得一提的是,马克龙强调“谁能想到,仅仅一年前,格陵兰岛会成为政治和战略讨论的中心?面对威胁的累积、风险和利益的演变,我们需要清晰地认知这些变化”。在我们看来,法国总统马克龙(法国是“老欧洲”的典型代表)也意识到了局势的快速变化,并对外传递出“面对美国可能的战略收缩,欧洲一定会有应对变化”。也就是说,既然美国打算找俄罗斯玩“合纵连横”,欧盟(老欧洲)自然也可以找中国玩“合纵连横”。不难看出,感觉可能再次被骗的俄罗斯,明显心态复杂化的欧盟,纷纷就特朗普“美国或战略收缩”话题的变化和发展,迅速做出反应和调整。 这种变化对中国来说,自然可以坦然面对。美国也好,欧盟、俄罗斯也罢,玩得尽兴就好,中国做自己要做的事情,正所谓“军队向前进,生产长一寸。加强纪律性,革命无不胜”。 ●“合纵连横”还没正式开始,似乎美国就先输一局 在俄罗斯和欧盟(“老欧洲”)出现这样或那样的变化后,对刚刚就任的美国总统特朗普来说,局面似乎变得有些尴尬: 其一,欧盟对可能的美俄合作局面表达了自己的严重关切,强调“欧洲需要实现自我防卫”; 其二,在“其一”的基础上,美国恐惧于欧盟的离开而转身在乌克兰问题上对俄罗斯又是批评,又是施压; 其三,在“其二”的基础上,感到自己可能再次被欺骗的俄罗斯摆出“实在不行就摇摆回去、进一步靠向中国”表达自己的强烈不满。 其四,在“其三”的基础上,“合纵连横”还没正式开始,似乎美国就先输一局。落得个“猪八戒照镜子里外不是人”——既惹得欧盟(“老欧洲”)十分不满,又让俄罗斯大失所望。 很明显,美国现在不能没有欧盟。对此,欧盟也是心知肚明。遂以“你敢做初一,我就做十五”的方式对美国施加警告。在我们看来,目前的美国,整体实力,无论是相对实力还是绝对实力,均已经弱于中国,这恐怕是美国玩不了、更玩不赢“合纵连横”的主要原因所在。 ●除俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”外,“美俄合作”很难找到更多共同点 通过炒作“美国或战略收缩”刺激俄罗斯“阿富汗政策小九九”,再辅助若干“战略欺骗”手段离间中俄关系,对特朗普而言,同样是举步维艰。 特朗普在批评俄罗斯总统普京的过程中提到了俄罗斯目前不容乐观的经济情况。在我们看来,某种意义上说,在俄罗斯眼中,西方解除对俄罗斯的经济制裁的重要性已经超过了俄乌战争停火本身。甚至在俄罗斯眼中,特朗普相关建议的“试金石”就是实质性解除对俄制裁,如果这一点无法兑现,任何形式的乌克兰问题停火激化都没有意义。 有消息显示,美国打算利用OPEC+成员之间的矛盾,也就是“OPEC”(中东、非洲地区主要产油国)与“+”(俄罗斯)之间的矛盾,拉拢沙特等中东国家,比如,在联手控制国际油价的问题上;再比如,在维持沙特和美国关系基本稳定的问题上。问题在于,如果把俄罗斯赶走,何谈对俄罗斯解除制裁?就算俄罗斯出于“阿富汗政策小九九”愿意相信特朗普说过的话,但面对仍然严酷的经济制裁现实,俄罗斯决策层恐怕也不能坐视不理。 此外,大家知道,俄罗斯与美国、加拿大等国在经济结构上高度重合,其中,化石能源、矿产和农产品都在三个国家的对外出口中占据重要位置。对特朗普来说,即便仅在名义上解除一部分对俄罗斯的经济制裁,都可能招致国内,在化石能源产业、矿业和农业方面有重大利益关切的保守利益集团的严重不满。 ●不论对外还是对内,特朗普想玩“合纵连横”,前提都是妥善处理对华关系 除了需要平衡对外关系外,如果特朗普不想“合纵联合”策略中途夭折,平衡国内不同利益集团之间更为复杂关系,也是其必须解决的问题。对此,我们不妨再来看一则新闻报道,再做详细展开。 1月21日,美国总统特朗普在白宫宣布,日本软银集团、美国开放人工智能研究中心(OpenAI)和美国甲骨文公司(Oracle)三家企业将投资5000亿美元,用于在美国建设支持AI发展的基础设施。 作为所谓美国精英阶层的典型代表人物,特朗普也好,拜登也罢,恐怕早就知道美国没救了。所以,对于他们而言,基于现实因素,最重要的只有两件事:第一,打出“让美国再次伟大”的旗号;第二,在“第一”的基础上,尽量谋求自己所在小集团的利益。也就是说,在“内外兼修”这一典型特征的基础上,特朗普上任后唯一能做,也是其自己认为唯一需要做的就是以权谋私。所谓“内外兼修”的意思就是,特朗普政府将其对外政策作为对内更好以权谋私的支撑手段。 以“新军工复合体”为例,这当然是对马斯克、扎克伯格等,这些全力支持特朗普上台者的回馈。而相对于这些“新贵”的美国利益中的保守势力来说,比如,“老军工复合体”,传统化石能源产业,矿业、农业等,最好能被“整合”进来。“整合”的主要手段自然是将“新蛋糕做大”,比如,创立“新军工复合体”并打造“新美国资本利益集团”(相对于“老美国资本利益集团”,但同属于“美国资本利益”概念,且至少在目前阶段,仍代言“西方资本利益”)。也就是说,在“整合”的过程中,尽量少动“老美国资本利益集团”的奶酪,尽量维持所谓的“团结”。 问题在于,今天的美国,或者说早已从“产业资本主义”跃迁至“金融资本主义”多年、实体制造严重空心化,且仍深陷“三线作战”(乌克兰、中东和西太)、至少“两线作战”(乌克兰和中东)的美国,如何、能否将“新蛋糕做大”。 在我们的观察与评估中,今天的美国想要通过“将蛋糕做大”的方式首先平衡内部矛盾,成功率为零。以“新军工复合体”为例,恐怕最终,其只能“落地”在虚拟经济和金融游戏上。也就是说,“新军工复合体”将是一个“以实体制造为辅,虚拟经济为主”的产业。 对此,至少对美国内部,现在的特朗普还是胸有成竹的。在软银投资5000亿美元的情况来看,在特朗普当政后,“钱自然不是问题”,剩下的就是“讲好故事”。当然,从马斯克就软银投资问题罕见给特朗普“泼冷水”的情况来看,即便在“特朗普阵营”内部,也并非铁板一块。至少“马部长”有理由质问特朗普,在美国建设支持AI发展的基础设施,为什么没有特斯拉,为什么没有Space-X,为什么没有“X平台”? 结合以上讨论内容大家不难看出,特朗普对外又是“战略收缩”,又是“合纵连横”,似乎都在于,借此对中国制造筹码,只要以此要挟中国在其公开、大规模开启印钞机后,不得施加干扰。更或者说,不论对外还是对内,特朗普想玩“合纵连横”,前提都是妥善处理对华关系。 ●“中国威胁论”的AI版 需要强调的是,所谓“妥善处理对华关系”并不意味着未来中美关系会向更加具有建设性的方向发展,而是会变得更加微妙、复杂。 对此,用西方的一句名言形容或许再合适不过了,那就是:假的和平比公开的战争危害更大。对美国而言,这句话落在实处就是,无论是对外,还是对内,美国仍需要树立一个敌人——中国。“合纵连横”是继续与中国对抗下去的策略。 从日本软银集团、美国开放人工智能研究中心和美国甲骨文公司三家企业将投资5000亿美元,用于在美国建设支持AI发展的基础设施的新闻报道来看,中国,这个敌人,首先会树立在AI技术发展与应用层面。可以说,这是“中国威胁论”的AI版。 讽刺的是,马斯克有理由认为特朗普要平衡其影响力也基于此。显然,特朗普并不想将马斯克作为“唯一依靠”。但问题在于,由于马斯克是“产业资本”和“金融资本”的综合体,彻底抛弃马斯克,特朗普同样玩不转。 最后需要补充的是,不排除特朗普在今后的执政过程中,彻底改变美国的政治气候的可能性。也就是学当年希特勒(在一段时期内发展了德国经济,让德国百姓桌子上有了牛奶和面包,这使得希特勒获得了空前的支持,为其日后扫平德国内部包括德共、冲锋队等内部各政治派别打下坚持基础),借“红巨星效应”(其中,吹泡泡,印钱,讲故事,包括军工复合体,AI,X帝国,这些是绝好的印钞的借口),一家独大,强力清算内部。显然,在1月20日之后,尽管特朗普顺利上台,但并不意味着美国内部围绕本次总统大选展开的“恶斗”会就此轻易平息。 【相关话题】 第7742期-合纵连横(3):美国“新、老军工复合体”若“结婚”并“开枝散叶”,或可作为观察拜登与特朗普顺利交接的切入点之一(2025-1-19) 声明:具体内容如有出入,请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。
Wednesday, January 22, 2025, Issue No. 1164 Why is it said that, whether externally or internally, Trump's attempt to play the game of "alliance and division" hinges on managing relations with China well? [Media Coverage] On January 20, US President Trump rarely criticized Russian President Putin, stating that Putin "didn't do a very good job." The report pointed out that Trump's attitude was unusually clear, focusing on the economic losses Russia had suffered due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. "I think Russia is going to have big problems. Just look at their economy and inflation rate. Prices are up close to 10%," Trump said. "I got along very well with him (Putin). I hope he wants to make a deal." Trump also mentioned Russia's casualty rate in this conflict, with Western officials estimating that 700,000 Russians have been killed or injured. On January 21, ******* held a video meeting with Russian President Putin at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. On January 22, US President Trump threatened that if Russia does not reach an agreement with Ukraine to end the conflict soon, the US may impose sanctions on Russia and levy high tariffs. In response, Russia stated that it was necessary to study the specific terms of the agreement mentioned by Trump, emphasizing that any agreement should address the root causes of the Ukraine crisis. 【Discussion Summary】 ●Russia's expectation of "the Trump team forming views on international issues" has finally emerged, but it seems a bit "unexpected" We noticed that on January 20, US President Trump rarely criticized Russian President Putin in a news report. Two days later, on January 22, US President Trump further clarified his stance on the Ukraine issue and issued a threat to Russia, stating that if Russia does not reach an agreement with Ukraine to end the conflict soon, the US may impose sanctions on Russia and levy high tariffs. Earlier, on January 20, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov had just stated at the annual press conference that Russia expected the Trump team to form views on international issues. Although Lavrov acknowledged that regarding the widely rumored possible meeting between Trump and Putin, Russia had not yet received specific proposals from the US team, Russia's expectation for the Trump administration was evident. As early as December 5, 2024, in an interview with American media personality Carlson, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov publicly stated that Russia hoped to establish normal relations with the US, and there was "no reason why the two countries cannot cooperate." Now, Russia's expectation of "the Trump team forming views on international issues" has finally emerged, but it seems a bit "unexpected." In our view, the signal Trump is sending to Russia is clear: it was Russia that sought the US, not the other way around. Obviously, Trump also "agrees" with Lavrov's view that "there is no reason why Russia and the US cannot cooperate," but the premise for "cooperation" is that Russia must do as the US says. Otherwise, the US may impose sanctions on Russia and levy high tariffs. Clearly, President Putin suddenly has a strong premonition that he may be tricked again (the last time was when former German Chancellor Merkel and former French President Hollande publicly humiliated him, saying that the "Minsk Agreement" was a hoax carefully planned to give Ukraine enough time to prepare for war). ●Europe and Russia Respond Rapidly to Changes in Trump's "Strategic Contraction" On the afternoon of January 21, 2025, ******* held a video meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. The two heads of state exchanged New Year greetings. Xi Jinping noted that the Chinese New Year was just a few days away, and he was delighted to have this video meeting with President Putin at this moment of bidding farewell to the old year and welcoming the new. He wished that the China-Russia relationship would be thriving in the new year. Putin expressed his delight at the video exchange with President Xi Jinping at the beginning of the new year, wishing President Xi Jinping and the Chinese people a happy Spring Festival and all the best! Feeling strongly that he might be deceived again, Russian President Vladimir Putin placed a call to Beijing. In our observation and assessment, Putin sent a strong signal to the US: if Trump dares to deceive Russia, Russia will "swing back" and lean further towards China. Similarly, following his New Year speeches in the air force in 2023 and the navy in 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron warned Europe on January 20, 2025, that it needed to remain vigilant towards the US's strategic adjustments and emphasized that Europe needed to achieve self-defense. On the same day, Trump signed an executive order renaming the "Gulf of Mexico" as the "Gulf of America" (The renaming of the Gulf of Mexico is symbolic. If the US annexes Canada and Greenland, it would be the irrevocable start of its strategic contraction. The US has historically seized a large amount of territory from Mexico, which is why it was originally called the Gulf of Mexico). Obviously, Trump was emphasizing that his so-called "strategic contraction" was not just talk. It is worth mentioning that Macron stressed, "Who would have thought that just a year ago, Greenland would become the center of political and strategic discussions? Faced with the accumulation of threats, the evolution of risks and interests, we need to clearly recognize these changes." In our view, French President Macron, a typical representative of "old Europe," has also realized the rapid changes in the situation and conveyed that "in the face of possible US strategic contraction, Europe must have a response to these changes." In other words, since the US intends to play the game of "alliance and division" with Russia, the European Union (old Europe) can naturally do the same with China. It is not difficult to see that Russia, which feels it may be deceived again, and the European Union, whose mentality has become complex, have quickly responded and adjusted to the changes and developments in Trump's "US strategic contraction" discourse. Such changes can naturally be faced calmly by China. Whether it's the US, the European Union, or Russia, let them play to their heart's content. China will focus on its own affairs, as the saying goes, "The army moves forward, production grows. With strengthened discipline, revolution cannot be defeated." ●Before "Alliance and Division" Even Begins, the US Seems to Have Lost a Round After the changes in Russia and the European Union ("old Europe"), things seem to have become somewhat awkward for newly inaugurated US President Trump: First, the European Union has expressed serious concerns about the possible US-Russia cooperation, emphasizing that "Europe needs to achieve self-defense." Second, based on the first point, the US, fearing the departure of the European Union, turned around and criticized and pressured Russia on the Ukraine issue. Third, based on the second point, Russia, feeling that it might be deceived again, expressed its strong dissatisfaction by saying that "if all else fails, we will swing back and lean further towards China." Fourth, based on the third point, it seems that the US has lost a round even before "alliance and division" has officially begun. The US has ended up in a dilemma, making itself disliked by both the European Union ("old Europe") and Russia. It is obvious that the US cannot do without the European Union. The European Union is also well aware of this. Therefore, it is warning the US in a way that says, "If you dare to make the first move, I will make the fifteenth." In our view, the overall strength of the US, whether in relative or absolute terms, is already weaker than that of China. This is probably the main reason why the US cannot play the game of "alliance and division" and is unlikely to win it. ●Besides Russia's "Afghan Policy Calculations," It is Difficult to Find More Common Ground for "US-Russia Cooperation" By hyping up the "US strategic contraction" to stimulate Russia's "Afghan policy calculations" and using several "strategic deception" tactics to drive a wedge between China and Russia, Trump is also facing an uphill battle. In criticizing Russian President Putin, Trump mentioned Russia's currently grim economic situation. In our view, in a sense, the importance of the West lifting economic sanctions on Russia has surpassed that of the ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war itself. Even in Russia's eyes, the "touchstone" for Trump's proposals is the substantive lifting of sanctions on Russia. If this cannot be achieved, any form of ceasefire in the Ukraine issue is meaningless. Sources indicate that the US intends to exploit the contradictions among OPEC+ members, specifically between OPEC (major oil-producing countries in the Middle East and Africa) and "+" (Russia), to court Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia. For instance, in issues related to jointly controlling international oil prices, or maintaining the basic stability of relations between Saudi Arabia and the US. The problem is, if Russia is expelled, how can sanctions on Russia be lifted? Even if Russia is willing to believe Trump's words due to its "Afghan policy calculations," the Russian decision-making layer probably cannot turn a blind eye to the harsh economic sanctions still in place. Moreover, as we all know, Russia's economic structure is highly overlapping with that of the US, Canada, and other countries. Fossil fuels, minerals, and agricultural products all occupy important positions in the export of these three countries. For Trump, even if only a part of the economic sanctions on Russia are nominally lifted, it may provoke severe dissatisfaction from conservative interest groups with significant stakes in the fossil fuel industry, mining, and agriculture within the US. ●Both Externally and Internally, Trump's "Diplomacy of Alliances and Divisions" Hinges on Properly Handling Relations with China In addition to balancing external relations, if Trump does not want his "diplomacy of alliances and divisions" strategy to falter midway, he must also address the more complex task of balancing the interests of different domestic interest groups. To elaborate on this, let's take a look at a news report. On January 21st, U.S. President Trump announced at the White House that three companies—Japan's SoftBank Group, the U.S.-based OpenAI, and Oracle—will invest $500 billion to build infrastructure in the United States to support AI development. As typical representatives of the so-called American elite, whether it's Trump or Biden, they probably already know that the United States is beyond saving. Therefore, for them, based on realistic considerations, there are only two important things: first, to champion the slogan "Make America Great Again"; and second, on the basis of the first, to seek the interests of their own small group as much as possible. That is to say, based on the typical characteristic of "internal and external cultivation," the only thing Trump can do and believes he needs to do after taking office is to abuse his power for personal gain. The meaning of "internal and external cultivation" is that the Trump administration uses its foreign policy as a means to better abuse power for personal gain domestically. Taking the "new military-industrial complex" as an example, this is certainly a reward for those who fully supported Trump's ascent to power, such as Musk and Zuckerberg. For the conservative forces in American interests, such as the "old military-industrial complex," the traditional fossil fuel industry, mining, agriculture, etc., it would be best if they could be "integrated." The primary means of "integration" is naturally to "make the new cake bigger," such as creating a "new military-industrial complex" and building a "new American capital interest group" (distinct from the "old American capital interest group," but still part of the concept of "American capital interests," and at least at this stage, still representing "Western capital interests"). That is to say, in the process of "integration," the cheese of the "old American capital interest group" should be disturbed as little as possible, and so-called "unity" should be maintained as much as possible. The problem is, how and whether today's United States, which has long transitioned from "industrial capitalism" to "financial capitalism," with severe hollowing out of its manufacturing sector and still mired in "three-front wars" (Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Western Pacific) or at least "two-front wars" (Ukraine and the Middle East), can "make the new cake bigger." In our observations and assessments, the United States today has zero chance of first balancing internal contradictions by "making the cake bigger." Taking the "new military-industrial complex" as an example, it will probably ultimately only "land" in the virtual economy and financial games. That is to say, the "new military-industrial complex" will be an industry "with manufacturing as a supplementary component and the virtual economy as the primary component." Regarding this, at least within the United States, Trump seems confident now. With SoftBank investing $500 billion, "money is not a problem" under Trump's administration, and all that remains is to "tell a good story." Of course, judging from Musk's rare "cold water" on Trump regarding the SoftBank investment, even within the "Trump camp," it is not a monolithic bloc. At least "Minister Ma" has reason to question Trump: why aren't Tesla, Space-X, and the "X platform" included in building infrastructure to support AI development in the United States? Based on the above discussion, it is not difficult to see that Trump's "diplomacy of alliances and divisions," both externally and internally, seems to be aimed at creating leverage against China, as long as China can be coerced into not interfering when the United States openly and massively starts printing money. Or rather, whether externally or internally, Trump's desire to play "diplomacy of alliances and divisions" hinges on properly handling relations with China. ●The AI Version of the "China Threat Theory" It should be emphasized that "properly handling relations with China" does not mean that future Sino-U.S. relations will develop in a more constructive direction, but rather will become more delicate and complex. To describe this, a famous Western saying may be most apt: "A false peace is more dangerous than open war." For the United States, this translates into the reality that, both externally and internally, the United States still needs to establish an enemy—China. "Diplomacy of alliances and divisions" is a strategy to continue confronting China. Judging from the news report that Japan's SoftBank Group, the U.S.-based OpenAI, and Oracle will invest $500 billion to build infrastructure in the United States to support AI development, China, this enemy, will first be established at the level of AI technology development and application. It can be said that this is the AI version of the "China threat theory." Ironically, Musk has reason to believe that Trump's desire to balance his influence is also based on this. Obviously, Trump does not want to rely solely on Musk. But the problem is that since Musk is a combination of "industrial capital" and "financial capital," Trump cannot succeed without completely abandoning Musk either. Finally, it should be added that there is a possibility that Trump could fundamentally change the political climate in the United States during his term in office. That is, following the example of Hitler (who developed the German economy for a period, putting milk and bread on the tables of German citizens, which gave Hitler unprecedented support and laid a solid foundation for him to eliminate various internal political factions in Germany, including the German Communist Party and the Storm Troopers), leveraging the "red giant effect" (including blowing bubbles, printing money, telling stories, including the military-industrial complex, AI, the X Empire, which are excellent excuses for printing money), becoming dominant, and forcefully settling internal accounts. Obviously, even though Trump took office smoothly on January 20th, it does not mean that the "fierce battle" within the United States over this presidential election will easily subside. [Related Topics] Issue 7742 - Diplomacy of Alliances and Divisions (3): If the "New and Old Military-Industrial Complexes" in the United States "Marry" and "Branch Out," It Could Serve as One of the Entry Points for Observing the Smooth Transition Between Biden and Trump (January 19, 2025)
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