回顾小泉纯一郎、安倍晋三时期的对外（对华）政策的调整与变化，小谈石破茂政府为何如此急迫开启访华之行

【媒体报道】

12月29日，日本首相石破茂再次表达了访问中国的意愿，并强调中日关系“必须保持稳定”。多名日本政府相关人士30日透露，石破茂拟推迟原定于1月中旬的访美行程。

12月29日，巴基斯坦外交部发言人表示，巴基斯坦希望与印度重启建设性接触和对话，以解决所有悬而未决的双边问题，其中包括克什米尔争端问题。

12月31日，法国国防部长勒科尔尼表示，在国际反圣战联盟的框架下，法国打击了叙利亚境内“伊斯兰国”组织阵地。这是巴沙尔·阿萨德下台以后的首次此类行动。

【讨论纪要】

●如果石破茂将新任期首访放在中国，中国或可考虑对其“发放一张机票”；否则，干脆别来！

12月29日，日本首相石破茂再次表达了访问中国的意愿，并强调中日关系“必须保持稳定”。多名日本政府相关人士30日透露，石破茂拟推迟原定于1月中旬的访美行程。

不难看出，日本首相石破茂表达了强烈的访华愿望，只可惜中国目前还没有对其发出邀请。而此前日本外相访华反省“日本过去曾实施了错误的国策，不能再重蹈覆辙，要坚持走和平国家道路”的主要意图之一就在于尽可能为石破茂访华“搞到一张机票”。

在我们看来，之所以中国没有对石破茂发出访华邀请，首先在于日方应明确态度。既然日本急切想要求生于中国经济，那就需要拿出求生的态度来。在这个问题上，日方首先要在石破茂第103期首相任期伊始，在首访选择美国还是中国的问题上明确态度。也就是说，如果石破茂将首访放在中国，中国或可考虑对其“发放一张机票”。否则，干脆别来！

说起日本的对外政策，尤其是对华政策，从很早以前就带有明显的投机色彩，且与国际局势的具体演化，以及日本经济状况的好坏密切相关。

在上次讨论中，我们提到了日本因恐惧于欧美夹击日本（从广场协议开始，日本经济失去了十年），在此基础上，日本再次感受到欧美谋划要再次联合金融攻击他（也就是1997年的亚洲金融风暴），于是在1995年出台“春山讲话”，被迫对日本对外政策，尤其是对华政策有所调整。这次日本外相岩屋毅访华之言论基调就是源自“春山讲话”。

1997年金融危机爆发后，日本在东南亚苦心多年的产业部署遭受灾难性打击，日本蒙受巨大经济损失。为了给重创后的日本经济找到一条重振之路，2001年，时任日本首相小泉纯一郎开启访华之旅。值得有的是，小泉纯一郎到京后要求前往设于北京丰台区卢沟桥畔的中国人民抗日战争纪念馆参观。事后，小泉纯一郎没有发表任何讲话或表态，只留下“忠恕”二字，以此彰显日本意欲遵守“春山讲话”精神之决心。尽管当时的日本已经表现出较为明显的对外政策，尤其是对华政策调整之意，但当时日本的想法还是很多的。比如，以朝鲜半岛为“跳板”，以广袤的中国市场为“腹地”重振日本经济。

●日本对外，尤其是对华政策调整问题上的典型代表人物——日本前首相安倍晋三其人

在日本对外政策，尤其是对华政策变化、调整中比较活跃的日本政客，除了小泉纯一郎外，还有安倍晋三。二者都是日本极右势力的典型代表人物。

在安倍晋的前任，也就是上文中提到的日本前首相小泉纯一郎在上任之初，首次在国际政治舞台上的亮相地点选择在美国。2006年10月8日，时任日本首相的安倍晋三，上台仅仅13天，位子都还没有坐热乎，也要急着出访。只是令人意外的是，他出访的首选不是美国，而是中国。

为了更好回顾这段历史，我们不妨参考《东方时事解读·时事简版》2006年10月9日的一段内容（注：网友想要了解那段历史的全部细节，可以阅读两期内容全文，相关内容可在东方时事解读网站查找或向微信客服：silvermask_fdd索取）。原文如下：

……

在东方评论员看来，撇开日本欲“两面下注”的因素之外，在“中欧美俄”的全力角力中，在美国对伊朗、巴基斯坦公开进行核威慑之后、也换来了“中俄”对日本进行核威慑的“事实”，以及日本欲从中俄的核威慑中获取额外利益的动机，这才是安倍晋三愿意“立刻接受”“村山讲话”、并将中国作为其访华第一站，且华盛顿对中日关系缓和“不仅没有异议，反而公开鼓励”的深层原因。

……

在这里，结合朝鲜已经跨入核门槛的事实，我们想补充一点，那就是：朝鲜“悍然”跨入核门槛，当然出于自身的最大利益，而北京指责朝鲜“悍然”跨入核门槛、却又坚持以谈判的方式和平解决问题，且没有任何迹象显示中国有意修改“具军事同盟性质”的《中朝友好条约》，也是出于自己的最大利益，同样，华盛顿在朝鲜核试验之后“保持了一种令人意外的低调”，并严格限制强硬派云集的五角大楼“不准说话”，而将“有关话语权”交给相对温和的美国国务院，由赖斯“全权打理”，这也是出于对形势的清楚认识，也是出于自己的最大利益；而对朝鲜一贯强硬，并就此才得以走红、并终于“上岗”首相宝座的安倍晋三，在听闻朝鲜核爆之后，仅仅说了一句“绝不容许”之后，就紧闭双唇，不再言语，绝口不提军事打击朝鲜的老调。在东方评论员看来，安倍晋三的沉默，更是出于日本保守势力最大利益的考虑，即：日本一方面欲从极可能爆发的东北亚核竞赛中捞取重新武装之战略机会、一方面也不想成为“中美俄”在全球角力中运用核威慑战略的牺牲品。

结合上述回顾，我们想要再次强调的是：

第一，安倍晋三将上任后首次访问选择在中国，带有明显的“量变下注”的投机心态。背景是，其一，日本欲从极可能爆发的东北亚核竞赛中捞取重新武装之战略机会；其二，日本不想成为“中美俄”在全球角力中运用核威慑战略的牺牲品；其三，日本欲从中俄的核威慑中获取额外利益；

1. 在“第一”的基础上，在中国眼中，尽管安倍晋三将上任后首次访问选择在中国，中国仍无法相信日本调整对外政策，尤其是对华政策之诚意，更不会仅凭安倍晋三“上嘴皮子一碰下嘴皮子”就改变自己的对外政策的立场原则；

第三，在“第二”的基础上，安倍访华以失败告终。且在专机落地韩国之际遭遇朝鲜通过第一次核试验为其“送行”（注：当然，本次核试验的主要意图在于响应巴基斯坦方面就美国核威胁对国际社会发出的“公开求救”）。值得一提的是，访华失败后的安倍晋三，极尽反华之能事，屡次在钓鱼岛问题上发起挑衅。比如，2007年2月4日，日方就中国“东方红”2号海洋调查船的正常科考活动（注：钓鱼岛西北约30公里海域）进行无端指责。安倍晋三本人更是在2月6日叫嚣称“钓鱼岛是日本的领土，这个立场在任何情况下，都不会改变”。

2007年9月12日，安倍晋三宣布因个人健康的原因辞去首相一职，暂停政治活动。2012年12月26日，安倍晋三就任日本第96代首相。2014年11月21日，安倍晋三宣布解散众议院，提前两年举行大选。12月14日，安倍晋三得以在众参两院首相提名选举中被选为日本第97代首相。

2014年是一个不安的年份，尤其对中国来说。

早在2015年年初，东方时事解读就反复强调一个观点：欧洲最晚在当年6月份降息。欧洲直到2014年5月都没有降息，结果进入6月份之后欧洲央行突然宣布降息。同样是在2014年初，东方时事解读指出，一旦欧洲央行6月降息，美联储就最早可以在2014年8月开始加息（最后因“七月流火，八月未央”一直拖到了年底）。这两个观点之所以一并提出，是因为在东方时事解读的长期观察与评估中，“这个最晚6月降息与最早8月加息”绝不是单纯的金融政策，而是欧美计划联手、着眼于在南方经济体中的经济、特别是金融的薄弱环节、比如印度与巴西，甚至俄罗斯定向发动攻击、以定向引爆局部金融甚至经济危机，企图“顺势”实质性展开“水淹南方”计划、并同时瞄准中国经济、利用“毒贷款”进行“金融狙击”，从而意图在“水淹南方”初始阶段，令南方经济体中实力最强的中国经济特别是金融无暇他顾！

基于对“毒贷款”的多层次观察，我们把西方邪恶势力决定这么做的时间点确定在2014年年底，西方金融通过“量宽”放出天量流动性、经某些金融手段，比如，通过中国部分地产商海外融资、锁定埋在中国经济运行中的“毒贷款”，并达到数量上的顶峰，也就是需要集中还款的一个高峰。只有欧洲央行“最晚6月份降息”之后才会为“最早8月美联储就可以加息”，也就是发动攻击而腾出“欧美经济特别是金融政策协调”的必要空间。2014年的情况非常危急，东方时事解读一度用“（注：西方邪恶势力）图穷匕见”来描述当时的危险情况，反复强调中国要做最坏打算。我们坚信我们会取得胜利，但是中国即便胜利，也是“惨胜”。

值得一提的是，2015年年初，安倍晋三表示，他今年的二战结束纪念谈话将继承包括“村山谈话”在内的日本历届政府在历史认知问题上的立场。不过，上月20日，安倍又表示不会像村山和前首相小泉纯一郎那样明提日本的“殖民统治与侵略”，也不会就日本过去的侵略明白、直接对相关国家道歉。安倍当时接受日本媒体访问称，他将会继承两位前首相表达的“基本想法”，但“没有必要再写一遍”上述关键措辞。而村山促安倍二战讲话保留“反省歉意”措辞。

结合我们对2014年国际局势对中国何等凶险的相关回顾，当时的日本内部，以安倍和春山为代表，显然在唱一出“双簧”。安倍的讲话用一个词形容，就是模棱两可。在当时日本政府看来，国际局势波谲云诡，中国处境不妙，日本只好“看看再说”，凸显善于投机的日本极右政客本色。

●日本首相石破茂在将近20年后，兜兜转转还是走上了安倍的“旧路”（注：进一步执行“最后一次战略投机”）

安倍晋三的第二任期，我们说起国际政治生命已死，日本对外政策只能运行在“最后一次战略投机”上。从今天日本首相石破茂不得不再考虑玩差不多20年前安倍玩过的“花活”——首访中国来看，自安倍晋三将日本对外政策带上“最后一次战略投机”后，日本的确没有其他选择。所谓“没有其他选择”也体现在安倍之死的问题上。尽管感觉或有杀身之祸降临的安倍晋三，意图通过紧急释放“台湾有事就是日本有事”之言论“求生”，但将其作为“最后一次战略投机”始作俑者看待的美国却杀心已定，除之而后快。

尽管如此，在岸田文雄知道其中成破利害毅然决然“撂挑子”后，在石破茂“过把首相瘾、光宗耀祖”后想要立刻闪人却最终被迫留在首相的位置上后，日本的对外政策仍只能，且更加深度地运行在“最后一次战略投机”之上。而日本战略现状就是，尽管国际局势风云变化，险象环生；尽管美帝日薄西山，气数将尽，但日本政府仍然既得不到中国的信任，更得不到美国的信任。石破茂深知放特朗普“鸽子”的下场，这也是他不愿意做首相的主要原因——事情毕竟要有人去做，毕竟要有人承担，但似乎石破茂已经顾不得这些了。甚至通过强调中日关系“必须保持稳定”公开向中方“索要机票”。

既然石破茂首相已经决定将任内首访放在中国，自然我们对实现石破茂首相的“热切期盼”考虑一二。当然，我们也可以有其他安排，毕竟2025年春节前后真的很忙（注：2025年1月中国已进入“两会节奏”）。正所谓，心诚则灵，情真则明。石破茂首相也可选择2025年2月份首访中国。否则，日方大可等待中国外长礼节性回访（注：中国外长王毅表示，春节后访日）！

●石破茂眼中的“巨大危险”正在临近

在日本首相石破茂急于访华的背后，当然是日本感受到了巨大的恐惧，在非传统安全层面恐怕是“金融断尾”，而传统安全层面则更加直接，那就是日本是否会成为“韩国第二”，成为“炮灰”。尽管日本从美国国家利益之全球战略两大战略支柱之西太安全框架的稳定性角度思考，美国牺牲日本的可能性不是很高，但恐怕也不能排除，毕竟有“叙利亚再乱”（注：阿萨德政权被颠覆）殷鉴不远。尽管没人知道还有不到20天就要下台的拜登政府因美国内部恶斗升级会疯狂到何种程度；尽管石破茂甚至如此做个人风险急剧飙升，但似乎他已经顾不上了。

如果说面对朝鲜第一次核试验，安倍晋三总体保持沉默，更是出于日本保守势力最大利益的考虑，那么今天石破茂甘当个人风险也要将任期首选放在中国，恐怕也是如此。

值得一提的是，随着对韩国总统尹锡悦逮捕令的发出，8名法官已经上任，尽管拜登政府（美军）还在拖时间（注：韩国专案组和尹锡悦的保安处（韩军，实际上就是美军）拔枪相向，所以，即便通过弹劾，想要逮捕尹锡悦也势比登天），但只要拜登没“摔杯为号”，朝鲜半岛很可能就此战云密布。一旦如此，日本很可能被推上前台。

甚至在我们看来，某种意义上，日本若被迫卷入朝鲜问题所承受的战略风险比卷入台湾问题更巨大。别的不说，日本首先就要面对“任何以武力方式解决朝鲜问题，后果均不可想象”的中国，与朝鲜签订有军事同盟条约的俄罗斯，以及自身就是有核国家的朝鲜，这三个有核国家，两个核大国、核强国的怒火。

●获得独立于美国之外的能源通道成为欧盟（注：老欧洲）的心腹大事

在讨论的最后，让我们把焦点转向中东局势。

值得大家注意的是，目前，以色列强化了对胡塞武装的军事打击力度。值得注意的是，拜登政府对于协助以色列强化对胡塞武装军事打击，更多是要借此刺激伊朗，进一步恶化伊朗与以色列之间的双边关系，将局势向两国直接开战，甚至美军被迫亲自“下水”的方向推动，所以，拜登政府更多是只做不说。相比之下，特朗普协助以色列强化对胡塞武装军事打击，更多是为了死死压住伊朗、进而助以色列一臂之力获得“大胜”，这对特朗普上任伊始可能获得一个较为理想的中东局势大有好处，所以，特朗普更多是只说不做。

此外，还值得大家注意的是，法国（注：代表欧盟，也是“老欧洲”核心成员）对叙境内“伊斯兰国”目标发动军事打击这一动向。在我们看来，这或是欧盟要与土耳其在叙利亚局势后续发展问题上进一步展开合作的具体表现。欧盟急于夺取叙利亚这个“中东十字路口”的控制权，但这显然动了“美国的奶酪”。

值得一提的是，面对仍没有明确结束日程表的俄乌战争，面对日益严峻的经济形势，欧洲在能源供应上越来越依赖美国，而美国为了让自己的石油和天然气卖个好价钱，在封堵欧洲能源其他通道、促进欧盟对美国能源依赖等问题上可谓无所不用其极。而价格越来越高的美国能源让欧洲制造业苦不堪言（注：再加上中国对美国施行的“长臂管辖”式制裁），纷纷外逃。所以，获得独立于美国之外的能源通道成为欧盟（注：老欧洲）的心腹大事。

无独有偶，恰在这个档口儿，我们注意到蒙古国与法国奥拉诺公司达成16亿美元铀矿协议的新闻报道。

在我们看来，法国在蒙古国找铀矿，也是为了寻找独立于美国之外的能源通道，在政治上颇有“投石问路”之意。由于蒙古只与中国和俄罗斯接壤，所以，如果这一合作能够落实，要么走“俄罗斯通道”，要么走“中国通道”。但实际情况是，“俄罗斯通道”运力有限，所以，现实的可行性方案只有走“中国通道”。基于此，法国在叙利亚罕见打击ISIS（注：美国支持）消息的传出，是否意味着中、欧、俄可以在叙利亚局势后续发展中找到合适的合作点，大家不妨密切关注。如果合作可行，恐怕首先嗨翻了的是沙特，土耳其等中东国家的能源供应商——他们的能源有可能从叙利亚装船一路进入欧洲。

●印度对外政策开始和美国拉开距离，有利于安定南亚的大气氛形成

除了中东局势外，我们也提请大家注意南亚局势的一些微妙变化。

巴基斯坦外交部发言人12月29日表示，巴基斯坦希望与印度重启建设性接触和对话，以解决所有悬而未决的双边问题，其中包括克什米尔争端问题。

近几天，中国持续“爆兵”发出的明确信号之一就是，美帝的军事霸权正在迅速崩塌，而附着其上的其他霸权也在迅速凋零，任何方面做出决策务必要基于长远打算。

大家知道，近段时间，印度和西方国家关系交恶，有意和中国缓和关系。印度对此前中巴“勇士-8”联合反恐演习整体态度上也比较低调。如果局势慢慢出现，总体上中伊，尤其是中俄关系进一步靠近的情况，尤其在我们建议俄罗斯和伊朗要从“上合有效重启”层面重回叙利亚的背景下去观察，印度对外政策或也会出现类似日本那样的微妙变化（注：日本如此反水，印度是看得满眼）。在我们看来，显然新闻报道的内容有利于“安定南亚”，对此我们表示欢迎。印度对外政策开始和美国拉开距离，有利于安定南亚的大气氛形成。如果印度方面对巴基斯坦提出的建议没有异议，“安定南亚”的趋势就算正式启动了。

【相关话题】

第7647期－透过简单回顾“地中海计划”，小谈为什么欧盟如此积极地介入叙利亚局势的后续发展（2024-12-22）
第7550期－从雅尔塔体系的“前世今生”，小谈，为何包括日、印、韩、中东等国家在内的方方面面都不希望看到伊朗就此倒下（2024-11-22）
第7681期－日本外相访华反省错误国策，与1995年“村山谈话”以及1997年亚洲金融危机有何可比性？（2024-12-31）

声明：具体内容如有出入，请以“东方时事解读”音频为准。

Looking Back at the Adjustments and Changes in Foreign (and China) Policy During the Koizumi and Abe Eras, and Discussing Why Ishiba Shigeru 's Government is so Eager to Initiate a Visit to China

[Media Reports]

On December 29, Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru once again expressed his willingness to visit China and emphasized that Sino-Japanese relations "must remain stable." Several Japanese government sources revealed on the 30th that Ishiba Shigeru plans to postpone his originally scheduled visit to the United States in mid-January.

On December 29, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that Pakistan hopes to restart constructive engagement and dialogue with India to resolve all outstanding bilateral issues, including the Kashmir dispute.

On December 31, French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced that France has targeted positions held by the "Islamic State" organization in Syria within the framework of the international anti-jihadist coalition. This is the first such operation since the fall of Bashar al-Assad.

[Discussion Summary]

●If Ishiba Shigeru chooses China for his first overseas visit in his new term, China may consider "issuing him a ticket"; otherwise, he might as well not come!

On December 29, Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru reiterated his desire to visit China and stressed the need for "stability in Sino-Japanese relations." Several Japanese government sources revealed on the 30th that Ishiba Shigeru plans to postpone his originally scheduled visit to the United States in mid-January.

It is evident that Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru has expressed a strong desire to visit China, but China has yet to extend an invitation. The recent visit to China by Japan's Foreign Minister to reflect on "Japan's past mistaken national policies and the need to avoid repeating them by adhering to the path of a peaceful nation" was primarily intended to secure an invitation for Ishiba Shigeru's visit to China.

In our view, the reason China has not invited Ishiba Shigeru is that Japan should first clarify its stance. If Japan urgently seeks economic survival through China, it needs to demonstrate a sincere attitude. On this issue, Japan should first clarify its stance on whether Ishiba Shigeru will choose the United States or China for his first overseas visit at the beginning of his 103rd prime ministerial term. In other words, if Ishiba Shigeru chooses China for his first foreign visit, China may consider "issuing him a ticket." Otherwise, he might as well not come!

Japan's foreign policy, especially its policy towards China, has long been characterized by opportunism, closely linked to the evolution of the international situation and the state of Japan's economy.

In our previous discussion, we mentioned that Japan, fearing a joint attack from Europe and the United States (starting with the Plaza Accord, which led to a lost decade for the Japanese economy), and sensing another concerted financial attack (the 1997 Asian financial crisis), adjusted its foreign policy, particularly towards China, with the "Haruyama Doctrine" in 1995. The tone of the recent visit to China by Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya echoes the "Haruyama Doctrine."

Following the 1997 financial crisis, Japan's industrial presence in Southeast Asia suffered catastrophic blows, resulting in significant economic losses. To revive the battered Japanese economy, then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited China in 2001. Notably, Koizumi requested a visit to the Museum of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan, located near the Lugou Bridge in Fengtai District, Beijing. Afterwards, Koizumi did not make any speeches or statements, leaving only the two characters "Chuju" (loyalty and forgiveness), signifying Japan's commitment to adhering to the spirit of the "Haruyama Doctrine." Although Japan had shown a clear intention to adjust its foreign policy, especially towards China, at that time, it had many other ideas. For example, using the Korean Peninsula as a "springboard" and the vast Chinese market as a "hinterland" to revive the Japanese economy.

●Shinzo Abe: A Typical Representative Figure in Japan's Foreign Policy, Especially in Adjusting Its Policy Towards China

Among Japanese politicians active in changing and adjusting Japan's foreign policy, especially towards China, besides Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe stands out. Both are typical representatives of Japan's far-right forces.

Junichiro Koizumi, the predecessor of Shinzo Abe, chose the United States as his first international political stage appearance when he took office. On October 8, 2006, just 13 days after taking office and before his seat had even warmed up, Shinzo Abe, the then-Prime Minister of Japan, was eager to make a foreign visit. Surprisingly, his first choice was not the United States but China.

To better recall this history, we can refer to a passage from the October 9, 2006 edition of "Oriental Review - Brief Edition" (Note: For the full details of this historical period, readers can access the full content of the two editions on the Oriental Review website or request them from the WeChat customer service: silvermask_fdd). The original text is as follows:

...

From the perspective of Eastern commentators, setting aside Japan's desire to "hedge its bets," amidst the full-on power struggle among "China, Europe, the United States, and Russia," and following the United States' public nuclear deterrence against Iran and Pakistan, this has been met with the "fact" of "China and Russia" engaging in nuclear deterrence against Japan. Additionally, Japan's motivation to seek additional benefits from China and Russia's nuclear deterrence is the underlying reason why Shinzo Abe was willing to "immediately accept" the "Murayama Statement" and make China his first stop during his visit, and why Washington not only had "no objections" to the easing of Sino-Japanese relations but also "publicly encouraged" it.

...

Here, in light of the fact that North Korea has crossed the nuclear threshold, we would like to add that North Korea's "bold" step into the nuclear arena was undoubtedly taken in its own best interest. While Beijing criticized North Korea for "boldly" crossing this threshold, it insisted on resolving the issue peacefully through negotiations, and there is no indication that China intends to revise the "military alliance-like" Sino-North Korean Friendship Treaty. This too was done in China's own best interest. Similarly, Washington's "surprisingly low-key" response after North Korea's nuclear test, along with strictly limiting the hawkish Pentagon from "speaking out" and entrusting the "relevant discourse power" to the relatively moderate U.S. State Department, with Condoleezza Rice "taking full charge," was also based on a clear understanding of the situation and in its own best interest. As for Shinzo Abe, who has always been tough on North Korea and gained popularity, ultimately ascending to the position of Prime Minister on this platform, after hearing about North Korea's nuclear detonation, he merely said "it will never be tolerated" and then clamped his lips shut, refraining from repeating his old rhetoric of military strikes against North Korea. In the view of Eastern commentators, Abe's silence is also in the best interest of Japan's conservative forces, namely: Japan, on the one hand, wants to seize the strategic opportunity to rearm itself from the potentially erupting nuclear competition in Northeast Asia, and on the other hand, does not want to become a sacrifice in the global power struggle among "China, the United States, and Russia" employing nuclear deterrence strategies.

Based on the above review, we would like to emphasize once again:

Firstly, Shinzo Abe chose China as the destination for his first overseas visit after taking office, with a clear speculative mindset of "betting on quantitative changes". The background to this is threefold: firstly, Japan seeks to seize the strategic opportunity to rearm itself amidst the potential outbreak of a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia; secondly, Japan does not want to become a sacrifice in the global power struggle among China, the United States, and Russia, where nuclear deterrence strategies are employed; thirdly, Japan aims to gain additional benefits from the nuclear deterrence of China and Russia.

Secondly, based on the first point, in China's view, despite Shinzo Abe choosing China for his first overseas visit after taking office, China still cannot trust Japan's sincerity in adjusting its foreign policy, especially towards China, and will not change its foreign policy stance and principles solely based on Abe's "lip service".

Thirdly, based on the second point, Abe's visit to China ended in failure. Moreover, upon his plane landing in South Korea, North Korea "saw him off" with its first nuclear test (Note: Of course, the primary intention of this nuclear test was to respond to Pakistan's "public plea" to the international community regarding US nuclear threats). It is worth mentioning that after the failed visit to China, Abe went to great lengths to provoke China on the Diaoyu Island issue. For example, on February 4, 2007, Japan made unfounded accusations against China's "Dongfanghong-2" oceanographic research vessel for its normal scientific research activities (Note: in waters about 30 kilometers northwest of the Diaoyu Island). Abe himself even boasted on February 6 that "the Diaoyu Island is Japanese territory, and this stance will not change under any circumstances."

On September 12, 2007, Shinzo Abe announced his resignation as Prime Minister due to personal health reasons and suspended his political activities. On December 26, 2012, Shinzo Abe became the 96th Prime Minister of Japan. On November 21, 2014, Abe announced the dissolution of the House of Representatives and called for a general election two years ahead of schedule. On December 14, Abe was elected as the 97th Prime Minister of Japan in the prime ministerial nomination elections held by both the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors.

2014 was a troubled year, especially for China.

Early in 2015, East News Interpretation repeatedly emphasized a viewpoint: Europe would cut interest rates by June at the latest. Europe had not cut interest rates by May 2014, but suddenly announced a rate cut in June. Also in early 2014, East News Interpretation pointed out that once the European Central Bank cut interest rates in June, the Federal Reserve could start raising interest rates as early as August 2014 (ultimately delayed until the end of the year due to "the heat of July and the lingering August"). These two viewpoints were proposed together because, in the long-term observation and assessment of East News Interpretation, "this latest June rate cut and earliest August rate hike" were by no means simple financial policies, but a joint plan by Europe and the United States to target and launch attacks on the economic, particularly financial, vulnerabilities of southern economies, such as India, Brazil, and even Russia, in an attempt to substantially unfold the "flooding the South" plan and simultaneously aim at the Chinese economy, using "toxic loans" for "financial sniper attacks," thereby intending to make the strongest southern economy, China, particularly its financial sector, preoccupied during the initial stage of "flooding the South"!

Based on multi-level observations of "toxic loans," we determined that the time point at which western evil forces decided to do so was at the end of 2014. Western finance released astronomical liquidity through "quantitative easing" and, through certain financial means, such as overseas financing by some Chinese real estate developers, locked in "toxic loans" embedded in China's economic operation, reaching a peak in quantity, which is a peak in the need for concentrated repayment. Only after the European Central Bank's "latest June rate cut" would it create the necessary space for "coordination between European and American economic and particularly financial policies" for the "earliest August Fed rate hike," that is, to launch an attack. The situation in 2014 was extremely critical, and East News Interpretation once used the phrase "revealing the dagger at the end of the map" to describe the dangerous situation at the time, repeatedly emphasizing that China needed to prepare for the worst. We believed that we would triumph, but even if China won, it would be a "Pyrrhic victory."

It is worth mentioning that in early 2015, Shinzo Abe stated that his speech on the anniversary of the end of World War II would inherit the position of previous Japanese governments, including the "Murayama Statement," on historical cognition issues. However, on the 20th of last month, Abe said he would not explicitly mention Japan's "colonial rule and aggression" like Murayama and former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, nor would he apologize directly and clearly to relevant countries for Japan's past aggression. Abe stated in an interview with Japanese media at the time that he would inherit the "basic ideas" expressed by the two former prime ministers, but there was "no need to rewrite" those key phrases. And Murayama urged Abe to retain the wording of "reflection and apology" in his speech on World War II.

Combining our review of how perilous the international situation was for China in 2014, it is evident that within Japan at that time, represented by Abe and Haruyama, they were clearly performing a "duet." Abe's speech can be described in one word: ambiguous. In the view of the Japanese government at that time, the international situation was full of intrigue and China was in a precarious position, so Japan had no choice but to "wait and see," highlighting the true colors of Japanese far-right politicians adept at speculation.

●Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, after nearly 20 years, has once again embarked on Abe's "old path" (Note: further implementing the "last strategic gamble").

During Shinzo Abe's second term, we said that his international political life was over, and Japan's foreign policy could only operate on the basis of the "last strategic gamble." Judging from the fact that Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru has no choice but to consider playing the same "tricks" that Abe played almost 20 years ago—making his first foreign visit to China—it is evident that since Shinzo Abe steered Japan's foreign policy towards the "last strategic gamble," Japan indeed has no other options. The phrase "no other options" is also reflected in the issue of Abe's death. Although Abe, sensing the impending threat to his life, attempted to "survive" by urgently declaring that "if there is trouble in Taiwan, there will be trouble in Japan," the United States, which viewed him as the originator of the "last strategic gamble," had already made up its mind to eliminate him and could not wait to do so.

Nevertheless, after Fumio Kishida understood the pros and cons and resolutely "abandoned his responsibilities," and after Ishiba Shigeru, who "wanted to have a taste of being prime minister and bring honor to his ancestors," tried to leave immediately but was ultimately forced to stay in the position of prime minister, Japan's foreign policy still can only, and even more deeply, operate on the basis of the "last strategic gamble." Japan's strategic situation is such that despite the ever-changing and perilous international situation, and despite the declining power of the American empire, the Japanese government still cannot earn the trust of either China or the United States. Ishiba Shigeru is well aware of the consequences of "letting Trump down," which is also the main reason he was reluctant to become prime minister—someone has to do the job, someone has to take responsibility, but it seems that Ishiba Shigeru can no longer afford to care about these things. He even publicly "asked for a ticket" from China by emphasizing that Sino-Japanese relations "must remain stable."

Since Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru has decided to make his first foreign visit during his term to China, naturally, we will consider fulfilling his "earnest expectation." Of course, we can also make other arrangements, especially since we are really busy around the Spring Festival in 2025 (Note: China will enter the "rhythm of the Two Sessions" in January 2025). As the saying goes, sincerity brings success, and genuine feelings bring clarity. Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru can also choose to make his first foreign visit to China in February 2025. Otherwise, Japan can simply wait for a courtesy visit from China's foreign minister (Note: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that he will visit Japan after the Spring Festival)!

● The "Immense Danger" in Ishiba Shigeru's Eyes is Approaching

Behind Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru's urgent visit to China lies, of course, Japan's immense fear. In terms of non-traditional security, it may be "financial amputation," while in traditional security terms, it is even more direct: whether Japan will become the "second Korea" and serve as "cannon fodder." Although Japan believes that from the perspective of the stability of the Western Pacific security framework, one of the two strategic pillars of the US global strategy for national interests, the likelihood of the US sacrificing Japan is not very high, it cannot be ruled out either, given the recent precedent of "Syria's chaos" (Note: the overthrow of the Assad regime). Nobody knows how far the Biden administration, which will step down in less than 20 days, will go in its escalating internal strife; despite the sharply rising personal risks for Ishiba Shigeru, he seems to be past caring.

If Shinzo Abe largely remained silent in the face of North Korea's first nuclear test, out of consideration for the greatest interests of Japan's conservative forces, then Ishiba Shigeru's willingness to take personal risks and prioritize China during his term is probably driven by similar considerations.

It's worth mentioning that with the issuance of an arrest warrant for South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol, eight judges have taken office. Although the Biden administration (US military) is still stalling for time (Note: The South Korean special prosecution team and Yoon's security detail (South Korean military, effectively the US military) are at gunpoint, so even if Yoon is impeached, arresting him will be extremely difficult), as long as Biden doesn't "give the signal," the Korean Peninsula is likely to be shrouded in war clouds. If this happens, Japan may be pushed to the forefront.

We even believe that, in a sense, the strategic risks Japan would face if forced to become involved in the North Korean issue are greater than those of becoming involved in the Taiwan issue. For starters, Japan would have to confront China, which warns that "any attempt to resolve the North Korean issue through military means would have unimaginable consequences," Russia, which has a military alliance treaty with North Korea, and North Korea itself, a nuclear-weapon state. These three nuclear-weapon states, including two major nuclear powers, would be enraged.

● Securing Energy Channels Independent of the US has Become a Top Priority for the EU (Note: Old Europe)

In the final part of our discussion, let's turn our focus to the situation in the Middle East.

It's worth noting that currently, Israel has intensified its military strikes against the Houthis. It's noteworthy that the Biden administration's assistance to Israel in intensifying its military strikes against the Houthis is more about provoking Iran and further deteriorating bilateral relations between Iran and Israel, pushing the situation towards a direct war between the two countries, or even forcing the US military to "get involved." Therefore, the Biden administration is more of a "doer rather than a talker." In contrast, Trump's assistance to Israel in intensifying its military strikes against the Houthis was more about firmly suppressing Iran and helping Israel achieve a "decisive victory," which would be beneficial for Trump to secure a relatively desirable Middle East situation at the beginning of his term. Therefore, Trump was more of a "talker rather than a doer."

Furthermore, it's also worth noting France's (Note: representing the EU and a core member of "Old Europe") military strikes against ISIS targets in Syria. In our view, this may be a concrete manifestation of the EU's intention to further cooperate with Turkey on the subsequent development of the situation in Syria. The EU is eager to seize control of Syria, the "crossroads of the Middle East," but this clearly encroaches on "America's cheese."

It's worth mentioning that in the face of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war without a clear end date and an increasingly severe economic situation, Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on the US for energy supplies. To sell its oil and natural gas at a good price, the US has spared no effort to block other energy channels for Europe and promote the EU's dependence on US energy. The increasingly expensive US energy has plagued European manufacturing (Note: coupled with China's "long-arm jurisdiction" sanctions against the US), causing many to relocate. Therefore, securing energy channels independent of the US has become a top priority for the EU (Note: Old Europe).

Coincidentally, at this juncture, we have noticed news reports of a $1.6 billion uranium mining agreement between Mongolia and France's Orano company.

In our view, France's search for uranium mines in Mongolia is also a political "test of the waters" to find energy channels independent of the US. Since Mongolia borders only China and Russia, if this cooperation can be implemented, it would either have to go through the "Russian channel" or the "Chinese channel." However, the reality is that the "Russian channel" has limited transport capacity, so the only feasible option is the "Chinese channel." Based on this, the rare news of France striking ISIS (Note: supported by the US) in Syria raises the question of whether China, Europe, and Russia can find suitable cooperation points in the subsequent development of the situation in Syria. Everyone is advised to pay close attention. If cooperation is feasible, it would likely delight energy suppliers from Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as their energy could be shipped to Europe via Syria.

● India's Foreign Policy is Starting to Distance Itself from the US, Conducive to Forming a Stable Atmosphere in South Asia

Apart from the situation in the Middle East, we also draw your attention to some subtle changes in the situation in South Asia.

On December 29, the spokesperson for the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Pakistan hopes to resume constructive engagement and dialogue with India to resolve all outstanding bilateral issues, including the Kashmir dispute.

In recent days, China's continuous "military buildup" has sent a clear signal that the US military hegemony is rapidly collapsing, and other forms of hegemony attached to it are also rapidly withering away. Any decision-making must be based on long-term considerations.

As we all know, recently, India's relations with Western countries have soured, and it has shown interest in mending ties with China. India has also maintained a relatively low-key attitude towards the recent "Warrior-8" joint counter-terrorism exercise between China and Pakistan. If the situation gradually evolves, with overall closer relations between China and Iran, and especially between China and Russia, and especially when observed in the context of our suggestion that Russia and Iran should return to Syria from the perspective of "effectively restarting the SCO," India's foreign policy may also undergo subtle changes similar to those of Japan (Note: Japan's betrayal is evident to India). In our view, the content of the news report is conducive to "stabilizing South Asia," which we welcome. India's foreign policy is starting to distance itself from the US, conducive to forming a stable atmosphere in South Asia. If India has no objections to Pakistan's proposal, the trend of "stabilizing South Asia" will be officially launched.

[Related Topics]

Issue 7647 - A Brief Review of the "Mediterranean Plan" to Discuss Why the EU is Actively Involved in the Subsequent Development of the Situation in Syria (2024-12-22)
Issue 7550 - From the "Past and Present" of the Yalta System, a Discussion on Why Various Parties, Including Japan, India, South Korea, and Middle Eastern Countries, do not Want to See Iran Fall (2024-11-22)
Issue 7681 - Japan's Foreign Minister's Visit to China to Reflect on Erroneous National Policies: What are the Similarities with the "Murayama Statement" of 1995 and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997? (2024-12-31)

Disclaimer: In case of any discrepancies in the specific content, please refer to the 'Eastern Current Affairs Interpretation Audio' for the most accurate information.

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