2025年1月3日，星期五，第1147期

“什叶派抵抗之弧”被截断后
伊朗在中东还能算是“四个地方王国家”之一吗？

【媒体报道】

1月1日，伊朗召见沙特阿拉伯驻德黑兰大使，强烈抗议因涉嫌贩毒而被关押在该国的六名伊朗公民被处决。

1月2日，援引数名消息人士的话称，美国总统拜登及其安全团队大约一个月前讨论了打击伊朗核设施的选项，但拜登并未作出任何最终决定。根据一名美国官员的说法，这次讨论并非由最新情报驱动，而是对未来事态应变计划的讨论，即如果伊朗在特朗普1月20日就职典礼之前接近制造核弹，美国该如何应对。

1月3日，美国国务院前乌克兰问题特使（特朗普第一任期）沃尔克认为，乌克兰将不得不承认失去对已经加入俄罗斯地区的控制，并放弃尝试以军事行动夺回这些地区。

【讨论纪要】

●王毅外长强调“中东是中东人民的中东”的弦外之音是什么？

国际社会目前并不急于重返叙利亚，更多是通过进一步发展与类似沙特这样国家之间的关系，间接影响叙利亚局势后续发展，态度上更接近于“广交朋友、无私利”。谋略上是“不争是争”，是“后发制人”，主打一个“神龙见首不见尾”。

2024年12月19日，中共中央政治局委员、外交部长王毅在北京集体会见阿拉伯各国驻华使节。

王毅指出，中东是中东人民的中东，中东不能继续沦为大国博弈的角斗场、地缘冲突的牺牲品。国际社会应当尊重地区国家的合理关切、自主选择和历史文化传统，支持地区国家和睦相处，实现长治久安。加沙应尽快全面停火、永久撤军，在“两国方案”基础上推动巴勒斯坦问题得到全面公正持久解决。黎巴嫩的主权、安全和领土完整必须得到维护。叙利亚各派别应当从国家和人民长远利益出发，开启开放包容的政治解决进程，尤其要防止恐怖主义趁乱回潮。中方将继续支持阿拉伯国家加强战略自主、实现团结自强，把前途命运掌握在自己手中，也将继续为中东和平稳定做出努力。

在叙利亚阿萨德政权被颠覆后，阿拉伯各国驻华使节集体前往北京的主要目的在于“问计中国”。对此，王毅外长强调，“中东是中东人民的中东”。言外之意就是，你们（阿拉伯各国）“应该知道如何做”。在我们看来，1月2日，以叙利亚过渡政府外长希巴尼率团访问沙特前，科威特外交大臣阿卜杜拉·叶海亚和海湾阿拉伯国家合作委员会秘书长贾西姆·布代维于2024年12月30日会见叙利亚过渡政府政要默罕默德·沙拉为代表的海湾阿拉伯国家与叙利亚临时政府之间的密集互动是践行“应该知道如何去做”的具体表现之一。如果说，在绝没有全球战略视野的叙利亚过渡政府（“沙姆解放组织”）其外长将首访放在沙特的背后一定有某些具有全球视野的势力在“背后支招”，那么，海湾阿拉伯国家的背后恐怕也有“高人指点”。

●伊朗是否还算是“中东四大地方王国家”之一？

俄罗斯与伊朗急切想要重返叙利亚，但却因力所不逮，尤其是继续做出错误的战略选择导致“重返方式错误”。这使得这两个国家在错误重返叙利亚的路线上越走越尴尬，路子越走越窄。

尽管土耳其目前阶段主导叙利亚过渡政府，但毕竟土耳其实力有限，必须借助一拨势力去平衡其他其他势力。比如，拉着俄罗斯和伊朗平衡欧蒙、将其拉进来，进而平衡美、以。当然，土耳其对俄罗斯、伊朗所谓的拉拢，是建立在两国以“龙套身份”介入叙利亚局势后续发展基础上的。

如何理解“龙套身份”？我们不妨以伊朗为例继续展开讨论。

有网友提出问题，在阿萨德政权被颠覆后，在伊朗苦心经营多年的“什叶派抵抗之弧”被截断后，伊朗是否还算是“中东四大地方王国家”之一？

在我们看来，答案是肯定的，只是当前的伊朗比阿萨德政权被颠覆之前要“落魄”很多。这主要指的是伊朗的国家威信在国际上大受损失，沦落到“姥姥不亲，舅舅不爱”的地步；伊朗的宗教影响在中东地区，乃至整个伊斯兰世界也被削弱很多；在政治上，伊朗当前阶段运行在“投降主义”主导的错误对外政策路线上。至少在2025年1月20日之前，遭遇美国直接军事打击的风险极高（美国媒体炒作称，拜登政府秘密讨论轰炸伊朗核设施）。之所以我们仍将伊朗看作是“中东四大地方王国家”之一，一个可见的原因就在，尽管伊朗重回叙利亚“方式错误”，但毕竟还不甘寂寞，小心思很多。此外，对西方而言，如果伊朗不再是“中东四大地方王国家”，其对西方利用中东国家民族，尤其是宗教矛盾、通过“离岸制衡”策略有效维持中东地区稳定显然是不利的。

●伊朗走到今天这步田地的核心原因在于，不敢、更不愿在叙利亚和西方彻底翻脸

在伊朗眼中，目前与叙利亚过渡政府密切互动的沙特，大有在叙利亚取代伊朗之意，伊朗自然是看在眼里，急在心头，主打一个不甘心！叙利亚伊朗从来都将其视为“自己的地盘儿”，什叶派穆斯林的势力范围。这或是目前伊朗对沙特抵触心理很强烈的主要原因之一。

在我们看来，伊朗的表现是不合适的。原因很简单，叙利亚今天这个局面不是沙特造成的，恰恰是伊朗和俄罗斯的错误战略决策造成的。现在伊朗想要重返叙利亚，不仅力所不逮，而且方式错误，在这种情况下，仍然极其抵触沙特与叙利亚过渡政府的互动就显得没有道理了。难道只允许伊朗“州官放火”，不允许海湾阿拉伯国家“百姓点灯”？

顺便一提的是，此前，国际社会选择沙特为主要合作伙伴，而非伊朗的决策在今天看来无比正确。某种意义上说，伊朗对国际社会的价值，第一在于伊朗的能源；第二在于伊朗的地缘政治战略优势。在叙利亚阿萨德政权被颠覆后，伊朗的地缘战略价值显然已大幅下降。这恐怕是伊朗现在需要正视的事实。

当然，伊朗并不是一个一无是处的国家，比如，伊朗是世界上为数不多的拥有较为完善工业门类的国家，这是伊朗的优势，的确很难得，但伊朗决策层的错误认识却把中国当成了伊朗商品在伊斯兰世界，特别是在中东和中亚的主要竞争对手之一。这或是伊朗某种意义上也较为抵触中国，甚至始终在中亚地区保有本不该存在的“大波斯主义”的重要原因之一。

值得一提的是，中国没有能够从俄罗斯进口更多的能源，一个原因是，出于国家安全保证，中国的能源进口途径必须多元化；另一个原因是，俄罗斯全球战略长期运行在错误的路线上，出于对中国的防备和提防，以及对融入西方的憧憬，在建设中俄能源管线问题上拖拉已久（“西伯利亚力量-2”天然气管线目前还在规划中），使得俄罗斯即便有足够多能源也不能大量向中国出口。这或是伊朗的能源在中国市场占有一席之地的主要原因。

此外，伊朗应该记得，在西方严厉制裁伊朗的时候，全世界只有中国对伊朗的原油照买不误，所以，伊朗在中国面前展现出的傲慢，于情于理都不合适。顺便提一句的是，“伊朗式傲慢”世界闻名，自觉在人种、文化、宗教等方面高人一等。1991年，时任中国国家主席的杨尚昆就曾遭遇过“伊朗式傲慢”。讽刺的是，尽管如此，“伊朗式傲慢”却会屈从于强权和力量。

如果当时俄罗斯和伊朗按我们的建议首先在叙利亚，瞄着幼发拉底河东岸的美军基地和戈兰高地“玩起来”，不至于沦落到今天的地步。在我们看来，伊朗之所以选择用挑动巴以问题（牺牲巴勒斯坦，牺牲哈马斯）的方式，就是因为惧怕美国，不敢、更不愿在叙利亚和西方彻底翻脸。

叙利亚阿萨德政权被颠覆后，在什叶派抵抗之弧的主要成员，哈马斯，黎巴嫩真主党，胡塞武装等最需要伊朗的时候，伊朗却一边紧急将4000军人撤离叙利亚（遭到俄罗斯总统普京“吐槽”），另一边撇清关系，声称自己在叙利亚没有“代理人”。对这样的国家，包括海湾阿拉伯国家在内的国际社会恐怕都会“斜眼视之”，于是也就有了伊朗1月1日召见沙特阿拉伯驻德黑兰大使，强烈抗议因涉嫌贩毒而被关押在该国的六名伊朗公民被处决这件事儿（内政部没有详细说明在沙特执行死刑的日期）一幕的上演。在我们看来，以叙利亚问题为例，如果没有国际社会的战略策应，西方恐怕根本就不会正眼看俄罗斯、伊朗一下。

●如果俄罗斯不改弦更张，不排除变为“大号的叙利亚”的可能性

无独有偶，我们经常将俄罗斯称为“大号的伊朗”，两个国家在看待这个世界，制定相关战略和做出相关决策的时候，其思维方式和逻辑总是惊人的相似。

近期，有消息称，素有“普京大脑”之称的俄罗斯著名战略家杜金表示，必要时刻可以通过归中国远东故土的方式换取中国的实质性战略支援。如果消息属实，暂不说杜金或者俄罗斯决策层是否真的有这样的想法，至少说明目前阶段，俄罗斯国内的精英人士认为俄罗斯的确已经处于十分危险的境地。

这种消息的出现依然证明俄罗斯决策层的思维运行在错误的路线上，显然，这是在向西方发出警告信号，实在不行，俄罗斯真的可以“投八路”，不要欺人太甚！在我们看来，如果俄罗斯真的决心已下，又何必通过这种“历史遗留问题”的方式谋求中国的实质性战略策应呢，何况这又很务虚？看来，在俄罗斯的心目中，中国仍然是一个眼里只有“俄罗斯领土”（中国故土）的“图强必霸”者，只有信奉帝国主义和大国沙文主义的国家才始终迷信于领土的“割让”或“扩张”。俄罗斯完全可以通过选择推动“首先两件事，其次两件”，以及与中国实质性联手、稳定中亚，安定南亚进程的方式，对西方发出最强烈的警告信号。看来，在俄罗斯的心中，即便“割让”领土，也不能放弃“阿富汗政策小九九”！俄罗斯仍然对西方抱有不切实际的政治幻想，尤其是那位对俄罗斯“百般安抚”且只有两周多一点时间就要走马上任的美国当选总统特朗普。

不难想象的是，如果俄罗斯不改弦更张，俄白联盟被瓦解恐怕就在不远的将来。一旦俄白联盟被瓦解，俄罗斯核威慑被实质性解除，普京政权还能维持多久呢？

可以预见的是，如果真的有一天俄罗斯普京政权如同阿萨德政权一样倒下后，恐怕插手的势力会更多，此时的俄罗斯就是一个“大号的叙利亚”（首先是白俄罗斯先成为“叙利亚第二”）。也许就在这样一个争抢过程中，欧美两家，一家被重创，一家死掉。在我们的观察与评估中，即便如此，恐怕也不妨碍美利坚合众国作为传统意义上的完整国家，最晚在2032年前瓦解。所以，本质上，俄罗斯是死是活，我们并不在乎，我们只在乎不让西方顺利消化俄罗斯。

●再次提醒俄罗斯和伊朗决策层，高度警惕拜登政府玩一出“声东击西”

我们再次提醒俄罗斯和伊朗决策层，至少在2025年1月20日之前高度警惕美国（拜登政府）玩一出“声东击西”。

我们注意到，近日，有特朗普第一任期的美国乌克兰问题特使有关“基辅将不得不放弃通过军事手段夺回领土”的相关言论。显然，这是特朗普企图在拜登政府不断挑衅、刺激俄罗斯的情况下，想方设法稳住俄罗斯的具体表现。

需要俄罗斯决策层注意的是，拜登在瞄着白俄罗斯玩一手“声东击西”的过程中，至少在客观上和特朗普想方设法稳住俄罗斯的做法形成“双簧”。也就是说，在俄罗斯或出于主观，或因为客观因素而继续期待特朗普上位（至少是）后俄罗斯的战略处境能有所好转的过程中，白俄罗斯或真的会“出事”，比如，遭到北约的军事挑衅或军事入侵。而由此导致的严重后果是，要么俄罗斯选择不可逆的和西方彻底决裂，要么俄罗斯选择如伊朗坐视阿萨德政权被推翻一样坐视卢卡申科政权倾覆，俄白联盟被瓦解。一旦如此，俄罗斯核威慑的有效性将随之被实质性解除。在我们看来，就算实质性消化俄罗斯之相关进程（当然，时间越短越好）仅仅被大幅推动，也足以相当程度上缓解拜登与“拜登们”和特朗普与“特朗普们”之间的矛盾。

如果俄罗斯不能继续忍受拜登政府的挑衅和刺激的话，那就按其给俄罗斯“指出的方向”，在乌克兰问题上，尤其是中东问题上做出反击吧！也许拜登会这样说，这是我在下台之前，给俄罗斯提供的重返叙利亚的最后机会！俄罗斯大可和伊朗签订什么协议，让伊朗敢于在俄罗斯的支持下，比如核背书下，敢于坚定推动反美、反以进程，比如，重新打通“什叶派抵抗之弧”（把以色列向“小胜”方向引导）。

需要伊朗决策层注意的是，在拜登正式下台前的十几天时间里，谨防拜登政府借也玩一把“声东击西”，只是这个“东”指的是白俄罗斯，而“西”是伊朗自己。也就是说，不排除美国对伊朗直接发动军事打击的可能性。至于借口，美国媒体已经为伊朗找好了——只要伊朗要造核弹！且是美国说说你造了你就造了，没造也是造了！

●种种迹象表明，中东局势持续混乱不利于美国长远国家利益

在伊朗苦心经营多年的“什叶派抵抗之弧”四分五裂之际，对黎巴嫩真主党而言，转进到叙利亚后，作为一方割据势力倒也不愁日后没有人找上门给钱，给抢。胡塞武装目前和以色列打得有来有回，有声有色，恐怕方方面面或已经与其直接或间接接触了，只要“孺子可教”，日后成为新的什叶派抵抗力量的领袖也未可知。只是伊朗，哈梅内伊怎么办？

当然，如果伊朗真的内部大乱，理论上倒也可成为拜登和特朗普合作的基础。毕竟伊朗这个“蛋糕”不比乌克兰这个“蛋糕”小多少，甚至更大些。但问题在于，解决伊朗不是一天两天能成的，一旦各方势力如同今天介入叙利亚一样介入伊朗内乱后续发展之中，比如，欧盟，会与美国同心同德的？届时局面美国又如何把握？所以，综合来看，伊朗大乱并导致中东局势更加混乱复杂，对美国长期利益是没好处的，除非特朗普因需要给美元打一针强心剂而搞乱伊朗。但是，如果真的是那样，甚至波斯湾一片混乱，美国世界霸权，尤其是金融霸权距离被从根本上打倒还有多远呢？

最后需要补充的是，在欧盟，尤其是“老欧洲”开始积极介入叙利亚局势后续发展的背景下，还未正式上位的特朗普也许在思考如何防范欧洲人尾大不掉的问题了。不难想象，一旦欧盟（老欧洲）在叙利亚站稳脚跟，欧盟（老欧洲）一定会拉各方，比如中国，和美国周旋，甚至就此周旋出一条独立于美国之外的欧盟自己的能源通道。如果欧盟借此机会倒逼美国，重开和俄罗斯之间的能源通道，届时美国如何在中东，尤其是欧洲自处？显然，这些可能性，似乎都落在王外长的那句“欧洲是欧洲的欧洲”这句话上。换句话说，透过欧盟急于争夺叙利亚这个“中东十字路口”来观察，与其说欧盟“反俄”，倒不如说欧盟“反美”。

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声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

January 3, 2025, Friday, Issue 1147

After the "Shiite Axis of Resistance" is Severed,
Can Iran Still be Considered One of the "Four Regional Powers" in the Middle East?

[Media Reports]

On January 1, Iran summoned the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Tehran to strongly protest the execution of six Iranian citizens who had been held in the country on suspicion of drug trafficking.

On January 2, citing several sources, it was reported that US President Biden and his security team discussed options for striking Iranian nuclear facilities about a month ago, but Biden did not make any final decisions. According to a US official, this discussion was not driven by the latest intelligence but was a contingency plan for future developments, namely, how the US should respond if Iran approaches the manufacturing of nuclear bombs before Trump's inauguration on January 20.

On January 3, former US Special Envoy for Ukraine (during Trump's first term) Volker believed that Ukraine would have to acknowledge the loss of control over regions that have joined Russia and abandon attempts to retake these areas through military action.

[Discussion Summary]

● What is the underlying message of Foreign Minister Wang Yi's emphasis that "the Middle East belongs to the people of the Middle East"?

The international community is not in a hurry to return to Syria; instead, it is indirectly influencing the subsequent development of the situation in Syria by further developing relationships with countries like Saudi Arabia. Its attitude is closer to "making friends widely without selfish interests." In terms of strategy, it is "not competing is competing" and "striking last," emphasizing a "mysterious and unpredictable" approach.

On December 19, 2024, Wang Yi, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Foreign Minister, collectively met with Arab ambassadors to China in Beijing.

Wang Yi pointed out that the Middle East belongs to the people of the Middle East and cannot continue to be a gladiatorial arena for great power games or a sacrifice for geopolitical conflicts. The international community should respect the reasonable concerns, independent choices, and historical and cultural traditions of regional countries, support harmonious coexistence among regional countries, and achieve long-term peace and stability. A comprehensive ceasefire and permanent withdrawal should be achieved in Gaza as soon as possible, and the Palestinian issue should be comprehensively, fairly, and lastingly resolved on the basis of the "two-state solution." Lebanon's sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity must be upheld. All factions in Syria should proceed from the long-term interests of the country and its people, initiate an open and inclusive political resolution process, and especially prevent the resurgence of terrorism amid the chaos. China will continue to support Arab countries in strengthening strategic autonomy, achieving unity and self-improvement, and taking their future and destiny into their own hands. China will also continue to contribute to peace and stability in the Middle East.

After the Assad regime was overturned, Arab ambassadors to China collectively visited Beijing mainly to "seek advice from China." In this regard, Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized that "the Middle East belongs to the people of the Middle East." The implication is that you (Arab countries) "should know what to do." In our view, before the foreign minister of the Syrian Transitional Government, Hibani, led a delegation to visit Saudi Arabia on January 2, the intensive interactions between Gulf Arab countries and the Syrian Interim Government, represented by the meeting between Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Abdullah Al-Yahya and Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Jassim Al-Budaiwi with Syrian Interim Government official Mohammed Sharaa on December 30, 2024, are one of the concrete manifestations of practicing "knowing what to do." If the Syrian Transitional Government ("Syrian Liberation Organization"), which lacks a global strategic vision, has its foreign minister's first visit to Saudi Arabia, it is certain that some force with a global vision is "advising behind the scenes." Then, there are probably also "wise men guiding" behind the Gulf Arab countries.

● Is Iran still considered one of the "Four Regional Powers" in the Middle East?

Russia and Iran are eager to return to Syria, but they are unable to do so effectively, especially due to continued erroneous strategic choices leading to "incorrect ways of returning." This has made these two countries increasingly embarrassed and their path increasingly narrow as they continue down the wrong path of returning to Syria.

Although Turkey currently dominates the Syrian Transitional Government, its strength is limited, and it must rely on a group of forces to balance other forces. For example, by bringing in Russia and Iran to balance the European Union and others, and then using them to balance the US and Israel. Of course, Turkey's so-called courting of Russia and Iran is based on the premise that these two countries will intervene in the subsequent development of the situation in Syria as "supporting actors."

How do we understand the term "supporting actors"? Let's continue the discussion with Iran as an example.

Some netizens have asked whether Iran can still be considered one of the "Four Regional Powers" in the Middle East after the Assad regime was overturned and Iran's carefully cultivated "Shiite Axis of Resistance" was severed.

In our view, the answer is yes, but the current Iran is much "more downtrodden" than before the overthrow of the Assad regime. This mainly refers to Iran's national prestige being greatly damaged internationally, to the point of being "unloved by everyone"; Iran's religious influence in the Middle East and the entire Islamic world has also been significantly weakened; politically, Iran is currently pursuing an erroneous foreign policy dominated by "surrenderism." At least until January 20, 2025, the risk of a direct military strike by the US is extremely high (US media speculate that the Biden administration is secretly discussing bombing Iranian nuclear facilities). The reason we still consider Iran one of the "Four Regional Powers" in the Middle East is that, despite its "incorrect approach" to returning to Syria, it is still restless and has many schemes. Furthermore, for the West, if Iran is no longer one of the "Four Regional Powers" in the Middle East, it would be unfavorable for the West to effectively maintain stability in the Middle East by exploiting ethnic and, especially, religious conflicts among Middle Eastern countries through an "offshore balancing" strategy.

● The core reason for Iran's current predicament is its reluctance, and even unwillingness, to completely break with Syria and the West.

In Iran's view, Saudi Arabia, which is currently interacting closely with the Syrian transitional government, seems intent on replacing Iran in Syria. Iran, naturally, sees this and is anxious, driven by a sense of不甘 (reluctance/unwillingness to accept). Syria has always been seen by Iran as its "own territory," a sphere of influence for Shia Muslims. This is perhaps one of the main reasons for Iran's strong resistance to Saudi Arabia.

From our perspective, Iran's behavior is inappropriate. The reason is simple: the current situation in Syria was not caused by Saudi Arabia, but rather by the erroneous strategic decisions of Iran and Russia. Now, Iran wants to return to Syria, but it is neither capable nor using the right approach. In this context, its strong resistance to Saudi Arabia's interaction with the Syrian transitional government seems unreasonable. Is it only allowable for Iran to "play with fire" while denying Gulf Arab countries the right to "light a lamp"?

It's worth mentioning that the international community's decision to choose Saudi Arabia as its main partner, rather than Iran, looks extremely wise today. In a sense, Iran's value to the international community lies firstly in its energy resources and secondly in its geopolitical strategic advantages. After the Assad regime in Syria was overthrown, Iran's geopolitical strategic value has obviously decreased significantly. This is a fact that Iran now needs to face.

Of course, Iran is not a worthless country. For example, Iran is one of the few countries in the world with a relatively complete industrial sector, which is a rare advantage. However, Iran's decision-makers mistakenly view China as one of Iran's main competitors in the Islamic world, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia. This is perhaps one of the important reasons why Iran is also somewhat resistant to China and even maintains an unwarranted "Greater Persianism" in Central Asia.

It's worth noting that one reason China hasn't been able to import more energy from Russia is that, for national security, China's energy import routes must be diversified. Another reason is that Russia's global strategy has long been on the wrong track. Due to its wariness of China and its aspiration to integrate with the West, Russia has been dragging its feet on constructing the Sino-Russian energy pipeline ("Power of Siberia-2" natural gas pipeline is still in the planning stage), making it impossible for Russia to export large amounts of energy to China even if it has enough. This is perhaps the main reason why Iran's energy has a place in the Chinese market.

Furthermore, Iran should remember that when the West imposed severe sanctions on it, China was the only country in the world that continued to buy Iran's crude oil. Therefore, Iran's arrogance towards China is neither appropriate in terms of sentiment nor reason. Incidentally, "Iranian arrogance" is world-renowned, with Iranians considering themselves superior in terms of race, culture, and religion. In 1991, then-Chinese President Yang Shangkun experienced "Iranian arrogance." Ironically, despite this, "Iranian arrogance" submits to power and strength.

If Russia and Iran had followed our advice and first "played" in Syria, targeting the US military bases on the east bank of the Euphrates River and the Golan Heights, they wouldn't have ended up in their current situation. In our view, the reason Iran chose to stir up the Israeli-Palestinian issue (sacrificing Palestine and Hamas) is because it fears the United States and is reluctant, and even unwilling, to completely break with Syria and the West.

After the Assad regime in Syria was overthrown, when Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis, the main members of the Shia resistance arc, needed Iran the most, Iran hastily withdrew 4,000 soldiers from Syria (earning a "complaint" from Russian President Putin) and distanced itself, claiming it had no "proxies" in Syria. The international community, including Gulf Arab countries, is likely to view such a country with skepticism. Hence, the incident on January 1st where Iran summoned the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Tehran to strongly protest the execution of six Iranian citizens detained in the country on suspicion of drug trafficking (the Ministry of the Interior did not specify the date of the execution in Saudi Arabia). In our view, taking the Syrian issue as an example, without strategic coordination from the international community, the West probably wouldn't have given Russia and Iran a second look.

● If Russia doesn't change course, it could become a "larger-scale Syria."

Similarly, we often refer to Russia as a "larger-scale Iran." When these two countries look at the world, formulate relevant strategies, and make decisions, their way of thinking and logic are strikingly similar.

Recently, it was reported that Aleksandr Dugin, a prominent Russian strategist known as "Putin's brain," said that if necessary, Russia could seek substantive strategic support from China by returning China's far eastern territories. If the report is true, regardless of whether Dugin or the Russian decision-makers really have such an idea, it at least indicates that at this stage, Russian elites believe that Russia is indeed in a very dangerous situation.

The emergence of such news still proves that the Russian decision-making process is on the wrong track. Clearly, this is a warning signal to the West: if push comes to shove, Russia can really "join the resistance" (a metaphorical expression, implying switching sides or seeking alternative alliances), so don't push too hard! In our view, if Russia has really made up its mind, why bother seeking substantive strategic support from China through this "historical legacy issue," which is also very abstract? It seems that in Russia's eyes, China is still a "power-seeking and hegemonic" country that only cares about "Russian territories" (which are actually China's ancient territories). Only countries that believe in imperialism and great power chauvinism are obsessed with the "cession" or "expansion" of territories. Russia could issue the strongest warning signal to the West by choosing to promote "first two things, then another two," and by substantially teaming up with China to stabilize Central Asia and bring peace to South Asia. It seems that in Russia's heart, even "ceding" territories cannot make it abandon its "Afghanistan policy machinations"! Russia still harbors unrealistic political fantasies about the West, especially about the US President-elect Trump, who has been "soothing" Russia and will take office in just over two weeks.

It's not hard to imagine that if Russia doesn't change course, the Russia-Belarus Union could be dismantled in the not-so-distant future. Once the Russia-Belarus Union is dismantled and Russia's nuclear deterrence is substantially lifted, how long can the Putin regime last?

It is foreseeable that if one day the Putin regime in Russia falls, just like the Assad regime, even more forces are likely to get involved. In this scramble, one of the European or American powers could be severely damaged, and the other could collapse. In our observation and assessment, even if this happens, it probably won't prevent the United States of America, in the traditional sense, from disintegrating by 2032 at the latest. Therefore, essentially, we don't care whether Russia lives or dies; we only care about not allowing the West to smoothly absorb Russia.

●A Reminder to Russian and Iranian Decision-Makers: Be Highly Vigilant Against the Biden Administration's "Diversionary Tactic"

We once again remind the decision-makers in Russia and Iran to be highly vigilant against the United States (Biden administration) employing a "diversionary tactic" at least until January 20, 2025.

We have noticed that recently, the U.S. special envoy for Ukraine during Trump's first term made remarks about "Kyiv having to abandon recapturing territories through military means." Clearly, this is Trump's attempt to stabilize Russia amidst the Biden administration's continuous provocations and provocations against Russia.

It is important for Russian decision-makers to note that, in the process of Biden targeting Belarus with a "diversionary tactic," he objectively forms a "duet" with Trump's efforts to stabilize Russia. That is to say, while Russia, either subjectively or due to objective factors, continues to anticipate an improvement in its strategic situation after Trump (or at least someone similar) comes to power, Belarus may really "be in trouble," such as facing NATO's military provocation or invasion. The serious consequences of this would be that Russia either chooses an irreversible and complete break with the West, or it chooses to sit idly by, like Iran did when the Assad regime was overthrown, and watch the Lukashenko regime fall and the Russia-Belarus alliance disintegrate. Once this happens, the effectiveness of Russia's nuclear deterrence will be substantially undermined. In our view, even if the process of substantially addressing Russia (naturally, the sooner the better) is only significantly advanced, it will be sufficient to alleviate the contradictions between Biden and the "Bidens" and Trump and the "Trumps" to a considerable extent.

If Russia cannot continue to tolerate the provocations and provocations of the Biden administration, then it should counterattack in the Ukrainian issue, especially in the Middle East issue, in the direction "pointed out" by the Biden administration. Perhaps Biden would say, this is the last chance I'm giving Russia to return to Syria before I leave office! Russia can sign an agreement with Iran, empowering Iran to resolutely push forward the anti-American and anti-Israel process with Russia's support, such as nuclear endorsement, and re-establish the "Shiite Resistance Arc" (steering Israel towards a "minor victory").

Iranian decision-makers should be aware that in the ten-plus days before Biden officially steps down, they must guard against the Biden administration also playing a "diversionary tactic," where the "east" refers to Belarus and the "west" is Iran itself. That is to say, the possibility of the United States launching a direct military strike against Iran cannot be ruled out. As for the pretext, the U.S. media has already found it for Iran - as long as Iran attempts to build nuclear bombs! And it's up to the U.S. to say whether you have or haven't built them, even if you haven't!

●Various Indicators Suggest That Continued Chaos in the Middle East Is Detrimental to U.S. Long-Term National Interests

As the "Shiite Resistance Arc" that Iran has painstakingly built over the years fragments, for Hezbollah in Lebanon, after moving to Syria, they can still count on people coming to them with money and arms as a regional power. The Houthi militia is currently engaging in fierce and lively fighting with Israel, and various parties may have already made direct or indirect contact with them. If they are "teachable," they may become the new leader of the Shiite resistance in the future. But what about Iran and Khamenei?

Of course, if Iran really descends into chaos, it could theoretically become a basis for cooperation between Biden and Trump. After all, the "cake" of Iran is not much smaller than that of Ukraine, and may even be larger. But the problem is that resolving the Iran issue is not something that can be done overnight. Once various forces intervene in the subsequent development of Iran's internal chaos, just as they did in Syria, for example, the EU, will it be united with the United States? How will the United States manage the situation then? Therefore, on the whole, chaos in Iran leading to an even more chaotic and complex situation in the Middle East is not beneficial to U.S. long-term interests, unless Trump intentionally destabilizes Iran to give the dollar a boost. But if that really happens, and the Persian Gulf descends into chaos, how far is the U.S. world hegemony, especially its financial hegemony, from being fundamentally overturned?

Finally, it should be added that, amidst the "old Europe's" active involvement in the subsequent development of the situation in Syria, the not-yet-inaugurated Trump may be thinking about how to prevent Europeans from becoming too independent. It is not hard to imagine that once the EU (old Europe) gains a foothold in Syria, it will definitely rally various parties, such as China, to negotiate with the United States, and even negotiate an independent energy corridor for the EU separate from the United States. If the EU seizes this opportunity to pressure the United States into reopening the energy corridor with Russia, how will the United States position itself in the Middle East, especially in Europe? Obviously, these possibilities seem to align with Foreign Minister Wang's statement that "Europe belongs to Europe." In other words, observing the EU's eagerness to compete for Syria, the "crossroads of the Middle East," it is more accurate to say that the EU is "anti-American" rather than "anti-Russian."

[Related Topics]

Issue 7679 - On the Issue of "Prosecuting" Those Responsible for the Azerbaijan Airlines Incident, Russia Risks Becoming a "Larger Version of Iran" if It Is Not Careful (December 31, 2024)
Issue 7687 - In the 18 Days Leading up to January 20, 2025, the Increasingly Tense Atmosphere Within the United States May Become the Trigger for Explosive News in the Global Situation (January 2, 2025)
Issue 7691 - Based on Foreign Minister Wang's Meeting with Arab Ambassadors to China on December 19, a Brief Discussion on the Strategic Game Levels of Various Parties After "Syria Becomes Chaotic Again" (January 3, 2025)

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